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This dissertation argues that Baptist churches served as important legal sites in the trans-
Appalachian West from the Revolutionary period to the outbreak of the Civil War.  By 
looking at how members and non-members approached their local churches for matters of 
dispute resolution over time and space, it illuminates a local legal culture transforming 
under the pressures of legal, economic, religious, and cultural change.  Legislative 
enactments and new understandings of the family gradually weakened churches’ 
authority over their members’ domestic relations.  An expanding market-economy 
necessitating predictable and presumably neutral dispute resolution led many to decry 
their churches’ factionalist-produced decrees.  Some churches refused to get involved 
with messy economic disputes and sanctioned members’ resort to state-based law.  
Others emerged as sites through which whites strengthened the region’s consolidating 
racial hierarchy, disproportionately focusing their disciplinary proceedings at their black 
brethren.  Furthermore, religious dissension wrecked trans-Appalachian Baptist churches 
during the 1820s and 1830s, leading to a decline in disciplinary activities.  Divided by 





opened the door for state authorities to meddle in ecclesiastical affairs.  In the end, this 
dissertation contends that the persistence of churches’ law-producing operations during 
the post-Revolutionary period—and the practice’s later diminishment during the 
antebellum era—shaped the contours of American religious and civil authority and held 









 “[O]ur only object…is to bring our difficulties to a close & to restore peace & 
good feelings with the members as well as with the neighbours [sic].”1 
 
 
 “I think it’s a mistake for any country,” Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal 
insisted in January 2015, “to allow the development of areas within their country, 
whether it’s neighborhoods or other areas, where the same laws, the same values, the 
same rules, simply don’t apply.” Speaking to a conservative think-tank in London, Jindal 
was referring to “no-go zones” purportedly set up by Muslim extremists in the United 
States and Britain in an effort “to colonize Western countries.”  Such “no-go zones,” the 
author Steven Emerson had told Fox News nine days prior to Jindal’s comments, barred 
non-Muslims and relied on religious authorities to enforce faith-based laws.  Claiming 
there was “no credible information” to support Emerson’s claims, Fox News ran an on-air 
retraction just days later. Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron simply responded by 
calling Emerson a “complete idiot.” This did not sway Jindal.  He insisted the “huge 
issue” was that such groups “want to come to our country but not adopt our values,” that 
they desired “to set apart their own enclaves and hold onto their own values.”  Jindal’s
                                                          
1
 An 1834 “Remonstrance” to Pastor James Fishback signed by John Curd and his fellow dissenters from 
the Mt. Vernon Baptist Church in Woodford County, Kentucky.  See, Bennett et al Trustees of the Mt. 
Vernon Church vs. Curd et al (1836) Folder 2, Box 69, Case 7914, Court of Justice, Woodford Circuit Case 





 comments only add to recent debates over sharia law’s influence in American 
communities.
1
   
Yet Jindal’s remarks also echoed fears expressed over two hundred years ago by 
Virginia’s colonial authorities as they faced the growth of the Baptists, a group whose 
first churches in the Old Dominion had been planted by outsiders.  In the late 1750s, 
Regular Baptists from Pennsylvania and Separate Baptists from New England migrated 
south and began proselytizing in the countryside of Virginia. Over the next two decades, 
these preachers set up dozens of churches, religious enclaves that challenged the existing 
social and religious order.  While extending spiritual equality to all members regardless 
of their race or sex, Baptists also eschewed the dancing, pre-occupation with social rank, 
and the ostentatious dress of the Virginia gentry. Moreover, Baptists’ “bizarre” practices 
of full-body immersion and internal discipline stoked animosity among all ranks of their 
Anglican neighbors.
2
 One historian notes that pockets of “rather thick Baptist dissent” 
appeared in areas where the preachers gained a foothold.
3
  As their ministers shunned 
civil authority by preaching without a license, and as their churches attracted a greater 
number of adherents, state authorities and Anglican Church leaders often labeled the 
upstart Baptists as “disturbers of the peace.”  One irate magistrate even charged a group 
                                                          
1
 For quotes see, Carlo Angerer, “Bobby Jindal Says West Allows Muslims to Set Up 'No-Go Zones',” NBC 
News, 19 January 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/bobby-jindal-says-west-allows-muslims-set-
no-go-zones-n289011. Accessed January 20, 2015; Associated Press, “Jindal: Muslims Form 'No-Go 
Zones' Outside Civic Control,” New York Times, 19 January 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/19/us/politics/ap-us-gop-2016-jindal.html?_r=0, Accessed 
January 20, 2015; On recent statutes against Sharia law, see, Kimberly Karseboom, “Sharia Law and 
America: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting the Consideration of Sharia Law in American Courts,” 10 
Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 663 (Summer 2012). 
2
 Christine Leigh Heyrman, Southern Cross: The Beginnings of the Bible Belt (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1997), 15-22. 
3
 Jewel L. Spangler, Virginians Reborn: Anglican Monopoly, Evangelical Dissent, and the Rise of the 
Baptists in the Late Eighteenth Century (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 77-78, 81-83, 
105 (quote).  There were doctrinal differences between Separate and Regular Baptists, though they were 





of Baptist preachers with “carrying on a mutiny against the authority of the land.”4 Many 
dissident Baptists joined other Euro-American migrants during the 1770s and 1780s and 
settled the region that became the states of Kentucky and Tennessee.  By the time 
Thomas Jefferson’s religious freedom bill became law in Virginia in 1786, trans-
Appalachian Baptists had already begun constructing an expansive institutional network 
of churches and associations which sought to regulate their budding communities through 
the ritual of discipline.   
This study examines Baptists’ practice of church discipline in Kentucky and 
Tennessee from the Revolutionary period until the outbreak of the Civil War.  Individuals 
used their churches as legal sites, and participated in a capacious legal culture that 
extended beyond state institutions to local church meetinghouses.  Baptists practiced 
discipline at their monthly Saturday business gatherings.  After prayer, the moderator 
enquired into the “peace” of the church, opening the door for members to air grievances 
or bring another’s (or their own) moral transgressions to light. This transformed the 
assembled brethren from a worshiping community to a church tribunal, law-producing 
actors pursuing their neighborhoods’ harmonious social relations. While churches 
punished moral transgressors for drunkenness, fornication, and profane swearing, they 
also arbitrated more serious civil disputes over slave sales, business contracts, and 
probate matters.  Members formed investigative committees to “labor” with the involved 
parties or interview relevant witnesses.  Churches required transgressors to make 
“satisfaction” for their offences or face suspension or exclusion from the church body.  
At times, in breach of covenant and trespass cases, churches decreed monetary awards or 
                                                          
4
 Quoted in, Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North 





commitments of future service to the offended party. They also provided authoritative 
recourse for groups, including women and blacks, who lacked legal standing or 
personhood in the eyes of state law.  Although over time, such opportunities were 
dampened as whites used church discipline to help solidify the region’s racial hierarchy, 
Baptist churches still served as instrumental legal sites through which members, and at 
times non-members, created law for their communities.   
In the last two generations, legal historians, focusing largely on small New 
England communities, argued that during the colonial and immediate post-Revolutionary 
periods, the courthouse became the primary arena for dispute resolution.  The 
professionalization and formalization of the colonial legal system—facilitated by an 
expanding commercial economy and an increase of disputes which stretched across town 
and county borders—led Americans to seek recourse through courts rather than 
churches.
5
  Alternatively, social and religious historians, of the South and West, while 
disagreeing over whether or not discipline served as a social-control mechanism, have 
pointed to the persistence of church-based arbitration, especially among evangelical 
                                                          
5
Bruce H. Mann, Neighbors and Strangers: Law and Community in Early Connecticut (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1987); William E. Nelson, Dispute and Conflict Resolution in 
Plymouth County, Massachusetts, 1725-1825 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); 
David Thomas Konig, Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts, Essex County, 1629-1692 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Women Before the Bar: Gender, Law, 
& Society in Connecticut, 1639-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Peter 
Charles Hoffer, Law and People in Colonial America: Revised Edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998); Legal scholar Christopher Tomlins has argued that during the early-nineteenth 
century, law became the “modality of rule” for Americans.  See, Tomlins, Law, Labor and Ideology in the 
Early American Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Historian Mark D. McGarvie, in 
his investigation of the process of disestablishment, agrees with Tomlins’s assertion, arguing that law, as a 
modality of rule, led to the triumph of common-law contract doctrine over Christian ethics, and the judge 
and court replaced the minister and church tribunal as social arbiter.  See Mark Douglas McGarvie, One 
Nation Under Law: America’s Early National Struggles to Separate Church and State (Dekalb: Northern 





groups, well into the nineteenth century.
6
 These studies only passingly note change over 
time in disciplinary procedures, and generally do not delve into church-state issues.
7
  
Recent scholarship has insisted that we examine the separation of church and state not as 
a clean break, but rather as a process rooted in law and culture.  This literature contends 
that disestablishment was entangled with a broader, cultural re-conceptualization of 
churches as private institutions apart from roles of civil government. Primarily focusing 
                                                          
6Strict disciplinary practices persisted in the South and West “long after New England Congregationalists 
abandoned the practice in the mid-eighteenth century.”  See Randy Sparks, On Jordan’s Stormy Banks: 
Evangelicalism in Mississippi, 1773-1876 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994), 146-147; Scholars 
disagree as to whether church tribunals were sites for social control.  See, for example, Monica Najar, 
Evangelizing the South: A Social History of Church and State in Early America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).  Najar looks at church disciplinary proceedings in the Upper South—Virginia, 
North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee—focusing especially on how church bodies exerted their 
authority within individual households (thus challenging the authority of the household head) but also how 
church discipline “eased the progress of the market economy” for members and provided a “version of 
‘citizenship’” for women and free and enslaved blacks. See p. 90 for quotes; Janet Moore Lindman, in 
Bodies of Belief: Baptist Community in Early America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2008), 91, examines Baptist churches in the mid-Atlantic region, noting that “as a means of social control, 
the church courts set standards of conduct for all members.”  Lindman focuses less on the opportunities 
church tribunals presented to subordinate groups, and more on the top-down imposition of church rules, 
insisting that church elders decided upon and enforced church regulations; In Religion and the Making Of 
Nat Turner’s Virginia: Baptist Community and Conflict, 1740-1840 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 2008), 169, Randolph Scully contends that among southeastern Virginia Baptists during the early-
nineteenth century, “despite white male control over the institution of church discipline, the process never 
became a straightforward application of social control,” as all members fell under the church’s jurisdiction;  
Similarly, Sparks, in On Jordan’s Stormy Banks,164-168, devotes a full chapter to the disciplinary 
practices of evangelical churches in Mississippi and argues that no member, black or white, free or 
enslaved, was exempt from church disciplinary proceedings, although blacks were “disciplined at a rate 
higher than their percentage of membership in some churches.”  Instead of solely a matter of social control, 
Sparks concludes on page 148, church discipline was “an effort to foster self-control, a crucial attribute in a 
republican society”; Gregory A. Wills, in Democratic Religion: Freedom, Authority, and Church 
Discipline in the Baptist South, 1785-1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 9-10, 117, notes 
that in some areas of Georgia where his study is focused, discipline continued into the early twentieth 
century.  He also argues that church discipline was less about social control and more about ecclesiastical 
control. 
7An exception is Monica Najar’s Evangelizing the South, which seeks to demonstrate how Baptist churches 
in the Upper South reshaped gender and race and “assisted in reformulating the lines between the 
‘religious’ and ‘secular’ realms with significant consequences for religion, slavery, and the emerging 
nation-state.”  See p. 4.  Najar’s examination, however, does not move past the first decade of the 





on court rulings and legislative actions to highlight disestablishment’s process, it does 
not, however, consider how churches’ legal operations contributed to this development.8 
Indeed, previous approaches confine “law” to the province of the state and ignore 
or depreciate the alternative legal systems rooted in church-based arbitration. They 
overlook how many early-nineteenth-century Americans participated in an expansive 
legal landscape.  This study argues that for church members, and even some non-
members, church discipline was the practice of law.  It illuminates a broader legal 
culture—how, when, where, and why individuals interacted with one legal site rather 
than another—in the early United States, and demonstrates how transformations in law, 
economy, and religion led individuals’ to re-conceptualize their churches’ role in matters 
of dispute resolution and moral regulation. Thus, it shows how the cultural process of 
separating church from state evolved amidst the more routine disciplinary actions of local 
churches and through legislation and court decrees emanating from statehouses.
9
   
Church meetinghouses served as sites of legal contestation, and records of such 
disputes provide glimpses of how individuals at the local level interacted with governing 
authority and constructed their legal culture. Historians have recently shifted the focus 
from “mandarin” texts of the legal elite and away from statehouses, highlighting how law 
arises in a variety of sites and through myriad social interactions.  Legal Scholar Ariela 
                                                          
8
 McGarvie, One Nation Under Law; Sarah Barringer Gordon, "The First Disestablishment: Limits on 
Church Power and Property Before the Civil War," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 162, no. 2 
(January, 2014), 309, 311.  For a recent discussion of the process of disestablishment in the nineteenth 
century, with a particular focus on legislative enactments, see, Steven K. Green, The Second 
Disestablishment: Church and State in Nineteenth Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010); Thomas E. Buckley, Establishing Religious Freedom: Jefferson’s Statute in Virginia 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013). 
9
 My understanding of “legal culture” derives from Lawrence M. Friedman, "Legal Culture and Social 





Gross describes this approach as “cultural-legal history.”10 Viewing trials in local courts 
as opposing narratives, performances that highlight underlying social or cultural tensions, 
this scholarship is still overwhelmingly focused on formal legal sites rather than legalities 
rooted in community consensus, such as church tribunals.
11
  As slaves used church 
tribunals to punish their own for theft, they called into question the ability of chattel 
property to make claims to property.   When church members charged slaves with 
adultery, they implicitly recognized slaves’ ability to form binding contracts, but often 
overlooked the social realities pulling slave spouses apart, whether it was separation by 
sale or an intransigent master forbidding one from seeing the other. When disputing 
Baptists ridiculed their churches’ legal procedures and turned instead to courts for 
resolution, they bucked one authority and embraced another. Their participation in this 
marketplace of authority helped construct the authoritative bounds of the religious and 
secular in the United States.  
Church disciplinary activities constituted what historian Laura Edwards recently 
termed “localized law.” In her study of the post-Revolutionary Carolinas, Edwards 
contends that despite the increased professionalization and formalization of law at the 
state level, the primary objective of local law was to maintain the “peace” of a 
                                                          
10
 Ariela Gross, “Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery,” Columbia Law 
Review 101 (April 2001):640-690; On “mandarin” legal texts, see, Robert Gordon, “Critical Legal 
Histories,” Stanford Law Review, 36 no. ½, Critical Legal Studies Symposium (January 1984): 57-125.  
11
 Yvonne Pitts, Family, Law, and Inheritance in America: A Social and Legal history of Nineteenth-
Century Kentucky (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7-8; For examples of such an approach, 
see, Ariela Gross, Double Character: Slavery and Mastery in the Antebellum Southern Courtroom (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2000); Joshua Rothman, Notorious in the Neighborhood: Sex and Families 
Across the Color Line in Virginia, 1787-1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); 
Walter Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999); Laura F. Edwards, “Law, Domestic Violence, and the Limits of Patriarchal Authority in the 
Antebellum South,” The Journal of Southern History 65, no. 4 (1999): 733-770.  Edwards does briefly look 





community.  The role of the conceptual peace was to uphold the social order, the 
particularities of which the local populace determined.  Whereas state law by the 1820s 
and 1830s increasingly sought to sustain liberal individual rights (for white men), local 
courts continued to look to the nuances of each case, at times elevating the community 
peace over abstract legal conceptions of individual rights.  Grounded in communities’ 
local knowledge, the quest for the “peace” relocated “the legal process into social 
relations, so that law both guided and emerged from the dynamics of people’s lives.”12  
Although subordinate groups had little access to the state-based legal system, Edwards 
demonstrates that women, slaves, and free blacks all influenced, albeit at times indirectly, 
the practice of law at the local level.  Similar to the workings of localized law, church 




Incorporating church tribunals’ actions into the post-Revolutionary West’s legal 
culture necessitates rethinking our definition of law. In the last half-century, 
anthropologists and socio-legal theorists have argued that all societies are legally plural.
14
  
                                                          
12
 For quote see, Laura F. Edwards, “The Peace: The Meaning and Production of Law in the Post-
Revolutionary South,” UC-Irvine Law Review 1 no. 3 (Feb., 2011);  For persistence of localized law in 
general, see, Edwards, The People and Their Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of Inequality in 
the Post-Revolutionary South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Edwards, though 
reacting to formalist and instrumentalist tendencies of legal historiography, is also building on the work of 
William Novak and others who have charted the extensive reach of local governments in subverting the 
individual to the needs of the community.  See, William Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law & Regulation 
in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); For various 
“legalities,” of British North America, see in general, The Many Legalities of Early America, eds., 
Christopher Tomlins and Bruce H. Mann (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
13
 In, The People and Their Peace, 83-84, Edwards does briefly examine disciplinary mechanisms of the 
Baptists, Presbyterians, and Methodists, but her examination is geared toward transformations of local law 
as practiced in courthouses, not church meetinghouses. 
14
 This scholarship does not address church discipline in post-Revolutionary America.  For an overview 
see, Leopold Pospisil, "Legal Levels and Multiplicity of Legal Systems in Human Societies," The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 11 no. 1, (March 1967): 2-26.  See also, Leopold Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A 





Although scholars of legal pluralism cohere around their disregard for legal centralism—
arguing that law manifests itself through a variety of institutions or social interactions—
there is still little agreement upon both the power and place of the state in such studies 
and where law ceases and social action begins.
15
 For the purposes of this dissertation, 
however, I define law, quoting from legal scholar Brian Tamanaha, as “whatever people 
identify and treat through their social practices as ‘law’.”16  Baptists, though delineating 
between state-based and church-based law, often identified church discipline as a legal 
practice.  Obtaining “legal” membership in a Baptist church also required individuals to 
keep “watchcare” over their fellow brethren, and to take the proper legal steps (the 
“gospel steps”) with transgressors or those with whom they disputed.  Failure to do so 
could itself lead to a charge from the church.  The Pleasant Grove Baptist Church, for 
instance, resolved in 1840 that it was “the imperious duty of every member to watch over 
each other,” and to bring unresolved conflict to the church. Those “who shall neglect to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
notes that some institutions, such as corporations, factories, civil associations, and universities “include 
written codes, tribunals, and security forces” which replicate “the structure and symbolic form of state 
law.”  Furthermore, in any society, various “informal systems”—from the family, labor group, or 
collective—establish rules and seek to gain compliance with them.  A variety of legal systems are found in 
almost all societies—not only in the colonized—and central to the investigation of law is the relationship 
between official state legal regimes and all other forms of social ordering which are separate yet still 
dependent upon state authority.  See, Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law & Society Review 22 no. 5 (1988), 
870-874.  
15
 For instance, the critical legal pluralists decry “social-scientific conceptions” of legal pluralism, such as 
the one advanced by Merry above, and their continued “appeal to the primacy of the institutionalized State 
legal order.”  Instead, Critical legal Pluralists attribute more agency to the legal subject, endowing him or 
her “with a responsibility to participate in the multiple normative communities by which they recognize and 
create their own legal subjectivity.”  See, Martha-Marie Kleinhans and Roderick A. Macdonald, "What is a 
Critical Legal Pluralism?" 12 Can. J. L. & Soc. 25 (1997): 35, 37-38;  On the pitfalls of classifying all 
normative ordering systems as “law”, see in general, Brian Z. Tamanaha, "A Non-Essentialist Version of 
Legal Pluralism," Journal of Law and Society 27, no. 2 (June, 2000): 296-321; For a recent review on the 
state of legal pluralism within the field of history, albeit directed at Empires and not religious groups, see 
the Introduction to Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross (eds.), Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850 
(New York: New York University Press, 2013). 
16
 This position is put forth by Tamanaha in “A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism,” 313.  Italics 
in original.  “Thus, what law is,” Tamanaha continues on page 314, “is determined by the people in the 





reprove and try to reclaim” a fellow member should “be dealt with for a neglect of 
duty.”17  
Churches expected members to refrain from suing one another at local courts, 
asserting that members keep their “legal doings” within the fellowship. Though churches 
did not possess the ability to inflict bodily punishment, church sanctions—whether 
through admonishment, suspension, or excommunication—could have social 
ramifications, and for the true believer, eternal consequences. The state holds no 
monopoly upon means of coercion.  As one rural church-goer remarked, “To be excluded 
from the only group that was really meeting and had any influence in the community was 
right much of a jolt to anyone.”18  Thus, by acknowledging that individuals produced law 
outside of state institutions, we can illuminate a more fluid trans-Appalachian legal 
culture, one in which individuals possessed an expansive vision of law, authority, and 
governance. 
Both historians and contemporary observers have noted that church disciplinary 
practices receded during the antebellum period.  Historian Donald Mathews, while 
acknowledging that discipline continued in southern churches through the Civil War, 
laments that “the meaning of these patterns of discipline, with their recurring cycles of 
intensity, is not yet totally clear.”19  Other scholars note a similar disciplinary declension, 
but have not offered a sufficient explanation for its occurrence.
 20
 Likewise, the Rev. 
                                                          
17
 Pleasant Grove Baptist Church Records, December 1840, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Kentucky 
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Eleazer Savage claimed in the 1840s that “[s]ome churches are so lax in discipline, so 
indulgent with delinquent members and even flagrant transgressors, because of property, 
or standing, or connexions [sic] as to become a very dunghill in society.”  Indeed, he 
concluded, “[i]t is a day of most alarming irresponsibility among the members of our 
churches!”21  Reverend Warham Walker, writing at the same time as Savage, sounded a 
comparable tune in his own exposition of church-based law, decrying that there was an 
“almost entire neglect of Discipline in many churches.”22  As matters of governance and 
discipline rested with all members, the decline in disciplinary activity disparaged by 
contemporary observers and noted by historians, signals individuals’ changing 
conceptions of their churches’ authoritative role, a reformulation of the broader legal 
culture.  
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The congregational form of early Baptist churches presents challenges to making 
broad generalizations about change over time within the denomination.
23
  But in this 
study I argue that a confluence of legal, economic, and cultural factors in north-central 
Kentucky and Middle Tennessee contributed to churches’ increasing disciplinary 
reticence by the antebellum period.  Changes in the law of the family that slowly chipped 
away at patriarchs’ broad power within the household coincided with emerging middle-
class notions of family privacy, hindering churches’ regulatory influence over domestic 
relations by the antebellum period.  Likewise, as individuals’ engagement in national and 
international markets supplanted face-to-face transactions, and as debt transformed from 
a moral failing to just another risk of the new economic marketplace, contract-law 
doctrine assumed precedence in American legal and intellectual thought.  To the 
detriment of the communitarian ethos stressed by churches, contract doctrine elevated the 
liberal individual bound only by his free-will commitments.  The expanding market 
economy necessitated a predictable, objective legal system.  Many Baptists and religious 
treatise writers lamented the prejudiced-produced decrees of church tribunals, and these 
sites’ authority over their members’ business lives waned.  In the end, rather than 
overseeing members’ private and public affairs, some churches directed their disciplinary 
focus toward black members, becoming venues through which whites strengthened the 
region’s racial hierarchy. 
These legal and economic transformations corresponded with the emergence of a 
competitive religious marketplace, one increasingly characterized by doctrinal dissension 
and church schism.  Although Baptists found fertile ground in the West—witnessing 
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membership growth in tune with the overall population expansion—the very religious 
liberty for which Baptists had so intently fought during the Revolutionary period led to 
increased sectarian rivalry over both adherents and access to local houses of worship. 
During the 1820s and 1830s the region’s religious landscape scorched with dissension as 
Baptists argued over a variety of doctrinal matters, but especially as the teachings of 
Alexander Campbell and Barton Stone gained prominence and adherents. Campbell’s 
calls for the supremacy of the individual over the collective will of the congregation, 
along with his denunciation of creeds, confessions of faith, and any religious body not 
deriving from the scriptures, found fertile ground among the region’s Baptists. With 
member relations strained by the influence of the Stone-Campbell movement (the two 
joined forces in 1832), discipline rates in many Baptist churches receded.  The failure of 
church tribunals to contain doctrinal dissension, too, propelled opposing church factions 
to invoke state authority to secure their temporal claims.  In some cases, land grantors 
and donors utilized legal instruments to exclude non-Protestant and “disorderly” religious 
groups from public meetinghouses, or entwined property rights with adherence to specific 
doctrinal stances. Other groups battled in court over rights to local meetinghouses, 
insisting they were the “true” church.  Highlighting the continuing process of separating 
church and state, this explicit deference of authority to local courts provided 
opportunities for judges to subtly meddle in ecclesiastical affairs.     
 Investigating the disciplinary practices of Baptist churches allows us to illuminate 
the workings of localized law amidst a changing religious and legal landscape.  In 
contrast to many of their religious counterparts, Baptists’ ostensible highest earthly 





Judicial Council or Presbyterian’s General Assembly.  Decisions on governing forms and 
disciplinary matters were decided by full-church members (largely defined after 1800 as 
white male, converted believers), by family, friends, and neighbors.
24
   Furthermore, the 
building of permanent Euro-American settlements in Kentucky and Tennessee coincided 
with the separation of church and state throughout much of the Republic.  Baptist 
churches were the first institutions of any kind on the trans-Appalachian frontier of the 
1770s and 1780s, and their early arrival and continued development allowed them to 
entwine their values into the region’s social structures.  Baptist churches helped to 
provide order in emerging communities, assuming a variety of civil functions in the 
absence of strong state governments.
25
  Even after statehood, however, their governing 
activities continued.  Investigating churches’ legal operations over time and space 
redirects the examination of disestablishment from the constitutional realm to the cultural 
process of separating churches from roles of civil service.  
 A focus on north-central Kentucky and middle Tennessee also allows us to chart 
changes in disciplinary practices—and thus the broader legal culture—in a region that 
experienced extensive economic and social transformation from 1780 through the 
antebellum period.  Kentucky’s Bluegrass Region developed from frontier-station 
outposts during the Revolutionary period to a vibrant center of commercialism by 1820.  
Surrounded by fertile agricultural lands, the greater-Lexington area greatly benefited 
from an explosion in the hemp trade during the 1790s.  This not only helped make the 
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city the leading commercial and industrial capital of the trans-Appalachian West, but 
catapulted Lexington’s population from 1,800 at the turn of the nineteenth century to 
4,300 just ten years later.
26
  Such commercial growth gave rise to a middle class 
propagating their ideas of respectability and sensibility, family privacy and class 
distinction.  As the century progressed, historian Craig Thompson Friend recently wrote, 
“refinement, capitalistic investment, and lines of distinction spread from Lexington 
outward,” with individuals of the lower classes finding more “common ground” with a 
burgeoning middle class made up of entrepreneurs, merchants, and lawyers.
27
   
 Middle Tennessee, or the Cumberland District as it was known during the pre- 
and early-statehood periods, also witnessed rapid economic and social transformation 
from the Revolutionary era through the first decades of the nineteenth century.  When 
Tennessee became a state in 1796 the region claimed only 11,500 residents.  Twenty-five 
years later, the population including slaves had sky-rocketed to just under 290,000, with 
many focused on land speculation, agricultural production, and commerce.  The 
Cumberland River became an important commercial highway, engendering a mercantile 
class that looked to farmers for cotton and tobacco to sale in distant markets.
28
  In 1800, 
Middle Tennessee may have “stood at the fringe of white civilization,” as historian 
Kristofer Ray has noted, but “by 1812 it had embraced a complex market economy,” 
revolving “around land speculation and the production of short-staple cotton and 
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tobacco.”29  In both Tennessee and Kentucky, not all residents were completely 
integrated into the expanding market-economy, nor did all readily accept the market-
driven social relations arising from such participation.
30
  Nonetheless, this region proves 
a valuable region of study to chart changes in religious and civil authority as it 
transformed from fluid frontier communities to more economically and socially complex 
societies.   
 This dissertation is arranged thematically. Chapter One details the settlement of 
Kentucky and Tennessee.  It focuses on the variety of ways that Euro-American settlers 
organized their growing communities, and particularly focuses on Baptists’ institutional 
network of churches and governing associations.  Following a survey of church 
disciplinary practices, it looks to how state governments, despite constitutional separation 
of church and state, buttressed churches’ legal operations. Chapter Two examines 
churches’ role in regulating their members’ household affairs alongside transformations 
in state-based domestic relations law.  Actions taken by church members in disciplining 
husbands and masters, unruly wives, disobedient slaves, and philandering spouses 
elevated the role of churches to prominent leadership positions within their communities.  
It argues, in contrast to previous studies, that church regulation of family life was not 
necessarily a radical break from the law practiced in local and state courts.  Moreover, by 
the end of the antebellum period, trans-Appalachian churches devoted less time to 
mitigating domestic relations cases, especially divorce and adultery, even though divorce 
cases appeared to be on the rise in local courtrooms.  Increasingly, scriptural views on the 
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perpetual nature of marriage came into conflict with the more liberal divorce legislation 
emerging from early-nineteenth century statehouses, legislation which loosened the 
compact’s contractual obligations by providing wider legal routes through which to 
pursue a separation or absolute divorce, and thus, legislation which chipped away at 
patriarchs’ broad power within their households.  The “law of the land,” rather than the 
“law of God” assumed precedence over domestic matters by the outbreak of Civil War.  
 The third chapter focuses on churches’ handling of members’ economic and 
property related disputes.  Churches charged members with breach of contract, 
indebtedness, and theft.  They arbitrated a variety of property disputes, including those 
over land and slaves.  Churches also took up disputes between slaves, recognizing, and at 
times substantiating their claims to property.  Yet, as the region transformed from 
backwoods outposts to complex societies during the early-nineteenth century, 
individuals’ engagement with national and international markets increasingly supplanted 
face-to-face transactions.  Meanwhile, a social-relations-by-contract discourse assumed 
precedence in American legal and intellectual thought.  Elevating the individual bound 
only by commitments of his own free will, contract doctrine slowly chipped away at the 
communitarian ethos propagated by Baptists and other religious groups.  Churches grew 
more willing to allow members’ to seek recourse at local and state courts, while others 
elevated the objective, predictable jurisprudence of state-based law over the factionalist, 
prejudiced decrees emanating from their church bodies. Churches’ reticence to involve 
themselves in their members’ business affairs, in some cases, led to an increased focus on 
black members’ actions as church tribunals emerged as venues through which to 





 Chapter Four explores how religious controversy affected individuals’ 
conceptions of their broader legal culture.  Throughout the first decades of the nineteenth 
century, disagreements over doctrine and form of church government pervaded trans-
Appalachian Baptist churches.  Though it touches on consternation engendered by the 
growing influence of missionary societies, as well as debates over the utility of governing 
associations, the examination primarily focuses on the rise of Alexander Campbell, 
Barton Stone, and their “Reformation” movement.  Many churches simply 
excommunicated members who adopted the divergent doctrinal practices, while others 
split into opposing factions.  Amidst a religious backdrop of doctrinal controversy and 
schism, afflicted churches witnessed a decline of disciplinary activities as individuals’ 
ceased to envision their churches as sites for neutral dispute resolution.  
 The final chapter investigates how this sectarian controversy propelled religious 
organizations’ interaction with state authority.  The failure of church courts to contain 
internal dissension and curtail schism led to contentious court battles over rights to local 
meetinghouses.  Although neither Kentucky nor Tennessee possessed a legacy of a 
church-establishment, state governments still influenced religious groups through 
legislative enactments and court rulings. Amidst a presumably “free” religious 
marketplace, one increasingly characterized by dissension and church schism, actions 
taken by both religious and state actors opened the door for the latter to shape 
ecclesiastical affairs.  Local meetinghouses also served as physical manifestations of the 
contested religious marketplace, and individuals utilized state authority in subtle ways to 
promote religious orthodoxy in their communities and exclude those groups deemed 





“democratization” of American religious culture during the post-Revolutionary period, 
then, begot a “jurisprudence of disestablishment” fashioned through the legal system, and 
significantly shaped the development of church-state relations.
31
  
 Issues over the relationship between church and state, of course, remain contested 
in the twenty-first century.  Indeed, contemporary news cycles are peppered with disputes 
over religious symbolism in state buildings or civic ceremonies.  Advocacy groups and 
politicians weigh the benefits and pitfalls of state-funding of religious groups’ various 
charitable endeavors.  The politics of LBGTQ and abortion have led to a new installment 
of church-state jurisprudence, as churches and businesses point to religious principles 
with hopes of side-stepping laws geared toward marriage equality, access to birth control, 
or the most basic rights of inclusion in the public sphere.  Meanwhile, congregations 
divided over gay marriage or doctrinal disagreements are seeking state recourse to secure 
their property claims. These issues, far from novel, go back to the republic’s founding. 
They are rooted in not only our nation’s experiment with religious liberty, but 
Americans’ divergent conceptions of law and authority.  One place to begin is to look at 
how those once deemed “disturbers of the peace” by Virginia’s authorities, soon after 
emerged as protectors of the peace in the new communities of the West. 
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CHAPTER 1.“THE WANT OF DISCIPLINE”: BAPTIST CHURCH TRIBUNALS 




“This little new church in the wilderness, was far from any establishment of the kind…”1 
 
As Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Virginian Baptists celebrated the 
passage of the “Act for Establishing Freedom of Religion” in 1786, Baptists at Bryan’s 
Station near present day Lexington, Kentucky, considered “their scattered state and the 
want of discipline among themselves,” and formed a church.  In July 1787, the new 
church debated its place within the wider community, specifically, “the expediency or 
inexpediency of [their] Church meetings for Discipline being in private or publick [sic].”  
The church body agreed, “that they be altogether in private,” and thus, the workings of its 
tribunal would take place in front of members only.
2
  Bryan’s Station Baptist Church, and 
churches throughout the trans-Appalachian West, served as important sites for the 
production of law well into the antebellum period.  Through their ritual practice of 
discipline, churches arbitrated member-disputes and morally regulated their communities.  
The members of Bryan’s Station witnessed charges ranging from fighting, drunkenness, 
adultery, and slave insubordination, among other accusations, during the church’s first six 
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years of existence.  Indeed, in the initial years of settlement, when local courts met 
infrequently or were located at great distances, church tribunals filled an authoritative 
vacuum for frontier communities and continued acting as governing sites even after the 
arrival of stronger state-based governing institutions.
3
  
The prevailing scholarship on religion in post-Revolutionary Kentucky and 
Tennessee does not adequately address Baptists’ continued legal operations or churches’ 
persistent interaction with state authority.  Most note in passing churches’ role in 
instilling moral order during the initial settlement period.
4
  Others, such as Monica 
Najar’s recent work on Baptists in the Upper South, examine churches’ civil functions, or 
look to how evangelicals sought to use local courts to disseminate their values.
5
  None of 
these studies, however, incorporate churches into the broader legal culture of the region 
from the settlement period through the early-nineteenth century.  Nor do they look to the 
underlying links between church and state which remained despite disestablishment.  
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Churches oversaw individuals’ morality and served as legal venues for members, 
and at times non-members, to settle disputes.  For white women and free and enslaved 
blacks, although their power within churches gradually dissipated by the turn of the 
nineteenth century, local church tribunals functioned as the most, or only, accessible 
venues in which to air grievances or seek resolution.
6
 In an attempt to maintain 
harmonious member-relations, churches expected members to follow the “gospel steps” 
when settling disputes, and insisted such conflict be kept within the fellowship.  They 
relied upon fear of eternal damnation and the social ostracism to enforce 
excommunication decrees.  On the early frontier, and continuing through the antebellum 
period, then, multiple legal systems persisted, at times complementary, but in other 
instances in opposition to the prevailing cultural and legal developments of the region.
7
  
Rather than emanating solely from state-based institutions, law operated in a variety of 
locations, including church meetinghouses.   
Churches’ law-making activities were backed by state authority despite church-
state separation.  Although by 1800 constitutional enactments at the federal level and in 
most states provided for disestablishment, the authoritative bounds of religious and civil 
authority remained contested through the mid-nineteenth century and beyond.  The early-
republican and antebellum decades proved a foundational period for church-state 
relations, with state governments doing much of the heavy lifting, as one historian notes, 
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“teasing apart links between religious and political institutions that were old and rusty.”8 
Kentucky and Tennessee were no exception. Both states’ constitutions forbade state-
establishment of religion, yet their governments still implicitly buttressed churches’ legal 
operations through both legislation and court rulings. Incorporation measures, trespass 
statutes, and judicial decrees against those who disturbed houses of worship, all protected 
church-goers as they worshiped and when they assembled as a church tribunal.  
The Baptists’ early arrival in Kentucky and Tennessee allowed them to entwine 
both their institutions and values into the foundation of the region’s emerging societies.9  
Free from official persecution in the trans-Appalachian country, “a flood of Baptist 
emigrants”—perhaps one quarter of all Virginia Baptists—migrated to Kentucky, 
sometimes as whole congregational bodies, during the Revolutionary period.
10
  They 
were not alone, but simply one segment of a large, trans-montane migration that began in 
the 1760s and only gained in numbers over the next four decades. Although preachers 
were active in the region from the first years of settlement (the Baptist preacher Thomas 
Tinsley regularly preached at the Harrodsburg station as early as 1776), not until the 
1780s did Baptists turn their full attention to constructing an institutional presence in the 
region.  By the early nineteenth-century, Baptists and other evangelical groups—
benefitting greatly from revivalist fervor of the “Great Revival” at the turn of the 
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century—had constructed a broad institutional presence in both states, one rooted in local 
churches and connected through regional governing associations.
11
   
Baptists’ network of governing institutions did not stand alone, as a variety social 
ordering systems persisted in the trans-Appalachian West from the settlement period and 
beyond.  The development of state-based governing institutions in the territory proved 
slow during the Revolutionary period. Virginia’s authority over its western lands, though 
“decentralized, inexpensive, and familiar,” was weak in eighteenth-century Kentucky.12 
North Carolina’s authority over the Tennessee backcountry was similarly tenuous.  
Disgruntled settlers in the eastern district constituted the independent state of Franklin in 
1784, and their Middle-Tennessean counterparts flirted with secession to Spain later in 
the decade.
13
  Shortly after settlement, however, Euro-American migrants organized 
extralegal governing organizations which served a number of social functions, including 
dispute arbitration and regulation of local militias.
14
 After Kentucky and Tennessee 
achieved statehood status in the 1790s, local courts emerged as essential sites of 
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governance in the region. Though these venues emerged as the “principle agents” of law 
and order in the region, they did little to enforce moral regulations, a task left largely to 
churches.
15
   
 This chapter briefly details the legal landscape of the trans-Appalachian West 
from the beginning of Euro-American settlement in the late eighteenth century through 
the opening decades of the nineteenth century. It particularly focuses on the development 
of local courts and the Baptists’ institutional network of churches and governing 
associations.  Then, after a discussion of Baptists’ vision of law and the workings of 
church discipline, it takes a broad look at the various offences mitigated by church 
tribunals, their relationship with state-based courts, and the ways in which state authority 
buttressed churches’ legal operations through legislation and court rulings.   Although 
legal historians have argued that by the time of American Independence law became 
rooted in state institutions, multiple legal systems continued to operate on various levels, 
with churches providing a variety of law-making functions for their members and the 
surrounding church neighborhood.
16
  In late 1793, Bryan’s Station Church responded to a 
member’s query related to the contours of the church’s authority in the new 
commonwealth.  “The design of a church,” the clerk recorded, was not only for the 
“Glory of God” and advancement of his kingdom across the world, but “secondly her 
power extends, to make any rule for her own government consistant [sic] with the word 
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of God, and to exercise her power in the Discipline of her members agreeable thereto.”17  
Despite the increased presence of state authority, Baptists in the early-statehood West 
intended that their parallel legal system would persist as an alternate, authoritative venue 
for their communities’ needs.  In so doing, they participated in a fluid legal culture, one 
in which local and state governments did not hold a monopoly on effective means of 
coercion.  
 
On a Sunday in September 1781, a throng of men and women, including children 
and slaves, congregated at an isolated meetinghouse in Spotsylvania County, Virginia, 
their attention focused on Lewis Craig as he spoke from a temporary pulpit.
18
  Craig, 
pastor of the Upper Spotsylvania Church, was well-known among Virginia’s Baptists for 
his multiple arrests stemming from charges of preaching without a license.  Some of 
those in attendance surely remembered when in 1768 colonial authorities arrested Craig 
while he preached in this same Spotsylvania meetinghouse.  Some, too, were probably 
among those who followed along as the sheriff transported him to the Fredericksburg jail, 
and who listened as he continued to exhort from behind his cell’s iron-barred window.  
On this day, thirteen years later, with the majority of his congregation preparing for an 
arduous journey to the new settlement of Kentucky, he reportedly touched on the 
Baptists’ progress in Virginia over the previous two decades.  He reminded the audience 
that “though already worn and weary from the long campaign” against religious 
persecution (a battle still being waged in Virginia), that God would lead them to the “the 
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rich and illimitable acres of a western Canaan.” The next day a convoy of between 500 
and 600 migrants, including around 200 members of the Spotsylvania Church, their 
children, slaves, and about a dozen preachers, embarked with Craig for Kentucky, their 
Canaan in the wilderness.
19
 
Had Craig and his flock stayed in Virginia much longer, they would have 
witnessed their counterparts’ further victories over the Anglican church establishment 
which had pestered so many of their brethren during the late eighteenth century.  From 
outset of Virginia’s settlement in the seventeenth-century, the Church of England served 
as the established church of the colony.  The colonial assembly sketched the boundaries 
of Anglican parishes, appointed lay vestries, raised funds for the church through taxation, 
and insisted all parish inhabitants attend Sunday services.  The state also restricted other 
religious groups’ activities—many of which had gained a foothold in the region during 
the Great Awakening of the 1730s through the 1750s—and, as in the case of Craig, 
arrested dissenters who preached without a license.  Gradually over the second-half of the 
eighteenth century, competing sects such as the Presbyterians and Baptists obtained small 
measures of religious toleration from the state.  Amidst the Revolutionary fervor of the 
1770s and 1780s, Baptists were at the forefront of the evangelical assault on the church-
state establishment.  They petitioned against the state’s tax support for, and incorporation 
of the Anglican Church, and eventually helped mobilize support for Jefferson’s 1786 
Statute establishing religious freedom in the Commonwealth.  No longer subject to legal 
persecution, Virginia’s Baptists were free to worship as they pleased.20    
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Yet for many Baptists and other Virginians, their future potential lay in the West.  
Craig’s group, since known as “The Travelling Church,” trekked nearly six hundred 
miles. They passed in the “shadow” of Jefferson’s Monticello, crossed the Blue Ridge 
Mountains through Buford’s Gap, and made it to Fort Chiswell in western Virginia by the 
end of September. There, the group dispensed with their wagons, and most of the party 
continued on horseback or on foot over the rough-shod trails.  They passed solitary grave 
markers of travelers who went before them, heard news of the British surrender at 
Yorktown, and engaged in a skirmish with Natives.  In early December they traversed 
through the Cumberland Gap into Kentucky, and two weeks later established “Craig’s 
Station,” where on the second Sunday in December 1781, far from Virginian authorities, 
the church members gathered to worship around the Bible brought with them from the 
Spotsylvania meetinghouse.  
 Over the next year and a half, members from the Travelling Church spread out 
through central Kentucky and organized churches.  In the fall of 1783, much of the 
congregation relocated to South Elkhorn just miles from Lexington.  The ministers 
Ambrose Dudley and William Waller, who had journeyed from Virginia with Craig’s 
convoy, would go on to constitute churches in Fayette County, including the one at 
Bryan’s Station and its arm at David’s Fork.  The Baptists institutional network had 
sprouted west of the Appalachians.  They, along with an expanding number of local 
governing institutions, served as primary legal sites for the region’s emerging Euro-
American societies. 
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Craig’s Travelling Church followed on the heels of over two-decades of 
continuous white-expedition and settlement in the trans-montane region. “Long hunters,” 
such as Daniel Boone, began crossing into the trans-montane region in the early 1760s, 
continuing their expeditions throughout the decade despite Britain’s Proclamation Line of 
1763 forbidding colonists from traversing the Appalachian Mountains.  The first settlers 
were typically young, white males seeking adventure, or escape from less-than-savory 
familial or social relations in the east.  With the end of the Revolutionary War, and as the 
region’s Natives became more dependent upon fur-traders and alcohol purveyors, 
thousands more Americans, including a greater number of women and children, 
journeyed into Kentucky, “slashing and burning” away the landscape to build 
homesteads.
21
  During the 1790s individuals and families of the gentry class arrived with 
hopes of disseminating their cultural mores and wielding political and social power.
22
 
Drawn west by the lure of both religious autonomy and economic opportunity, 
settlers of all social and religious backgrounds sought to establish orderly communities in 
the trans-Appalachian region.  Freedom from religious persecution may have propelled 
some Baptists to seek refuge in Kentucky, but, as the nineteenth-century Baptist 
chronicler, George Ranck, admitted, “pioneer Baptists” were also “attracted by the 
magnificent land” of Kentucky’s Bluegrass region.23  Like so many others, Baptists had 
heard tales of Kentucky’s expansive lands and its reputation as the best “poor man’s 
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country.”24  The West was the Promised Land where one could attain his own plot of 
“virgin” land which promised a high yield, and thus secure his agrarian independence.25  
Although overtime the demographics of settlement became increasingly diverse, historian 
Craig Thompson Friend notes that all migrants understood that in journeying to 
Kentucky, they were splitting off “the beaten path of American society,” constructing 
societies “anew on what they considered to be the blank slate of the western wilds.”26 
Most Euro-American settlers were imbued with Christian spirituality, but not all 
Christians actively practiced their faith.  Dispersed settlement, a lack of preachers, and 
the continued Indian threat led to rather weak religious institutions.
27
  Almost all the 
settlers, faithful or not, however, understood that a certain moral economy was needed in 
order to regulate the dispersed and often chaotic settlement of the backcountry. Mutual 
respect, individual responsibility to the community, and the meting out of justice to 




Due to the persistent Native presence in the region, settler-life revolved around 
the frontier station through the 1780s, with little formalized legal institutions. Stations—
log houses connected by a high wooden wall which acted as a fortified structure—served 
as whites’ primary defense against Native attack.  A dozen or more families would live 
near each station, retreating behind its walls when attacks became eminent.
29
  This 
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“search for stability” stunted the growth of the region’s governing institutions, including 
churches.
30
  Settlers at Craig’s Station attended worship services with their rifles, while 
armed sentries stood guard outside the building.
31
 The Baptist minister William Hickman 
recalled church-goers traveling in groups, with the men acting as an armed escort, to 
Sunday services in the 1780s.  And small frontier congregations’ very survival could be 
jeopardized because of an Indian attack. Cooper’s Run Baptist Church in Kentucky had 
five of its members killed by Natives in its first year of existence.
32
 
The “Kentucke” region was part of Virginia, but as population numbers swelled 
legislators in the east created new county governments in order to secure their authority 
over the sprawling backcountry settlements where residents had already turned extra-
legal governing institutions in hopes of ordering their communities.  In 1775, the 
Transylvania Land Company, led by Judge Richard Henderson and his associates, 
negotiated with local Natives to acquire much of present day Kentucky.  A number of 
stations were established in the region, including Boonesborough—named after Daniel 
Boone who briefly worked for Henderson by clearing paths and leading settlers into 
central Kentucky.  In May of that year, representatives from nearby stations assembled at 
Boonesborough and drew up a rudimentary government which, among other things, 
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established courts and set proper punishments for criminal activity.  The short-lived 
Boonesborough government primarily focused upon issues such as courts’ operations, the 
militia, and fees for local officials (but, among its first measures passed was “An Act to 
Prevent Profane Swearing and Sabbath Breaking”).33 Many settlers were not pleased with 
the Company’s high land prices, however, and believed, rather than with the 
Transylvania Company, that their titles would better be secured under Virginia’s 
authority.  Virginia’s General Assembly shared the settlers’ discontent with Henderson’s 
extra-legal actions, and in December 1776, sliced out the territory west of the 
Alleghenies, designating it Kentucky County.  With governing authority now extending 
from Richmond, the legislature created by the Boonesborough Covenant never 
reconvened.
34
   
Permanent white settlement in Tennessee began in 1768, and over the next two 
decades white settlers organized various governing institutions to maintain the social 
order and facilitate economic exchange.  In 1772, eager to protect their land claims, 
settlers politically organized themselves through the Watauga Association. The “first 
constitutional government west of the Appalachians,” the Watauga Association was a 
five-man court primarily responsible for adjudicating disputed land claims and upholding 
individual rights. It also created local offices, such as sheriff, and presided over mundane 
business similar to local governments in the East—legalizing marriages, punishing 
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criminals, probating wills, recording land claims or sales, and overseeing militia duties.  
At the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, settlers in East Tennessee, believing they 
resided on the fringes of Virginia’s claims, organized a Committee of Safety whose 
authority overlapped with the Watauga court, and petitioned Virginia for annexation.
35
  
Finally realizing they were within the boundaries of North Carolina, not Virginia, 
inhabitants of eastern Tennessee appealed to North Carolina for protection and 
representation. In response, North Carolina legislators organized their western lands into 
the Washington District (which became Washington County in 1777), established a court, 
and promised the backcountry settlers representation in the state assembly.
36
    
Over the course of the 1780s, as Euro-American settlers trekked deeper into 
Tennessee, frontier leaders sought governing assistance from both North Carolina and the 
Confederation Congress.  James Robertson, John Donelson, and a group of land hunters 
were among the first white settlers of Middle Tennessee.  Following the Tennessee River 
nearly 150 miles west from the original towns and settlements of the eastern district, 
Donelson and his cohorts established a new settlement in the Cumberland region, not far 
from present day Nashville.
37
  Upon arrival, they repeated the familiar process of setting 
up rudimentary governments—with what historian John Finger called “an aura of 
legality”—organizing in May of 1780 the Cumberland Compact.  This extralegal 
association elected twelve men to serve as arbiters for disputes over land claims, 
regulators of the land office, and dispensers of local justice.  Nominally part of 
Washington County, the closest court was still nearly two hundred miles away, and thus, 
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all legal authority resided in Cumberland judicatory.  Men who refused to sign the 
compact were excluded from utilizing the court.
38
   
Gradually, however, as trans-montane settlers acquired local governance through 
the county form, the rudimentary governments of the early settlement phase morphed into 
state institutions backed by a constitutionally-based government.  Throughout the late 
1780s, Tennessee settlers had organized compacts similar to the Watauga and 
Cumberland agreements, establishing quasi-governing committees for community 
protection and law enforcement.  But, as with the case of Kentucky’s Boonesborough 
Covenant, their authority receded with the arrival of official state authority. After fighting 
with Great Britain ceased, North Carolina’s Assembly created Davidson County.  The 
Assembly later designated Nashville the county seat, integrating middle-Tennessee 
settlements into the region’s established system of courts, and further diminishing the 
Cumberland Compact’s authority.  The operations of the new, state-backed courts 
primarily focused on protecting property, keeping records, facilitating economic 
development, and creating an “orderly, moral system of control”.39   
The creation of new counties went a long way in bringing local government to the 
growing trans-montane populace and signaled settlers’ desire for more immediate and 
hopefully effective governing institutions.  In response to a population influx in the late 
1770s, the Virginia Assembly in 1780 laid out three new counties: Fayette, Jefferson, and 
Lincoln.
40
 County courts recorded everything from property transfers to powers of 
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attorney.  They also regulated local roads, taverns, riparian rights, as well as probate 
actions involving wills, guardians, and executors. In both Kentucky and Tennessee, most 
legal affairs, public and private, were handled by local justices of the peace.  Justices 
regulated ferries, taverns, and mills.  They appointed road supervisors, registered 
livestock marks, and even created a basic public welfare program which provided 
assistance to orphans, the mentally incapable, and the poor.
41
   Though they did little to 
regulate morality, in most economic matters, such as constructing market houses and 
roads, regulating taverns, and litigating lawsuits, local courts were largely effective.
42
  
Inhabitants’ pleas for more responsive county governance, historian Ellen Eslinger 
argues, demonstrated that settlers “desired more rather than less local government.”43   
 During the 1790s, amidst population growth, political animosity, market 
competitiveness and rising class tensions, white men in early Tennessee and Kentucky 
sought to quell the rising tide of disharmony and order their increasingly heterogeneous 
societies.  This desire for stronger communal ties led many to join one of the growing 
number of voluntary associations, such as the Free Masons or agricultural societies.  
These associations became sites in which men could make business, economic, and 
political contacts with a wide range of individuals.
44
 The faithful bound together into 
their own inclusive, sectarian communities in the early trans-Appalachian West. 
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Although during the early years of settlement Anglicanism weighed heavily on Virginia’s 
religious and social landscape, dissenting groups like the Baptists found fertile ground 
west of the mountains.
45
   And, while the region’s settlers—many church-goers 
included—looked to state-based governing authority for protection against the Native 
threats, security of property, and regulation of the social peace, Baptists sought to 
maintain their relations through the ritual practice of discipline—a legal system rooted in 
covenanted communities and free for all converted individuals regardless of sex or social 
status. 
 
In June 1794, the Baptist preacher John Taylor helped organize the Bullittsburgh 
Church “on the margin of the Ohio River” in what was then Campbell County (later 
Boone).  “This little new church in the wilderness,” Taylor reminisced, “was far from any 
establishment of the kind,” and none of its original eight members, or others in the small 
community, were “free from Indian danger.”  The church soon joined the Elkhorn 
Association of Baptists, and Taylor and his family gained membership the following 
year. By that time, the church had grown to thirteen members, “all of whom,” the 
preacher claimed, “I was well acquainted with.”46  Despite its short membership roll, the 
little church flexed its disciplinary muscles in the fall of 1795, excluding Benjamin Bryan 
in October for disorder, lying, and “keeping persons out of their property.”47 Like Taylor 
and his brethren at the Bullittsburgh church, Baptists throughout the trans-Appalachian 
                                                          
45
 Eslinger, Citizens of Zion, 84. 
46
 Taylor, A History of Ten Baptist Churches, 81.  
47
 For select minutes from the Bullittsburgh Baptist Church see, 





West claimed authority over their neighborhood’s social peace, regulating moral 
transgressions and mitigating civil offenses. 
His assistance in constituting the Bullittsburgh Church was not Taylor’s first or 
last foray into church organization.  Born in Fauquier County, Virginia in 1752, and 
baptized in the early 1770s, Taylor eventually preached at the South River Baptist Church 
in Virginia before removing with his family and slaves to Kentucky in 1783.
48
  Prior to 
relocating, South River Baptists warned he “was going to a country of strangers, and 
Savage rage.”  But upon arrival Taylor quickly embarked on extending the Baptists’ 
institutional network and converting strangers to neighbors. He briefly joined a church on 
Gilbert’s Creek and later gained membership at the South Elkhorn Church pastored by 
Lewis Craig. In 1784 he moved to Woodford County where he helped organize the Clear 
Creek Church in 1785.
49
 Over the next decade leading to founding of the Bullittsburgh 
Church, Taylor traveled and preached throughout Kentucky, baptized scores of converts, 
and delighted in any advance in the Baptists’ cause.   For Taylor, membership in a Baptist 
Church of Christ was one of the “greatest privileges on earth.”50  
Much like residents petitioning for closer, more effective state governance, as 
churches grew and members moved further from their house of worship, they sought a 
more immediate church presence in their neighborhoods. The experience at the 
Bullittsburgh Church demonstrates this process.  Within three years from its founding, a 
number of the new arrivals, many of them “Baptists of the first class,” joined the 
Bullittsburgh Church and pushed the membership total up to “about sixty members.”  
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Taylor praised the new members, as “many of them [were] good old peaceable 
disciplinarians.” The church continued to attract converts through the 1790s, eventually 
claiming “about two hundred members,” all “very compactly settled with their meeting 
house in a central place.” Only a few members “were a little scattered off.”  It was not 
long before the twenty or so dispersed members “began to contemplate a new 
constitution,” and petitioned the Bullittsburgh Church for assistance in organizing a new 
church.  Soon after, Taylor reported, the new church was “perhaps equal in strength” in 
both “number” and “property.”51  Within both churches at Bullittsburgh, and in 
meetinghouses across the region, members adhered to the governing authority of the 
church majority.  Rooted in the Scriptures and maintained by a rigorous discipline, 
churches exerted state-like powers in claiming jurisdiction over members’ personal and 
public matters.   
Churches claiming authority over both the secular and spiritual was nothing new 
in the Upper South, as prior to the late late-eighteenth century, the Anglican Church in 
the Chesapeake had often assumed civil functions, combining with the local courthouse 
to serve “as twin centers of power and authority.”52  Indeed, as Rhys Isaac notes, the 
Anglican Church “was an integral part of the fabric of colonial Virginia society and its 
systems of authority.”   Parish boundaries often lined with those of the county, and 
church leaders worked to identify disorderly behavior, assisted the government in 
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providing care for the poor and orphan, and even helped settle property boundaries.
53
  
Beginning in the mid- to late-eighteenth century the established church’s role in the 
Upper South slowly changed.  In the 1740s and 1750s, county courts assumed authority 
over civil matters and grand juries replaced church leaders in presenting criminal charges 
to the county courts.  The North Carolina Assembly placed county courts in control of 
orphans and their estates the following decade.
54
  
The reformulation of religious and state authority over civil matters progressed on 
two levels and did not initially affect Baptist churches in the same way.  As Monica Najar 
notes, legislatures instigated much of the change, but the “gradual realignment” also 
“occurred on the local level as parish and county governments shifted jurisdictions.”  
Disestablishment during the Revolutionary period quickened the realignment’s pace.  
Poor relief and the setting of property boundaries increasingly fell under the jurisdiction 
of local governments.  County governments assumed “a more centralized civil authority” 
and churches sphere of influence in the now republican-states narrowed to focus upon the 
“religious.”  But this process did not occur in the same way for evangelical sects such as 
the Baptists.
55
  Their congregations continued to relieve the poor, especially destitute 
women, through member contributions of food, cash, or at times, individual labor, and 
churches persisted in mitigating civil disputes and charging members with moral 
transgressions.  Trans-Appalachian Baptists, like their counterparts to the east, funneled 
such civil functions through two institutional structures: the local church and the regional 
governing association. 
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For Baptists, their congregational organization provided that the local church was 
the highest earthly authority.  Final resolutions resided with full members, not with a 
pastor or ecclesiastical hierarchy.
56
  In most churches, majority consent or a unanimous 
vote directed matters of doctrine, governance, and discipline. Baptist churches—
especially those of the Regular order—subscribed to a written confession of faith 
outlining their doctrinal principles, rules of conduct, membership obligations, and 
strictures of discipline.
57
  Written church covenants created and maintained the 
fellowship’s purity (for, as the Baptist Silas M. Noel exclaimed in 1825, “A nuncupative 
creed, is not calculated to quiet disturbances, or to exclude corruption.”).58 Converts had 
to accept the covenant’s expressed terms, and many churches required these founding 
documents to be read at their monthly church gatherings in order to constantly remind 
members of their obligations. John Taylor recollected that prior to joining the Baptists, he 
heard a local church’s covenant read aloud at a group baptism, and concluded, “that no 
man on earth could comply with it.”59 But once an individual professed adherence to a 
church’s covenant, the baptized—white or black, slave or free—became, as Taylor noted, 
“legal” members of the fellowship.60   
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The differences between membership and non-membership proved more 
important to post-Revolutionary Baptists than did distinctions based on gender, race, or 
class.
61
 Especially during the settlement era, Baptists extended membership privileges to 
those groups who generally lacked legal personhood in the eyes of state law. Taylor 
noted that when the Bullittsburgh Church claimed sixty members in the late 1790s, only 
“about twenty [were] free male[s],” meaning at least two-thirds of the church body were 
women or enslaved.
62
  The appellations of “brother” and “sister” extended to each 
baptized convert, regardless of his or her status.  This partly stemmed from Baptist 
theology which heralded the equality of all souls, but frontier conditions, coupled with 
the “shapelessness of slavery” in the region also infiltrated church walls, providing 
women, free blacks, and slaves power in matters of church governance and discipline.
63
  
When the Clear Creek Church called a new pastor in 1785, for instance, Lewis Craig 
asked “every member of the church, male or female, bound or free, who do you choose 
for your pastor[?]”64 Some churches granted preaching licenses to male slaves and free 
black men, and even granted them votes in business matters appearing before the church.  
Slaves charged one another with disorderly conduct, theft, and adultery.  White women 
charged others with drunkenness, profane swearing, and at times leveled accusations 
against husbands and patriarchs for mistreatment or negligence. These individuals’ 
actions within the disciplinary sphere—as plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses, and even 
investigators—directly affected how law developed in the congregational community, 
and thus helped to define the contours of church authority in maintaining the social peace 
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of a church neighborhood.  By the turn of the nineteenth-century, though, Baptists 
churches increasingly equated full membership with the status of free white male. All 
members, bond or free, male or female, however, remained subject to discipline and were 
expected to follow strictures laid out in church covenants or rules of decorum.
 65
  
These autonomous churches were connected through regional governing 
associations. Compared to many of their denominational counterparts, Baptist churches 
were remarkably independent.  But congregations still communicated with their “sister 
churches,” subscribed to (and encouraged subscription of) Baptist periodicals, and sent 
messengers to annual association meetings.  The “basic unit in Baptist polity for 
intercongregational relationships,” associations served as information networks, sites of 
socialization and, at times, they connected geographically remote congregations.  The 
association was not a permanent body.  Churches were free to separate from associations 
as they pleased.  But the fluid nature of associational affiliations should not mislead us to 
think that the governing body had no influence upon an individual church’s practice.  
Questions over doctrine, ordinance, and discipline were routine at association meetings.
66
  
For instance, not long after the Bullittsburgh Church joined the Elkhorn Association in 
June, delegates to that body took up a query over the “devine [sic] Authority” for the 
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Association’s very existence.  Two years later, churches asked Elkhorn to illuminate the 
scriptural basis for funeral preaching and the justification for Baptists’ retail in liquor.67 
An association was expected to respect the autonomy of its member churches, yet, 
as Baptist historian Albert Wardin Jr. notes, “for all practical purposes” an association 
acted as an “ecclesiastical court.”  Indeed, some associational bodies accepted their role 
as their region’s ecclesiastical-appeals court.  In 1805 the Long Run Association 
determined that an excommunicated member of one of its affiliated churches possessed 
the “right to Appeal to an Association” for redress if their former brethren failed to 
receive their pleas.  Furthermore, if the governing body deemed a church’s doctrine 
unsound, its practices unbiblical, it possessed the power to remove the church from the 
fellowship.  This was not a small matter, as excluding one church could lead to division 
not only within that particular congregation, but in the association as a whole.  And in a 
time of increased religious competition, when the religious landscape of the trans-
Appalachian West burned with schism over matters of doctrine and proper church 
governance (and disputes over the necessity of written church covenants), an unstable 
association’s authority could be further weakened if one church’s exclusion led to a series 
of congregational withdrawals.  Thus, if a central responsibility of the association was to 
cultivate harmonious relations between isolated congregations, its failure to do so could 
potentially disrupt or alter the ritual of individual churches.
68
   
By the mid-1780s Kentucky Baptists had already begun constructing such an 
institutional presence in the West.  “The religion of [the early 1780s],” state historian 
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Mann Butler penned in 1834, “most necessarily [had] suffered amidst the pressing 
privations surrounding the inhabitants,” for “it could not have been greatly cultivated 
amidst the struggles with want, and the battles with Indians.”69  Remembering his own 
time in Kentucky during the mid-1780s, John Taylor agreed, noting that “there were a 
number of Baptists scattered about,” but that “every body had so much to do that religion 
was scarcely talked of even on Sundays.”70 Despite these conditions, church-building 
picked up momentum over the course of the decade.  In June 1781, eighteen Baptists 
gathered “in the wilderness under a green sugar-tree” and constituted Severn’s Valley 
Church, the first in Kentucky, and according to an early church historian, the first “in the 
entire West.”71  They were followed later in the year by members of the Travelling 
Church who constituted a new church at Craig’s Station. Within four years, there were 
eighteen Baptist churches in Kentucky.  In 1790, on the eve of statehood, 3,105 Baptists 
and 42 churches were present in Kentucky.  Ten years later, Kentucky Baptists had 
organized six associations, housing just over one hundred churches with a total 
membership of 5,110.  The religious fervor emanating from the 1801 Cane Ridge revivals 
swelled Baptist ranks over the next three years, more than doubling the number of 
churches to 219, and tripling the denomination’s membership in Kentucky to 15,495.  
The number of Baptists in the state increased to 31,689 members in 1820, when the 
population of Kentucky, including slaves and free blacks, was 564,135.
72
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  Kentucky Baptists’ counterparts in Tennessee witnessed similar developments in 
the decades following their arrival in the region during the 1770s.  Baptists first settled in 
the northeastern region of the state, migrating from Virginia and North Carolina during 
the 1760s.  There may have been two churches established in eastern Tennessee in the 
early 1770s, only to be broken up during the War for Independence.
73
  In any case, the 
first Baptist churches preceded those of their Methodist and Presbyterian counterparts, 
and by 1781, there were five or six Baptist churches in eastern Tennessee.
74
  In 1780, 
Baptist settlers traveled through the Cumberland Gap and established churches in Middle 
Tennessee.
75
   Baptists in Middle Tennessee witnessed slow growth until the early 1790s 
when churches appeared “in rapid succession” during the years immediately before and 
after statehood in 1796.
76
  Continued migration and assistance from associations to the 
north and east furthered the Baptists’ cause in Tennessee. Visiting ministers, including 
some from Kentucky, traveled through Middle Tennessee and successfully organized five 
churches, forming the Mero Association in 1796.  Five years later Mero housed eighteen 
churches from both Kentucky and Tennessee.
77
  The Mill Creek Church, a member of the 
Mero Association, emerged as “a center of Baptist strength in Middle Tennessee,” 
influencing the establishment and growth of other congregations in and around 
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  The Mero Association dissolved in 1803, and churches in Middle Tennessee 
coalesced into the Cumberland Association, which by 1806, was home to thirty-nine 
churches and nearly 2,000 members. By 1817 the General Missionary Convention of 
Baptists claimed eight associations representing churches with a total population of 
9,186, over 6,000 of which were in Middle Tennessee.
79
 
Like the members of the Bullittsburgh Church—where a congregation of 200 
“were very compactly settled with their meeting house in a central place”—many 
Kentuckians and Tennesseans’ social, economic, and religious lives revolved around their 
local congregation.
80
 Merchants, budding entrepreneurs, and farmers brokered deals on 
meetinghouse lawns as their congregations assembled for Saturday business meetings.  In 
some areas, the church connected all the neighborhood residents. Taylor noted that in the 
1790s all residents within “a circle from a center of three miles” radiating from his Clear 
Creek Church were members, and that one could use the appellation “brother” with 
everybody that you met.
81
 Detailing his church’s role in the Mt. Vernon Kentucky 
community during the 1820s, Pastor James Fishback insisted the church proved so central 
that “scarcly [sic] one family in the neighborhood” did not have “one or more members 
of the Church in it.”  And, thanks to the church, Fishback concluded, “no neighborhood 
enjoyed more uninterrupted peace, kind feelings and good order & happiness, than did 
the one about Mt. Vernon.”82  
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A church’s centrality in the neighborhood assisted members in enforcing church 
disciplinary decrees and ensured that legal actions taken at the meetinghouse were well-
known throughout the area.   Many of  two-hundred-plus members of the Bullittsburgh 
Church, along with numerous other congregants, probably watched in September 1800 as 
Lewis Conner answered a charge for trespassing into a another member’s orchard and 
stealing apples.  Some served on the investigative committee, and all full members would 
have served as the jury which voted to maintain Conner in the fellowship. Five months 
later, in February 1801, the same members acquitted John Murfey for “having an afray 
[sic] with a Certain man.”83 This communal supervision of individuals’ conduct was 
intrinsic to church discipline.  Relying on the scriptures, most church covenants provided 
for the fellowship’s discipline. When first organized in 1820, for example, members of 
the First Baptist Church of Nashville agreed—along with a pledged “to keep, and 
maintain, a regular Gospel Government—to “give ourselves to each other, in the Lord, to 
watch over, and perform each relative duty.”84  
As purveyors of good order, Baptists and others throughout the trans-Appalachian 
region envisioned churches as law-producing sites and the practice of discipline as a 
viable legal system.  Baptists certainly perceived a difference between state-based law 
and church practices, but the latter’s operations emerged from the immediate social 
relations of the congregational community, and thus, could be a more responsive, familiar 
legal venue. Individuals’ conceptions of their churches’ law making powers can be seen, 
especially, in how they discussed disciplinary procedures. In June 1808, the preacher 
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Carter Tarrant explained to the Mount Gilead Baptist Church that witnesses on his behalf 
would not appear “without [being] legally call’d for by the Church.”85  Looking back at 
his time with the Buck Run Church in the early 1820s, John Taylor insisted the members 
were in peace as “but one legal complaint” had come before the church, and that “against 
a poor negro.”86  As late as 1866, in discussing a dispute between two members of his Mt. 
Olivet Church, the clerk noted that the complaining brother had prepared “the case 
legally for the church.”87  Others routinely referred to discipline as “ecclesiastical law” or 
“Baptist jurisprudence.”88  
 The system of Baptist jurisprudence that observers often referred to stemmed 
from Baptists’ duty of keeping “watchcare” over their fellow church members.  The ritual 
practice of discipline derived its authority from the New Testament, especially the Gospel 
of Matthew and Paul’s letter to the Corinthians.  Baptists did not regard all transgressions 
as equal, and prescribed different procedures and ramifications according to the 
seriousness of the offence. In 1844 the Reverend Eleazer Savage broke down his various 
categories of offences.  He admitted, however, that these categories were not absolute, as 
some offences overlapped the prescribed groupings.  Minor offences constituted those 
which were inherent in some members’ disposition—such as levity, irritability, an 
inclination to speak, act imprudently, or shirk responsibility, etc.—and, he insisted, the 
church should bear the burden of these, their weakest members, rather than gratify 
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themselves through their exclusion.  If one witnessed another member’s transgression, he 
was to follow the gospel steps as laid down in Matthew 18:15-17, speaking with the 
offender in private and only bringing the matter to church if reconciliation could not be 
forged. Baptists sought to deal with such conflict privately because, as Alexander 
Campbell noted in 1828, the “practice of telling all private scandals, trespasses, and 
offenses, to the whole congregation” was “replete with mischief” and could potentially 
alienate members.
89
  For personal infractions, too, those “when one brother injures 
another in his person, reputation, or property,” and sufficient evidence existed, churches 
encouraged members to labor in private for reconciliation before coming to the church 
for recourse.  Public violations were treated slightly different. They were transgressions 
that “equally injure[d] all the members of the church,” and included breach of peace, 
covetousness, heresy, drunkenness, railing, and profane swearing.  The church 
membership as a whole worked with such offenders for satisfaction, resorting to 
exclusion if that effort failed.   
No matter the type of offense, church discipline sought to uphold harmonious 
member-relations through the threat of excommunication.  Churches tribunals did not 
have the authority to corporally punish their offending brethren, but their decrees carried 
social weight.
90
   Especially on the mobile, fluid frontier of trans-Appalachia, church 
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discipline provided an impetus for an individual to practice restraint while far removed 
from traditional institutions of discouragement, such as the family or local government.
91
  
Social ramifications arising from a tribunal’s decision, one historian recently asserted, 
“carried enough moral suasion to change actions and attitudes.”92  
Even well after Kentucky and Tennessee achieved statehood and a more stable, 
less mobile society, exclusion from church fellowship could affect one’s standing in the 
wider community. Revered Savage reminded Baptists of their duty for the strict 
“avoidance of free and familiar” intercourse with excommunicated individuals. After 
one’s exclusion, Savage penned, “he should be made to feel the amazing weight of the 
solemn sentence, by a corresponding conduct, on the part of every member of the 
church,” even “every member of every church.”93 News of disciplinary activities often 
spread through church neighborhoods and could affect one’s business transactions and 
personal reputation beyond the confines of the church fellowship. Hemp-dealer William 
Collins, after being excluded from the Elizabeth Baptist Church in Bourbon County, 
Kentucky, found that news of his contract dispute and excommunication had dispersed 
into surrounding counties, well before he took the matter to the local courts.
94
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Although Collins eventually sought recourse with the Bourbon County Circuit 
Court, churches sought to contain member-disputes within the fellowship.  In a way this 
served to protect a church’s reputation within the surrounding area.  Some congregations, 
such as Tennessee’s Red River Baptist Church, insisted that no member should “divulge 
the infirmation [sic] of one another or till [sic] them to such as are not of our communion 
by any means, when it can be lawfully avoided.”95  Demanding members refrain from 
“going to law”—suing one’s brother before infidels—was another means to maintain 
harmonious member-relations and avoid potential “cross swearing among the members of 
the church” at court.96  Members suing each other at local and state courts not only aired 
members’ dirty laundry in a public setting, but litigation held the potential to exacerbate 
the conflict, even provoke schism.
97
   
Churches leveled charges against disputing members who sought out state 
authority without their sanction.
98
  In July 1825, for example, Brother John Sturgeon of 
the Flat Rock Baptist Church in Shelby County, Kentucky asked, “will the church 
approbate a Bro. to go to law with [another] Bro. in any case or not[?]”  When the church 
answered that it did not, that it in fact disapproved of the practice, Sturgeon entered a 
charge against himself for “going to law with Bro. Isaac Keller.”  Sturgeon insisted that 
he filed suit against Keller “in a friendly way,” and made proper acknowledgements to 
the satisfaction of the church body.  Sturgeon was not alone in his courthouse-actions, 
however, as the church then formed a committee made up of “six Brethren” to investigate 
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“Sister Deborah Bohannon in defending a law suit against Bro. James Bartlett.” In 
August, the committee reported that Sister Bohannon had indeed “erred in agreeing to a 
friendly suit” that had been “brought against her.”  Yet, like Sturgeon, her 
acknowledgements satisfied the church body.  The church ruled that Bartlett, too, had 
“erred in going to law” with Sister Bohannon.  Unfortunately, the clerk of the Flat Rock 
church never recorded Bartlett’s fate in this particular case.99  
Baptists’ insistence of keeping “watchcare” over one another opened the door for 
churches to regulate nearly all aspects of their members’ lives, though one’s race, sex, 
and secular legal status may have made them likely to face certain charges. Men were 
overwhelmingly the targets of disciplinary procedures, garnering 73% of all charges.  
Intoxication charges—making up 14% of all offences—were directed almost exclusively 
at male members (94%).  Other prominent charges, such as fighting or rioting, totaling 
7% of all charges, were also primarily male-focused (81%).  These numbers are rather 
unsurprising, as white-male recreation in the slave states often revolved around drinking 
and defending one’s honor through physical combat.100 Churches recognized this reality, 
and often retained men who fought only when provoked.  For example, when the Pleasant 
Grove Baptist Church charged Richard Nash with fighting, they restored him to 
fellowship after Nash insisted he only fought because he had been “compelled to resist 
and defend himself.”101 For other transgressions as well, charges against men 
predominated.  As married women generally could not agree to contract or represent 
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themselves in court, it makes sense that 96% of breach of covenant cases and 84% of 
“going to law” with another Baptist charges went against males.   
In other matters, however, women made up a great percentage of the accused.  
Twenty-four percent of falsehood, slander, and lying charges went against women.  
Likewise, 40% of dancing/fiddling charges were leveled against female members.  One 
striking aspect of charges against women is that 65% of cases dealing with a member’s 
interaction with another religious sect or denomination involved female defendants.   
This may be due to women’s willingness to assert their religious autonomy in a 
competitive religious marketplace, or a sign that churches more rigorously policed 
women’s religious activities.  In any case, being charged with straying from the 
fellowship was a virtual guaranteed exclusion from the church, as 93% of those facing 
such an accusation were excommunicated.  As historian Susan Juster demonstrated in her 
study of Separate Baptists in New England, by the post-Revolutionary period churches 
increasingly saw women as disorderly, disproportionately charging them for crimes of 
sexual nature and for holding the church in contempt.
102
  But not quite same dynamic 
appears to have played out in trans-Appalachian churches during the early-nineteenth 
century, as the bulk of disorderly conduct charges went against men, as did those of 
slander (76%) and profane swearing (85%).  This may have been due to the presence of 
slaves within many western and southern churches.  As we will see in the next chapter, 
sexually-related transgressions, such as fornication and adultery, were primarily directed 
toward women, especially black women.   
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Top Five Charges Male (% within charge) Female  (% within 
charge) 
 Total Charges (% of 
total) 
Drunkenness 326 (94%) 21 (6%) 347 (14%) 
Disorderly Conduct 223 (71%) 91 (29%) 315 (13%)*  
Meeting Non-Attendance 245 (78%) 67 (22%) 313 (13%)* 
Fighting or Rioting 148 (81%) 24 (19%) 173 (7%)* 
Interaction w/ other sect 47 (35%) 89 (65%) 136 (6%) 
Figure 1.
103
 *One unknown sex 
More than simply a dispute resolution mechanism, however, church discipline 
helped create and maintain the church community, delineating the boundaries and 
privileges of membership.  Even when churches were not vigorously meting out 
discipline or resolving disputes, members actively constructed the contours of their intra-
congregational system of law, and thus the sphere of church authority. Between 1807 and 
1810, the Fox Run Church in Shelby County recorded only four cases, three for 
drunkenness and one for “gaming.”  Despite this apparent lack of disputation or moral 
regulation, concerns about the ritual of discipline remained prominent.  In June 1807 
members voted that church business should “be transacted in a private manner; that is, 
that no persons not of our community should be present.”  This resolution was followed 
by a query on whether it was the duty of the church “to declare to the World” the 
exclusion of “Members for disorderly conduct.”  In July the church voted that they had 
no such duty, that disciplinary procedures should remain internal matters.   A year later, 
in March 1808, the church agreed that “in the future all matters of private grief” between 
members should be “transacted in a private manner when brought before the church,” 
while all other difficulties were to be transacted publicly. Two months later, Fox Run 
took up a proposition on the extent of women’s authority in matters of church 
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governance, and voted in favor of the proposal, exclaiming that “in the future [female 
members] have a vote in all things that may come before the Church.”  In July, however, 
the church opened the floor for more debate on this resolution, finally deciding in August 
1808, “after maturely considering” the matter, that women did not have a “ruling voice in 
the church.”  And finally, in October 1809, a member queried as to whether the scriptures 
provided any mode for bringing complaints to the church other than the “18th Chap of 
Matthew.”  The church laid over the query until July 1810, when it agreed that members 
could bring complaints directly to the church rather than striving to first settle the dispute 
in private.
104
   
These resolutions dealing with the procedure of church discipline—alternate 
modes for bringing complaints, to what audience would matters be aired, the duties of the 
church, and who possessed the power to vote—signals a church body grappling with the 
contours of the disciplinary system itself.  Many Baptists, especially white male 
members, may have still been uneasy about their social status amidst the changing 
religious and secular landscape of early Kentucky.  Allowing non-members, those who 
had not experienced a re-birth through Christ, to watch as churches disciplined their own 
for various moral shortcomings surely gave many members pause, as they knew that 
gossip networks extended well beyond the confines of the church community and that 
accusations at the meetinghouse could affect their business or other social transactions.  
Moreover, the fact that church bodies subjected white patriarchs to the same disciplinary 
actions as free blacks, slaves, and women, directly challenged their civic identities as 
sovereign, independent heads-of-households. 
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Their central neighborhood location, not only ensured that gossip networks 
carried news of their proceedings through the community, but meant that at times non-
members took active roles in cases appearing before church tribunals.  Some outsiders 
even initiated suit at the meetinghouse.  In September 1808, for instance,  the Red River 
Church of Robertson County, Tennessee heard a complaint from a non-member, William 
Stratton who “desired [ that the Red River] church to take it into consideration & try to 
settle the matter of dispute between” himself and Brother Nicholas Darnall.”105 The 
young lawyer and future Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky, Robert McAfee, reported in 
1803 that he had visited “the Holeman’s [B]aptist Meeting House, to settle a dispute 
between two men.”  Although he further reported that “nothing was done,” his brief 
mention of his intended role in the dispute does complicate our understanding of church 
autonomy, or rather, the role of outsiders in mitigating differences between church 
members.  McAfee, a lawyer, saw nothing unusual in dispute resolution within the 
church, as he mentioned the church matter as casually as he did cases he was pleading in 
the local court.  Other non-members testified in matters heard by local church bodies.  In 
the mid-1840s, four individuals, “not members of any church” testified on behalf of the 




Although Baptist churches were autonomous units, claiming jurisdiction over 
their own members, they relied upon a network of “sister” churches which provided 
information and often assisted in difficult disputes. Churches back east required members 
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alert the church body of their intention to move, gain letters of dismission, and settle any 
standing grievances or debts.  Trans-Appalachian churches examined these dismissal 
letters meticulously.  If much time had passed since an individual’s former church had 
vouched for their conduct, or if a new arrival claimed to be a Baptist but had no letter, 
their new church inquired into their recent doings.  In January 1833, for instance, the 
clerk for Nashville’ First Baptist Church was ordered “to write the church on Mill 
Swamp, Isle of Wight County, Virginia, concerning Anthony, a servant formerly a 
member of said church.”107  Some churches placed expiration dates on their dismission 
letters and reminded departing brethren that the letter could be revoked if they did not 
speedily join another church. The Franklin Association related to its affiliated churches in 
1827 that dismission letters should “be considered as credentials for one year only.”  If 
more than a year lapsed, and the dismissed had not joined “some sister Church in the 
vicinity of their residence, they be considered as having violated covenant obligations, 
and become liable to censure.”108   
Others served as information networks that worked to spread the godly discipline 
across the mobile region.  In June 1804, for example, the David’s Fork Church sent a 
letter to the Indiana Creek Church with reports on the conduct of the latter’s Sister R. 
Jones, “in order that it may be settled among themselves.”109  Even when a member 
traveled far from the bounds of the church, he or she carried the reputation of the 
congregation with them and were still answerable to the church body for transgressions.  
The Flat Rock Baptist Church of northern Kentucky excluded John Hansbrough in 1814 
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after a church in Knox County, Indiana Territory “informed by Christian proof” members 
at Flat Rock that he “had been guilty of profane secularizing and other profane 
conduct.”110 This vast network of Baptists, rooted in local communities but extending 
across county boundaries, state lines, and mountain ranges, helped serve as an important 
mechanism for ordering the mobile society.    
 Of course, Baptists did not shun the secular legal system.  Indeed, they could not 
if they wanted to secure title to their land or file a will.  And from the beginning of 
Kentucky settlement, Baptists played integral roles in civil governance.
111
  In 1785, for 
instance, James Garrard, a Baptist who settled in the western country two years previous, 
returned to Virginia as the new representative to the state Assembly from Fayette County.  
Garrard later became a justice of the peace Bourbon County, as did at least five other 
Baptists who had migrated with him to Kentucky.
112
   Likewise, Leonard Young, a 
member of the Bryan’s Station Church, was also Fayette County’s Justice of the Peace, 
and thus was intimately involved in producing law in both legal venues.  In 1803 he 
entered rape charges against Richard Tomlinson at the November church meeting, 
charges he had been informed of by the victim in his role as county magistrate.
113
 
Moreover, as will be discussed in greater length in Chapter Three, some churches 
sanctioned members to seek recourse at local courts.  
But for much of the first decades after settlement, there remained no truce 
between an evangelical religious culture rooted in communitarian ethos and a burgeoning 
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liberal legal regime.  As historian Stephen Aron notes of Kentucky after the turn of the 
century, “lawyers jeered evangelicals” and “evangelicals scorned lawyers.”  Church 
discipline itself, was a way for churches to “maintain order” without the assistance of 
lawyers, as the accused acted as the arbitrator and the members as jurors.  Indeed, church 
discipline served as an important venue for dispute resolution because courts were 
“clogged by land litigation” and seemingly governed by greed.  Church tribunals, “swift, 
simple, and seemingly democratic,” Aron notes, were “everything disheartened 
Kentuckians wished their legal system to be.”114  By the end of the antebellum period, 
many trans-Appalachian church-goers claimed just the opposite, elevating the workings 
of state-based courts while claiming that faction and prejudice governed their churches’ 
legal operations.   
It is also impossible to completely disentangle the legal system of the church and 
that of the state.  Early state constitutions, including those of Tennessee and Kentucky, 
said little of religion or God, yet neither did they articulate notions of free thought or 
religious equality.  Instead, they incorporated provisions which favored Protestant 
Christianity over other faiths, and required religious oaths for office and court testimony.  
Furthermore, although clergy were generally barred from holding office, most state 
constitutions noted the importance of organized religion for society’s morality and virtue, 
and all states retained or enacted laws protecting the Sabbath from desecration, as well as 
other moral regulations pertaining to bastardy, fornication, profane swearing and 
blasphemy.
115
 Tennessee politicians secured Christianity’s place in their state, insisting 
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that “no person who denies the being of God or a future State of rewards and 
punishments” could hold any civil office.116  Tennessee did not successfully regulate 
alcohol consumption through the legislative arena, but the religiously-inclined did pass 
measures for regulating Sabbath observance, gambling, and dueling during the first 
decades of the nineteenth century.  Churchgoers, particularly female members, often led 
the charge in passing such moral regulations.
117
  In Kentucky, Baptists and other 
evangelicals utilized state courts as forums through which they critiqued the larger 
culture. Historian Christopher Waldrep has shown that during periods of revival, 
evangelicals tried to extend their influence over grand juries, only resorting to church 
tribunals when they felt their power waning alongside declining revivalist fervor.
118
   
But, in the end, Baptists dispensed discipline and produced law in their 
communities in the shadow of state authority. State-chartered acts of incorporation 
empowered churches in constructing and maintaining their communities. Any number of 
individuals could voluntarily congregate for a common purpose, but incorporation 
imbued these associations with the authority to create their own laws and to hold 
members accountable to their strictures.
119
 Kentucky’s general incorporation statute only 
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extended that legal privilege to Christian denominations.   In an 1842 decree, too, the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals legitimated churches’ disciplinary actions by deferring to 
ecclesiastical authorities in cases which involved individuals’ membership status.120 
Likewise, the Tennessee legislature passed a law in 1801 to protect churches’ worship 
services, exclaiming that "any person [who] shall interrupt a congregation assembled for 
the purpose of worshiping the Deity, such person shall be dealt with as a rioter at 
common law."  Fourteen years later, in 1815, the legislature, noting that some citizens 
were "wickedly and fatally bent to disturb” those committed to worshiping the Deity, 
claimed the 1801 law was ineffective.  Its strengthened reincarnation prohibited 
interrupting worship or violating "any rule or regulation, which may have been adopted 
by [the churches] for their own government, and good order."  In 1824, legislators banned 
trading in "ardent spirits" within one mile "of any place of public worship, and forbade 
"offering to sell, within view of any worshiping assembly on the Sabbath day any article 
of traffic whatsoever, in such a manner as to disturb such worshiping assembly."
121
  In a 
similar vein, the Kentucky General Assembly authorized grand jury indictments “for any 
trespass, damage or injury done to any church, meeting house, or encampment, erected 
for religious worship.”122 
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During the early days of settlement, bringing one’s dispute to the local church was 
not abnormal.  Law existed “everywhere and nowhere,” as courthouses were not always 
available.  Although local governments increasingly assumed greater responsibility for 
regulating the public order after statehood in the 1790s, “there was no single location for 
law.”123 Circuit courts met in any building that could accommodate the proceedings, 
locations that otherwise served a variety of purposes.  This process continued throughout 
the trans-Appalachian West’s developmental stages, as the legislature carved new 
counties out of older ones, and new institutional seats of judicial power were imagined, 
designed, and built.
124
  Churches, too, often lacked official meeting places.  
Congregations assembled in members’ homes, in shared community (“republican”) 
meetinghouses, or, on occasion, at the local courthouse.  Nonetheless, churches served 
such important roles in community life that as towns grew and individuals dispersed from 
neighborhood centers, they—as in the case of the Bullittsburgh Church—demanded their 
church institutions followed suit.  
Even after the north-central Kentucky and Middle Tennessee emerged as a more 
economically and socially complex societies during the second decade of the nineteenth 
century, churches continued as central legal sites.
125
 It was not unusual, then, for Baptists 
to invoke their churches’ authority when settling domestic or property-related disputes.  
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In 1809 Brother Boyce asked his fellow Baptists at Bryan’s Station “If a member of the 
Baptist order have a claim on two persons jointly bound by a written contract,” and one 
of them was a Baptist and the other was “under no church government,” but both 
“refuse[d] to comply with their contract, to what tribunal” should the aggrieved party 
seek recourse?” Boyce’s query at once illuminated his expansive vision of law and a 
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CHAPTER 2. CHURCHES, THE STATE AND THE “PERPLEXING DIFFICULTIES 




“Oh that the church could be freed from such perplexing difficulties…”1 
 
In 1813, members of the Big Cedar Lick Church in Wilson County, Tennessee 
heard thirteen separate charges against their fellow brethren.  Peppered between such 
transgressions as profane swearing, drunkenness, and disorderly conduct, the church took 
up matters related to the most intimate matters of the household.  A query in January 
asked whether it was “agreeable to the gospel for a female member who is the wife of a 
male member of the Church to become a witness for her husband.”  The church answered 
in the affirmative, that a husband could call his wife for testimony “in any case that he 
may think will be in his favor.”2  Five months later Sister Chandler charged Brother 
Small with telling “an untruth” for claiming she had encouraged her children to abuse 
Small’s children and destroy his property.  In October, the church excluded a slave 
member, Brother Reuben, for “lying and disobedience to his master.” Soon thereafter, on 
testimony from two members, the church excluded Charles Shoemaker for being “guilty 
of the acct [sic] of Buggary [sic].”  Big Cedar Lick members concluded their year with an 
Inter-church dispute between a member of the Cedar Grove Church, David Allen, and 
                                                          
1
 Pleasant Grove Baptist Church Records, December 1845, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Kentucky 
(hereafter FHS). Written by the church clerk, John Williamson, when the church was in the midst of 
settling a divorce suit.  
2
 Interestingly, the clerk did not note whether the church body itself could call on the wife if her testimony 





one of their own, Elder Moore Stephenson.  Allen had accused Stephenson of 
drunkenness, and Stephenson’s son, John, with turning “his mother out of doors” and 
whipping his sister.  A committee visited the Stephenson women, and each insisted that 
Allen’s allegations were “false and without foundation.”  Two other women and three 
men testified about the accusations of Stephenson’s intemperance.  The church eventually 
voted in early 1814 to charge Allen with slander, appointing a committee to visit the 
Cedar Grove church and support their “charges by Gospel Evidence.”3  These instances 
demonstrate how Baptist churches in the early-republican Trans-Appalachian region 
extended their authoritative reach into member homes and served as forum through which 
domestic relations were contested and defined.  
Churches, while not shying away from crossing the threshold into the patriarchal 
jurisdiction of the household, saw their role in domestic regulation change over the late-
eighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries as new cultural and legal understandings of the 
family percolated through American society. Indeed, husband-wife, parent-child, and 
master-slave relationships were all fair game in early church proceedings. Members’ 
disciplining of husbands and masters, unruly wives, disobedient slaves, and philandering 
spouses elevated churches as prominent sites for family regulation.  In some domestic 
relations cases that reached the courtroom, too, judges looked to actions taken by 
churches and the larger community, relying on observers’ statements and church rulings 
to uncover the character of the disputing parties.  By the mid-nineteenth century, trans-
Appalachian churches devoted less time to mitigating domestic relations cases, especially 
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divorce, and adultery, even though divorce cases appeared to be on the rise in local 
courtrooms.  This resulted partially from new Victorian notions centered upon household 
privacy, but also from the gradual reworking of domestic relations law as state lawmakers 
forged direct connections with dependents.  Increasingly, scriptural views on the 
perpetual nature of marriage came into conflict with divorce legislation, legislation which 
loosened the compact’s contractual obligations by providing wider legal routes through 
which to pursue a separation or absolute divorce, and thus, legislation which chipped 
away at husbands’ and fathers’ broad power within their households.   
The prevailing scholarship fails to fully consider the often complementary roles 
played by both legal and religious venues in governing the household.
4
  Historians of 
early-American religion have documented the role of evangelical churches in nurturing 
stable households, especially in the developing communities of the frontier.
5
  Scholars 
have not sufficiently examined how churches interacted with members’ household 
relations alongside the transformation of state-based domestic relations law in the post-
Revolutionary period and beyond.  For instance, historian Monica Najar recently claimed 
that through committee investigations of household matters and the punishment of 
patriarchs for transgressions against their dependents, “church discipline embedded 
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religious authority and, more specifically, the church structure in the architecture of the 
evangelical family.”6  She insists that this served as a “countercurrent” to wider legal and 
cultural reformulations of the household, reformulations which granted male heads of 
household broad power over domestic affairs.
7
    
Najar and others, however, do not fully account for local law’s authority over the 
household which at times quelled the household-head’s actions.  Enmeshed in 
neighborhood- and kin-networks, the family unit was often viewed as a microcosm of 
American society in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, and state 
governments undoubtedly possessed an interest in promoting stable households.  The 
white-male household head’s responsibility was to ensure that domestic order did not 
lapse.  In him state law vested broad authority over dependents—women, children, 
slaves, and wards. But his rule was never absolute, and the family’s discipline was 
entwined in web of social relations spun through local and family relations, church 
affiliation, and business networks.  All these local factors held the potential to thwart or 
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uphold a patriarch’s power within his household.  Churches, in seeking to regulate 
members’ family life, were simply one site among others that circumscribed household-
heads’ power within the domestic sphere.8 
Churches went much farther than local and state courts in challenging the will of 
the household head over his domestic affairs and in regulating members’ daily activities, 
yet during the first-half of the nineteenth century, state governing authority was making 
inroads to the American household. Local courts would probably not take up charges 
against a household head for “permitting his house to be used for theatrical 
performances” as the Cane Run Baptist Church did in 1833.9  But courts would, if a 
spouse entered a divorce or alimony petition in chancery, investigate allegations of a 
household head’s drunkenness and family abuse, just as the Red River Baptist Church did 
in 1814, when such accusations were entered against Brother Nathaniel Bostick.
10
 Local 
courts, though far from the unabashed ally of household dependents, could and did 
punish abusive or negligent fathers and husbands.
11
 Furthermore, over the course of the 
antebellum period, state courts and legislatures across the republic reached deeper into 
the domestic realm.  They constructed direct legal relationships with household 
dependents, and in the process gradually undercut patriarchal authority.   These actions 
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did not completely overturn the common law marriage doctrine of coverture, and 
certainly did not elevate women or dependents to equitable status within the home—
indeed, in many cases the state’s goal was to buttress legal prescriptions by punishing 
those who neglected their responsibilities as patriarchs—but during the early nineteenth 
century, state law assumed control over domestic relations in unprecedented ways.
12
   
To posit Baptist practices as “countercurrent” to state legal practice, as Najar 
does, not only ignores developments in domestic relations law, but misconstrues how 
local law—both church- and state-based—operated in society.13 In some practices, 
churches diverged from state legal practices, most prominently in their institutional 
recognition of slave marriages.
14
 By acknowledging slave marriages, churches departed 
from practices of the secular legal system, yes, but fell in line with the wider culture’s 
acknowledgement of informal marriage and, in particular, the validity of slave marriages 
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  Moreover, law, whether practiced at the local courthouse or 
church meetinghouse, emerged from the community’s social relations. Churches 
investigated the private lives of their members only when transgressions came to light, 
and especially so when reports thereof circulated through the surrounding neighborhood 
and possessed the potential to damage a congregation’s reputation. Local courts, too, only 
examined the particulars of a household’s familial dynamics when one of its members 
petitioned for an absolute divorce, a legal separation, alimony, or when rumors of 
extreme abuse reached the ears of a local justice of the peace, constable, or court official.    
Examining how both religious and state venues operated in defining the marriage 
compact and in litigating cases of adultery and divorce, this chapter uncovers a more 
complete and nuanced portrait of the legalities of domestic relations of the post-
Revolutionary West.  It also illuminates a subtle shift from religious to civil authority in 
regulating the household by the outbreak of the Civil War. Early-nineteenth century 
legislative enactments revolving around marriage, divorce, and alimony, for instance, 
demonstrated that the marital contract, the core relationship of the household, “[f]ar from 
being an institution fixed by God,” was “in the hands” of state legislatures.16   
 
A member of the Clear Creek Baptist Church in Kentucky, “Old Brother 
Castleman,” and his family gave preacher John Taylor great joy.  By the early 1820s, 
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Castleman and his wife had been married “perhaps fifty years.”  The two had been 
baptized together not long after their matrimony, and “raised children, a number of them” 
professing Baptists.  Their grandchildren, too, were attached to Baptist churches “in 
different parts of [the] Commonwealth.”  Indeed, Taylor reported, “[t]he family at home, 
is a pretty respectable church among themselves.” But the family at home included more 
than simply Castleman’s children and grandchildren.  The family owned “many black 
people” and “a number of them” had also been baptized.  In January 1823, two of 
Castleman’s young slaves, one “about ten years old, the other about eight,” were received 
by experience into the Clear Creek Church. Despite their age, “what they related to the 
church could not be objected too,” and the boys followed in the path of their fourteen-
year-old sister who had obtained membership in the church the previous month. Two 
other slaves belonging to Castleman were even licensed preachers.  Castleman had also 
“long kept a great Tannery,” where he trained “numerous” apprentices, many of whom 
had become “professors of religion.”  This extended household, Taylor concluded, “has 
been a great nursery to the Baptist church for near a half of century.”17  
When the recently-married Brother and Sister Castleman were baptized in the 
early 1770s, many of their kin and neighbors may have lamented the couple’s new found 
religious affiliation.  Unlike Taylor writing in the 1820s, during the colonial and 
immediate post-Revolutionary period, many southerners viewed evangelical culture as a 
threat to the family institution, not a nursery of piety and good order.  For detractors, 
evangelical sects too closely resembled marginal religious groups such as the Quakers 
and Shakers.  They seemed to lure individuals away from family connections, and 
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extended power within churches to women and blacks.  This, along with their questioning 
of slavery, their cultivation of the spiritual family based upon church membership (the 
equality of all souls which ignored gender, racial, and social status), and intrusive 
disciplinary methods, convinced outsiders that evangelicals were a threat to the entire 
social order.
18
   
By the turn of the nineteenth century, however, evangelicals were not as marginal 
to southern society as they appeared a generation earlier. Most Upper-South Baptists had 
shed their more iconoclast leanings in regards to slaveholding and gender relations by the 
1810s, increasingly granting full membership rights only to white men, while restricting 
the power of women and blacks in directing church matters.
19
  Disciplinary practices 
continued, but, rather than promoting doctrine and practice that seemed to subvert the 
orderly household, evangelicals largely fell in line with mainstream culture, heralding 
patriarchal authority within the home.
20
  The relation between the orderly church and 
stable families was cemented by the character traits necessary of a preacher.  Specifically, 
a preacher must “ruleth well his own house, having children in subjection; (for if a man 
know not how to rule his own house, how shall he take care of the church of God?).”21  
The contractual church, the foundation of the godly society, was contingent upon well-
ordered households. 
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Evangelicals’ gradual move toward the center of southern society during the post-
Revolutionary period coincided with a legal and cultural re-ordering of American 
domestic relations. Not long after Separate Baptists began widespread proselytizing in the 
Upper South during the 1750s and 1760s, first stoking apprehension in the Anglican 
establishment, American colonists up and down the Atlantic seaboard were questioning 
their relationship with the mother country, a process that necessitated a reformulation of 
household governance as well.  Eventually their questioning of political authority led to 
outright rebellion, as colonial militia squared off against British regulars in the spring of 
1775 and colonies declared independence the following summer.  Influenced by John 
Locke and other theorists who argued that men voluntarily consented to government, 
colonial leaders justified their political split through familial analogies, especially that of 
parent-child.
22
  For many American Revolutionaries, Great Britain, “the haughty Parent 
Country” had provoked the colonies, and as one observer remarked, “when the nurturing 
season is past, the young of all kinds are left to act for themselves.”23 
 This questioning of political authority, alongside increasingly shrill calls for 
individual liberty, engendered the need to legitimize a husband’s authority within a 
household.
24
  Thus, Locke’s ideas on political consent were remolded to serve the 
household.
25
  The white-male patriarch, though invested by the state with broad authority 
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over his dependents, was expected to provide and protect those under his care.  Women 
voluntarily consented to the governance of her husband upon marriage—her legal 
identity, through the common law doctrine of coverture, merged with her husband’s—
and, just as white men voted for leaders in the political sphere and expected protection 
through state laws, women, upon entering the marriage contract, could assume sanctuary 
under their husbands’ rule.  Children, slaves, and other dependents had a duty to obey the 
household head as well, only displaying disobedience if the father, master, or guardian 
proved abusive or negligent in his responsibilities.
26
   
Initially, this contractually-based, “republican family” did not make as great of 
inroads into slaveholding states as it did in the North.  Republican ideology infiltrated 
nearly every aspect of life during the post-Revolutionary period.  Its aversion to 
illegitimate authority and government encroachment, its elevation of property ownership, 
self-governance, individual virtue, and a social-relations-by-contract vision for society, 
cemented the republican polity with the republican household. Republicanism served as a 
continuing “frame of reference” for northern domestic relations law as the competitive, 
atomizing effects of market capitalism infiltrated the northern household.  This 
transformed household relations as dependents carved out their own identities and 
immediate relationship with the state.  Although, as historian Michael Grossberg insists, 
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“[m]ale authority remained supreme throughout the nineteenth century,” law slowly and 
subtly re-worked power within Northern households.
27
   
In the South, slavery—and the centrality of the master-slave relationship in 
buttressing the region’s social order—proved a deterrent, though not complete obstacle, 
to the transforming effects of market capitalism and the contractual ethos of the liberal 
political- and economic-order.  Prior to the Civil War, relations of hierarchy and 
dependence—not egalitarianism and consent—largely governed Southern households.28  
The state connected to dependents through the household-head.  Slaves, women, and 
children, observers believed, had no other government than that of the family.  By 
subordinating white women and slaves through this patriarchal ideology, white men in 
the South constructed a political realm in which they functioned as equals. “The 
discipline of the family,” one antebellum observer noted, “is that which renders the work 
of the government easy.  When that discipline is perfect, the reign of order and of virtue 
in the state is established,” and when domestic governance lapsed, it threatened the 
stability of the entire social order.
29
  Unsurprisingly, southern state-lawmakers sought to 
bolster white-male authority, only intervening into the domestic sphere when the 
household head abused his powers or failed to adequately provide for his dependents, a 
transgression which undermined the whole system of patriarchal domestic relations.
30
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Patriarchy in law and practice was not firmly entrenched during the first decades 
of trans-Appalachian settlement.  Most settlers inherited legal traditions from the 
Carolinas and Virginia, but the frontier experience tested the cultural- and legal- 
patriarchal order. Marriage in much of the settled colonies was viewed as a contractual 
relationship between man and woman, with the husband serving as household head, 
responsible for and sovereign over, his wife, children, servants, and slaves.
31
  In the 
newly-settled western regions, however, the reality of frontier conditions led to more 
tenuous kinship networks and a less solidified patriarchal order. The continued threat of 
Native attack spawned fluid gender identities and provided white women—as well as 
free- and enslaved blacks—greater opportunities than was customarily available in the 
more stable coastal societies.  Prior to statehood, Kentucky’s legal system remained weak 
and enforcement of and engagement with Virginia law was lax.  “It was not uncommon 
1780s,” historian Craig Thompson Friend writes, “to see a woman filing a warrant at the 
land office or attending court as an administrator of her husband’s estate.”32   
Such autonomy for women and other dependents increasingly retracted with the 
arrival of the gentry class in the region during the 1790s.
33
 Although increased 
immigration brought gentry values regarding the proper place of women (specifically as 
an emotional partner of her husband), many whites welcomed some cultural 
prescriptions, and rejected others.  Frontier Tennessee women generally accepted the 
morality of legal marriage, historian Cynthia Cumfer notes, yet “persisted in viewing 
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their domestic role as more akin to that of a vocal participant than a submissive 
helpmate.”  Furthermore, many white women in Tennessee continued to go against legal 
norms by asserting their property rights after marriage.
34
  By the 1810s, a more solidified 
patriarchal order had hardened in the region, and with the War of 1812, Kentucky had 
emerged as an Old South state, Craig Thompson Friend argues, “fully controlled by and 
rooted in the honor-driven culture of white southern manhood” which benefitted “white 
men by negating opportunities for blacks, Indians, and white women.”35  At the same 
time, white men in Tennessee crafted a government that limited the meanings of 
citizenship for blacks and women.
36
 
Even after the region’s culture of patriarchal-hierarchy hardened during the first 
decades of the nineteenth-century, the household-head’s rule was not an absolute 
monarchy in which he dispensed justice with little outside supervision or repercussion.  
Local courts were generally not dependents’ first stop when seeking protection from an 
abusive patriarch.  Although treatise writers and advice columnists in the turn-of-the-
century trans-Appalachian West stressed the household as an autonomous unit, women 
especially, sought to posit their homes within a larger community, constructing “bonds of 
sociability, forged in communal networks, gossip, and churches.”37  In close-knit frontier 
communities of the trans-montane region, men and women constructed a world in which 
one’s personal character was extremely important in maintaining economic and social 
relations, and, as historian Cynthia Cumfer notes, relied on gossip networks to “enforce 
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norms about sexuality and honesty.”38  When disputes arose within the household, 
husband and wife could seek outside assistance from churches, friends, neighbors, and 
kin before pursuing the authority of the secular legal system. In the more formal legal 
settings of local courtrooms, too, gossip networks proved important in establishing a 
witnesses’ credibility or the disputing parties’ personal character.39 Neighborhood 
churches were central sites in a community’s gossip network, and these churches, much 
like local courts, sought to enshrine their own conceptions of domestic relations within 
members’ households. 
 
Baptists posited a clear linkage between the household, church, and social order. 
Their initial understanding of family was not the traditional unit formed by bloodlines 
and marriage, but rather a more encompassing view which stressed acceptance of 
Protestant values, and one in which slaves, free blacks, and white women were included 
as spiritual equals.  Similar to Locke’s contractual theory stipulating that individuals 
voluntarily submitted to the state, giving up some rights in order for protection, Baptists 
willingly entered religious society, relinquishing some “worldly” affairs in exchange for 
spiritual shelter.  Baptists valued church membership—a commitment to the church’s 
communal goals—over “earthly” distinctions based on race, class, or gender.40  Thus, 
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kinship did not need to determine familial connections.  The use of “brother” and “sister” 
when addressing fellow church members signified the ability to construct family bonds 
without bloodlines, and by extending these appellations to subordinate groups, Baptists 
and other evangelical groups endeavored “to extend orderly moral community into both 
farmhouses and slave quarters.”41  Indeed, the familial relations of all members, black 
and white, slave and free, fell under the jurisdiction of the local church.  No matter their 
race or gender, all Baptists were “children of the same Father,” just as Jesus Christ “was 
the head of his family, and his apostles [members of] his household.”42 
Each contracting member—each individual who professed conversion and 
accepted the church’s covenant—was bound to inherent obligations. Joining a Baptist 
church entailed individuals’ submission to church authority over all matters, including 
those of the household. Churches sought to regulate anything that threatened domestic 
peace—which, if not quelled could damage the fellowship’s harmonious relations. They 
punished instances of verbal and physical abuse, drunkenness, extravagance, and sexual 
deviance.
43
 They encouraged mothers and fathers to avoid “sending [their children] into 
all the gay fashionable and often vicious scenes of amusement and dissipation.”44  
Members were furthermore expected to “abstain from contributing, going to, or 
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countenancing public dinners or barbecues got up for political purposes.”45  This policing 
of family relations was extended to slave members.  The David’s Fork Church in the mid-
1830s, for instance, excluded a slave member, Ann, “for acting the harlot,” and acquitted 
a male slave, John, of a charge for “rangling [sic]” and “quarrelling with [Ann] as his 
wife.”46   
This communal supervision over all members’ lives could impede a household-
head’s authority within the home. Indeed, whereas heads-of-households in the South 
legally possessed a great deal of authority over their dependents, in practice, many had to 
contend with the prying eyes of neighbors, kin, fellow church members.  Household-
heads, Baptists believed, should not be tyrannical in their governance; rather they were 
expected to be benevolent patriarchs.  If they strayed from the reciprocal duties of their 
marriage contract, or failed to adequately provide for their dependents, then they faced 
admonishment or exclusion from their local church, not to mention potential punishment 
from the state.  In 1822, the Flat Rock Church of Shelby County, Kentucky excluded 
Brother James Vaughan for “unmerciful treatment of an orphan child.”  Similarly, a year 
later, the church excommunicated Brother Joseph McCarly for attempting suicide and 
“for mistrting [sic] children that [were] under his care.”47  In other cases, dependents’ 
utilized their churches to air grievances against their household head, as when Sister 
Frances Pride demanded either her excommunication from the Fyke’s Grove Primitive 
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Baptist Church or a committee appointed to settle a difficulty she had with “her father 
and his wife.”48 
Baptists also at times diverged from secular prescriptions of domestic relations by 
insisting men as well as women were responsible for children’s educational and moral 
development. In the decades following the Revolution, historian Linda Kerber insists, 
America’s secular sphere relied upon “righteous mothers…to raise the virtuous male 
citizens on whom the health of the Republic depended.”49  Although surely Baptists 
expected wives and mothers to inculcate republican virtue in their young, they also 
articulated a vision of the household in which each spouse was dependent upon the other 
and created a family unit of shared responsibility.  This was especially true in relation to 
promoting the cause of religion within the household.  In 1803, the David’s Fork Baptist 
Church in Lexington appointed three members to labor with Brother Lewis Berry “in 
order to shew [sic] him his duty in family worship night.”50  In 1831, leading Baptists in 
Kentucky reminded “heads of families,” to bring their “children up, in the nurture and 
admonition of the Lord,” reading them Scripture and providing them with “good advice.” 
51
 The following year, Elkhorn Association’s circular letter warned that “we fear [prayer] 
is too much neglected by heads of families.”52 Furthermore, at least one Baptist 
governing association, referred to both spouses as “‘heads of households’ with 
                                                          
48
 Fyke’s Grove Primitive Baptist Church, September/October 1836, SBLA.   The committee did settle the 
difficulty between Sister Pride and her father, but unfortunately for her, also uncovered “that she was in a 
state of pregnancy” and she was excluded from the church.  
49
 Kerber, Women of the Republic, 10. 
50
 David’s Fork Baptist Church Records, March 1803. 
51
 Records of the Elkhorn Association of Baptists, 1831, 6-7, SBTL;  
52





responsibility for maintaining religion within the family and household.”53 For Baptists, 
the patriarchs’ duties included instilling religious values in the household.   
But nineteenth-century Baptists’ focus on constructing households of shared 
responsibility was tempered by the injunctions that women should be submissive to their 
husbands and that servants and slaves obey their masters.  These prescriptions for 
evangelical family life largely aligned with those emanating from other cultural and legal 
sources during the post-Revolutionary period. A patriarch’s duty to instill moral values in 
the household did not necessarily lead to any greater deference shown to his dependents.  
In 1831, for instance, the Elkhorn Association reminded area Baptists that women should 
be “keepers at home” who “love” and remain “obedient to their husbands.”   Servants, 
Elkhorn’s circular letter continued, should “be obedient unto their own masters,” not steal 
or talk back, and display “good fidelity” in all things.  And, despite Revolutionary-era 
churches offering women some sliver of “citizenship,” to women as Monica Najar 
contends, nineteenth-century churches largely upheld the proper roles of husband and 
wife disseminated throughout the wider legal culture.  For instance, in 1828, when Sister 
Hannah Morton composed and sent a letter of grievances against her pastor to the 
Bryan’s Station Baptist Church, she only did so with the “sanction” of her husband.54  
Likewise, when the Buffalo Lick Church brought up a white member for “using the rod 
on a black brother,” members voted he had not violated any church rules.55 
Churches also charged female members for their actions within the domestic 
sphere, relying upon male members to investigate and rule on such matters.   The Long 
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Run Baptist church leveled charges against Sisters Esther Casey and her daughter Evelin 
for “keeping a disorderly house,” appointing a committee of ten men to investigate, who, 
“after a short retirement” called for the women’s exclusions from the fellowship.56  In 
1820 the Harrod’s Creek Church charged Nancy Carder with “quarreling with a 
neighbour [sic]” and “disobedience to her husband,” and four months later charged Eliza 
Dunnagin for “neglecting her famely [sic] conserns [sic]” and “for not being in 
Subjection to her own husband.”57 Two years later, the church excluded Sister Edmons 
“for threatening to whip her husband and after words [sic] puting [sic] her threats into 
circulation.”58   
Churches did, indeed, take up charges against household heads for overstepping 
their authoritative role, but these instances appear spottily in church record books, and 
did not always work out in the dependents’ favor.  The Elk Lick Primitive Baptist Church 
leveled a series of charges against Brother Farier in August 1812, including wife abuse, 
intoxication, and profane swearing.  Farier admitted that he abused his wife and drank too 
much, but denied he ever used coarse language, to which the church voted satisfaction 
and retained him in fellowship.
59
 Similarly, in 1823, J. Gardner admitted to the Red River 
Church that while out of town on business he had drank to excess.  His wife claimed that 
upon his return “he abused her & one of the children, and made use of foul language.”  In 
response, Gardner claimed “he did not remember it,” but “did not deny it, not knowing 
what he did or said” since the alcohol had “made him almost beside himself.”  He 
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apologized for his alleged, though unrecalled, behavior and the church restored him to 
fellowship.
60
  Neither Sister Farier nor Sister Gardner of Red River found protection from 
their abusive spouses at their local churches.  Instead, their churches served as institutions 
through which patriarchal prerogatives were substantiated.  
Despite these broad actions to regulate household relations, antebellum observers 
often lamented churches’ decreased authority over familial matters.  By the 1830s, church 
leaders in the slave states began to more enthusiastically disseminate northern ideals of 
domesticity.  Like Castleman’s nursery of piety, the home became a church, “a sanctuary 
tended by wives and mothers.”  Most importantly, it restored moral authority to the 
home.  This, historian Christine Heyrman, notes, led to a “withering of congregational 
discipline” as many families sought greater privacy in domestic matters.61 In the 1840s, 
one religious periodical in the region even advocated to “avoid going from house to 
house for the purpose of hearing news, and interfering with other people’s business,” a 
far cry from the strictures of “watchcare” advanced earlier in the century.62  Increased 
notions of family privacy, however, served as only a part of the cause for receding church 
discipline over household matters, as these ideas merged with gradual transformations of 
family law that restructured the legal household in the first-half of the nineteenth century.   
 
For some time prior to the fall of 1809, Eliza Bainbridge had taken up residence 
with Capt. Norborne Beall in Spring Station, her children in tow.  In August, Eliza’s 
husband, Absalom, sent a letter to their daughter, Juliet, demanding she return home 
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immediately lest he had to “whip [her] home.”  Juliet’s mother might have been satisfied 
with “going to hell herself,” but Absalom was determined the rest of his family would not 
follow her.  “Do not you know,” he implored to Juliet, that “I am by the Laws of God & 
man Lord & master of my Family & that I have a right [to] Chastise every one [sic] in it 
if they do not obey me in all things reasonable?”  Bainbridge noted to his daughter that he 
was sure Capt. Beall wished that he had never meddled with her mother.
63
  Yet, the 
following month Absalom sent Beall a formal notice accusing him of “harbouring [sic] 
and detaining my wife Elizabeth Bainbridge contrary” to his consent.  “Unless [Eliza] 
speedily returns home, Absalom asserted, he would “resort to legal redress” against Beall 
and apply for a divorce from his wife.
64
  Eliza apparently did not quickly return, for in 
December, Absalom sent a letter to her at Spring Station, cryptically warning that he 
would spend all the money he could raise “& every drop of blood in my body” to attain 
satisfaction against Beall.  “Should I die before him if God will permit me[,] I will haunt 
him & every white person on the plantation.”  Beall, Bainbridge concluded, was “a target 
I shall allways [sic] keep my eye on.”65  
Bainbridge’s words and actions in regard to his wife’s apparent abandonment—
and perhaps adultery—signify both the hardened patriarchal ideology guiding Kentucky’s 
culture in the early-nineteenth century, as well as the practical reality of its limitations.  
White-male patriarchy, as noted above, remained weak, and gender roles more fluid, in 
                                                          
63
 Letter from Absalom Bainbridge to Norborne Beall, ca. August 1809 and letter from Absalom 
Bainbridge to Juliet [Bainbridge], ca. August 1809, Beall-Booth Family Papers, Folder 45, Norborne Beall 
Correspondence, 1809, FHS. 
64
 Bainbridge to Beall Notice, 25 September 1809, Beall-Booth Family Papers, Folder 117, Norborne Beall 
Papers, Business Records: Agreements, 1803-1820, FHS. 
65
 Letter from Absalom Bainbridge to Mrs. [Eliza] Bainbridge, 4 December 1809, Beall-Booth Family 





frontier and early-statehood Kentucky.  In 1809, with Kentucky arriving at the threshold 
southern values, however, Bainbridge interpreted his rights as a father and husband 
through both the laws of God and man, insisting he held broad authority, in all matters 
“reasonable.”66  Legally speaking, as the head of household, Bainbridge did possess the 
right to induce the obedience of all his dependents.  Yet Eliza Bainbridge’s actions 
demonstrated her own willingness to buck his authority and find refuge elsewhere, and 
perhaps force his hand in filing for a divorce, just at the time when the Kentucky 
legislature was tinkering with the stipulations—the reciprocal duties of husband and 
wife—of the legal marital contract.67 
Religious groups in Kentucky and Tennessee often deplored the ease with which 
the state governments granted divorce, at times pressuring their legislatures to reform the 
laws.  By the end of the antebellum period, despite the growing frequency of divorce 
cases in local courts, Baptist church record books and observers’ comments demonstrate 
that churches were growing more reluctant to discipline their members’ marital 
transgressions. This did not necessarily mean that trans-Appalachian Baptists became less 
faithful or less zealous in their interpretation of the Scriptures in regard to domestic 
relations, but it does signal a re-envisioning of religious and state authority, as churches’ 
lack of such discipline implicitly deferred power to civil governance in handling such 
affairs. 
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 Churches decreased role in household matters was rooted in changes in American 
law and culture that re-worked household relations in the decades following the 
Revolution.  As noted above, these changes took hold in the industrializing North much 
quicker than in the slave states.  By the 1850s, however, historian Peter Bardaglio argues, 
the North’s individualistic, contractualist philosophy for family life began infiltrating 
southern culture. State governments exerted even greater influence within southern 
homes after the Civil War than in the decades preceding it.  But the sectional strife did 
not mark a clear line between continuity and change, as shifts in domestic relations law 
during the antebellum period regarding slaves, married women’s property rights, divorce, 
and child-custody, signaled the infiltration of liberal social relations in the prewar 
South.
68
 Southern state legislatures, especially in newly settled in-land areas, enlarged 
married women’s property rights over the course of the late antebellum period.  These 
legislators were not revolutionaries seeking to establish equal gender relations; rather, 
they were reacting to a changing economic and cultural landscape.  In 1839, for instance, 
amidst the financial fallout of the Panics of 1837 and 1839, Mississippi enacted measures 
allowing married women to hold property in their own names, and subsequent legislation 
in that state provided for wives to profit off such land, enter into contracts, and sign 
deeds, all without interference from their husbands.
69
    
Other state legislators felt pressure to reform because of the widening domestic 
role Victorian society attributed to women, assigning them greater responsibilities within 
the household. Much of this stemmed from the awareness that married women needed 
greater legal recourse to secure their economic standing in case their husband failed to 
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support the family or wagered all in the unstable market and lost.
70
  This line of thought 
was not lost in the trans-Appalachian region. As early as 1843 Judge William B. Turley 
of the Tennessee Supreme Court, distinguishing America’s system of domestic relations 
from the uncivilized feudal systems which preceded it—systems which looked to the wife 
and children as property of the husband—described such dependents “as having equal 
rights to all the enjoyments of life, and as safe and adequate protection for them, as the 
husband and father.”71  
 The marriage compact was central to the colonial and post-Revolutionary 
American household. Its conceptualization as a private contract stretched back deep into 
the English legal tradition.  In their efforts to define marriage in the new republican legal 
order, nineteenth century lawyers pulled from colonial statutes and common practice, two 
sources which themselves were grounded in diverse intellectual strands such as Calvinist 
thought, English ecclesiastical law, and the common law.  Although differing in many 
respects, these sources agreed that marriage was a private contract with public 
repercussions and thus requiring communal supervision and regulation. Over the course 
of the colonial period, community supervision waned, but state law still emphasized the 
civil, or public, nature of the marital contract.
72
  After the Revolution, however, many 
American observers and lawmakers reacted against this emphasis, envisioning marriage 
instead as largely a private contract among consenting parties, and one that could be 
terminated by the spouses.  Yet, tensions between marriage’s public and private nature, as 
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well as the inherent inequality of the consenting parties, simmered over the course of the 
antebellum period.  
 Observers and legal theorists during the nineteenth century struggled to neatly 
define the marriage contract.  United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story noted in 
1841 that marriage was “something more than a mere contract.”73  Justice George 
Robertson of the Kentucky Court of Appeals waxed similarly in 1838.  Marriage is, “in 
one sense, a contract,” as it is a “concurrence of two competent minds,” but, “unlike 
ordinary or commercial contracts, [it] is publici juris, because it establishes fundamental 
and most important domestic relations.”  Robertson continued that all organized societies 
were interested in the harmony of its member-relations, and that marriage, as the most 
basic and useful of social relationships was “regulated and controlled by the power of the 
State, and cannot, like mere contracts, be dissolved by the mutual consent only of the 
contracting parties.”74   
As something more than a mere contract, its regulation fell under the sovereign 
will of the state.  The marital contract, Kentucky courts exclaimed on more than one 
occasion, was “subject to the public will, and not to that of the parties.”75  Indeed, for 
some lawmakers, civilization’s progress depended upon policing marriage relations.  As 
Judge Jacob Peck of the Tennessee Supreme Court exclaimed in the 1830s, the 
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“refinement of a people, and the purity of their morals, are perhaps better tested by the 
regard which the laws have to the enforcement” of the duties arising from the marital 
contract, more so “than from any other source.”  Taking a tongue-in-cheek jab at his 
state’s divorce laws, Peck continued that “it may be safely said, that when a people 
become lost to the binding obligation of the marriage contract, they are verging to a state 
that threatens the social compact.”  When the marriage contract was looked down upon, 
or even with simple indifference, it was a sure sign that the community was 
“retrograding.”76 
 In the Revolutionary-era trans-montane region, however, there was little 
institutional control over the marriage contract.  Due to a lack of licensed preachers in the 
region and the sheer distance of state institutions, frontier residents often married 
illegitimately, without religious or state sanction.
77
  Institutional control over marriage 
remained inchoate at best in early-statehood Kentucky, as the persistence of illegitimate 
marriages through the 1790s forced religious and state authorities to address the issue.  In 
1795, the Bryan’s Station Baptist Church excluded Elizabeth Ross for living with a man 
as her husband and not being “lawfully” married.78   Three years later, in 1798, Kentucky 
lawmakers consolidated the Commonwealth’s marriage laws.  The state assembly 
"returned marriage to local church authority" by requiring marriages to be performed by 
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licensed Christian ministers.  Formalizing the terms of the marital contract, individuals 
had to navigate the religious sphere in order to attain state recognition.
79
 Similar 
conditions existed in eighteenth-century Tennessee.  The Anglican minister Charles 
Woodmason journeyed through the backcountry of the Carolinas during the 1760s, often 
making note of the marital practices of frontier inhabitants.  He lamented the lack of 
ministers in the region, and claimed that through the “licentiousness of the People, many 
hundreds live in Concubinage—swopping their Wives as Cattel [sic], and living in a State 
of Nature, more irregularly and unchastely than the Indians.”80  As with Justice Peck after 
him, Woodmason entwined civilization with proper gender relations funneled through the 
marriage contract.   
Although initially the fluid frontier conditions of early Tennessee, as in Kentucky, 
weakened state authority over marriage, by the turn of the century, government had 
increased its role in defining the marital terms.  Judicial efforts to enforce marriage rules 
in the late-eighteenth century often stumbled when the matter resided with a jury of 
peers, and sexual relationships remained unsolidified, with little push back from either 
secular or religious authorities.  In many cases, local courts only intervened in cases of 
needed support for illegitimate children.
81
  State legislatures throughout the young 
republic, however, eventually monopolized the formal power to regulate marriage, 
directing who could marry whom, the procedures and validity of such nuptials, the legal 
responsibilities of the each party, and, the conditions for divorce, alimony, and the modes 
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for pursuing these actions.
82
  Each state had its own legal peculiarities when it came to 
policing marriage.  Legislation specified the type of divorce allowed, the grounds for 
divorce, what constituted “abandonment,” and what rights women held over property 
brought to the union and money made off that property during the marriage.
83
   
 Baptists and other evangelicals did not deny the importance of the state in 
regulating the marriage contract, rather, like many of their judicial counterparts, they saw 
it as both a religious and secular compact. “Marriage is a civil as well as a religious 
institution,” Baptist reformer Alexander Campbell wrote in 1828.  “It is, therefore, a 
proper subject of civil legislation.”84  As a public and private contract, evangelicals 
agreed marriage necessitated the backing of civil authority.  The issue of property 
transmission certainly played a major role in this need, but so too did moral issues.  One 
Tennessee Baptist, referring to a couple who was married by someone who was not a 
magistrate or a licensed minister, asked rhetorically “[c]ould their children, by the old 
English law, inherit the property?  By no means,” he gathered, for, in “the eyes of the 
law, no marriage existed.”  If such “informal marriages” were pronounced lawful, the 
writer concluded, then “[a]ll order would be abolished, and the greatest immorality and 
libertinism [would] succeed” throughout society.85  Indeed, stable marriages were seen as 
so important to the social fabric that some observers and lawmakers went to great lengths 
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to promote the institution and allowed for rather extensive state regulation of marital 
relations.  The Methodist circuit rider and editor of the Tennessee Whig, William 
Brownlow, praised Alabama lawmakers who in late 1839 proposed a bill taxing 
unmarried white males over the age of twenty five.  “We should like to see such a law 
passed in Tennessee,” he asserted, but with an additional clause “that all who court, or 
make marriage contracts” with no intention of seeing their pledges through should be 
imprisoned, while those “who have married one wife,” yet continue “prowling about their 
neighbor’s houses” should be sent to the penitentiary for at least one year, and no more 
than ten.
86
 Though Tennessee and Kentucky legislators did not go as far as fining 
bachelors, they did implement a variety of laws centered upon the marriage institution.   
Beginning in 1799 and continuing throughout the early-republican and 
antebellum-eras, Tennessee expanded its divorce laws and proved an easier place to seek 
and obtain a martial dissolution than many other southern states.
87
  Imbued with 
Revolutionary-era ideals of individual liberty and facing the realities of a mobile pioneer 
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society, Tennessee set down rather progressive divorce laws.
88
  In 1799, the Assembly 
passed, “one of the most liberal divorce statues in the country,” allowing local courts to 
decree a divorce if the parties met simple statutory conditions.
89
  In order to obtain an 
absolute divorce (divortium a vincula), a party had to prove their spouse’s guilt relative to 
adultery, bigamy, desertion, or impotence.
90
  A push back from religious groups led to the 
Act’s repeal in 1807, only to see it reinstated in 1809 after a flood of divorce petitions 
reached the legislature.  From 1796 to 1810 alone, at least eighty-eight petitions for 
divorce reached the state assembly, 50% of which were instigated by women.
91
  In 1825 
legislators passed a measure designed to relieve women whose husbands had abandoned 
them, setting aside any property she had attained since the separation from seizure to pay 
for her husband’s debts.  Over the following decades, the Tennessee Assembly continued 
to remold the contours of the household, constructing measures which, while not 
completely disempowering the patriarch, provided greater access for his spouse to 
interact with the state.  
The 1830s and 1840s witnessed even more extensive legislation in Tennessee 
which allowed women greater autonomy when seeking to exit a marriage. In 1831, the 
Assembly voted to allow women to have no-cost divorces (provided their bill was 
successful) and dispensed with, for women at least, the required four-week successive 
publication of the divorce in the local press.  An 1835 amended divorce bill went further, 
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allowing for married women to sue for divorce in their own names and stipulated that 
divorced spouses could re-marry without any waiting period, as if the first marriage had 
never taken place.  Furthermore, a wife could obtain a divorce and gain a right to alimony 
if, after being charged by her husband with adultery, could prove that her husband 
allowed her to work as a prostitute, “or exposed [her] to lewd company.”  Women acting 
as complainants in a successful divorce bill, too, were entitled to “the absolute enjoyment 
of such real estate and to the entire dominion and control of such goods and chattels” 
which they may have received from their husbands, acquired through their own industry, 
or inherited from a relative dying intestate.  The bill did note, however, that husbands 
who successfully obtained a divorce, and possessed a right or interest in any of his former 
wife’s lands or tenements or hereditaments, retained such rights of interest.  Moreover, a 
wife found guilty of adultery could not claim a dower in her former husband’s estate, was 
not entitled to alimony, and her husband retained rights in any property she may have 
held.
92
  Despite these latter stipulations which sought to control female sexuality, the 
1835 Act, by expanding divorced wives’ rights after the dissolution, allowing them to sue 
in their own names,  and assume sole control over any property they had acquired, 
certainly provided greater recourse, or at least greater incentive, for an unhappy wife to 
seek a legal divorce.  In 1840, the legislature allowed married women of good character 
who had resided in Tennessee for at least two years the ability to sue for a divorce on any 
legal grounds, even if the offences had occurred while she lived in a another state.
93
  Two 
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years later, the legislature passed an act which allowed for absolute divorce in all cases 
which had previously met standards for a legal separation and empowered courts to grant 
divorced wives “such part of the real and personal property of the husband as they shall 
think proper.”94 
 Kentucky’s divorce legislation, though not as progressive as Tennessee’s, still 
chipped away at patriarchs’ expansive power within the household. Two years after 
passing “An Act for the Solemnization of Marriages” in 1798—which imparted the 
power to officiate wedding ceremonies, among other things, to ordained Christian 
ministers—Kentucky passed its first alimony law.  Empowering all courts of quarter 
sessions with jurisdiction in alimony cases, the Act provided women an opportunity to 
seek financial assistance from husbands who had abandoned them for more than one year 
in succession, had lived in open adultery with another woman for at least six months, or 
“in cases of cruel, inhuman and barbarous treatment.”  Upon a decree for alimony, the 
husband’s power over the wife, his legal authority over her through the common-law 
form of coverture, ceased, and she was free to buy, sell, and transfer property without any 
hindrance from her husband, “in the same manner as if she was a feme sole.95  This act 
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did not actually provide for a legal divorce, but acknowledged that circumstances arose in 
which it was better off for the woman to have maintenance provided her by her estranged 
husband, and that she should have her legal identity restored.  
Nine years later, however, the Assembly did pass a law stipulating the conditions 
for a divorce.  “An Act Regulating Divorces in this Commonwealth” granted circuit 
courts the authority to decree a divorce to a husband if his wife was living in open 
adultery, had been convicted of a felony in the United States, or if she had abandoned 
him for the space of three years.   Similarly, women could attain a divorce if their 
husband was living in open adultery, had abandoned her for more than two years, had 
been convicted of a felony anywhere in the country, “or where his treatment of her [was] 
so cruel, barbarous and inhuman as actually to endanger her life.”  Section Six of the Act 
specified that, upon a decree for divorce, the offending party, say the adulterous husband, 
was not released from his duties as husband, and “he shall nevertheless remain subject to 
all the pains and penalties which the law prescribes against a marriage” while his former 
wife was still alive.  The injured party, in this hypothetical case, the wife, was enjoined 
from marrying again within two years from the divorce decree.
96
  Over thirty years later, 
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in March 1843, the General Assembly amended the 1809 divorce act, laying out new 
requirements for a divorce.  A husband could now attain a divorce if his wife was 
pregnant by another man before the marriage without the husband’s knowledge, in cases 
in which his wife was malformed to the extent it rendered “sexual intercourse 
impossible,” and in cases of her adultery or abandonment of one year.  For married 
women, too, the court broadened the terms necessary for a divorce.  It shortened the 
requisite length of a husband’s abandonment from two years to one, and provided divorce 
for in cases of a husband’s impotence, his habitual drunkenness, and his cruel treatment 
meant to “destroy her peace and happiness.”  Furthermore, sections four and five of the 
act released both parties from the marriage contract upon a divorce decree in favor of 
either party.  No longer would husband or wife have to uphold the obligations of 
marriage despite their legal divorce.
97
 
 Like other states that enacted divorce statutes during the post-Revolutionary 
period, Kentucky and Tennessee’s legislation was an effort to reassert state authority over 
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transmission of property. In passing such divorce bills, legislators sought not to weaken 
the marriage institution, but to perfect it by clearing out ruptured contracts.
98
   Legislators 
not only accepted the actuality of marital relations—that adultery, bigamy, and desertion 
occurred in their states—but believed that by eliminating patriarchy’s worst abusers, both 
the marriage institution and society as a whole would be more stable.
99
  
In reality, however, these enactments possessed the potential to destabilize 
household-heads’ authority by granting more avenues for their dependents’ interaction 
with the state.  Post-Revolutionary divorce laws were unprecedented in Western society.  
By noting barbarous or cruel treatment as a condition for divorce, state legislatures, not 
only made it easier for unhappy wives to seek a divorce, but removed the legal protection 
for husbands’ corporeal punishment of their wives.100 Like Kentucky and Tennessee, 
most states gradually expanded divorce laws during the post-Revolutionary period, a 
sign, historians have noted, which gives “compelling evidence that the contractual 
ideology of the Declaration of Independence resonated through [legislators’] thinking 
about spousal relations.”101  
Judges still expressed misgivings when mitigating divorce suits as they tried to 
rectify the sanctity of the marital contract with the states’ liberalizing divorce laws.  
Justice Robertson, in Logan v. Logan (1841), expounded his view of the marriage 
contract as well as the power of state courts to dissolve the marital relation.  Both parties 
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of a matrimonial compact, he averred, needed to understand that having bound 
themselves together “in the most sacred and endearing of all earthly relations” both 
“human and divine law” required they forebear each other with kindness.  “If this cannot 
be done,” the Chief Justice continued, then both parties “‘must suffer in silence.’” Courts 
were not forums through which individuals found the “cures for all the miseries of life,” 
and unless there was evidence of cruelty, a Kentucky court did not have the authority to 
separate “those whom ‘God hath joined together.’”102  Couples seeking a divorce in the 
post-Revolutionary and antebellum-United States understood that by breaking the terms 
of their mutual contract, they offended “the larger community, the law, and the state, as 
much as offending” each other.103   
The local community, over the course of the first-half of the nineteenth century, 
served as the most effective disciplinary forum for regulating marriages, and 
neighborhood churches emerged as key institutions through which communities policed 
spousal relations.
104
 Trans-Appalachian Baptists often dealt swiftly with charges 
pertaining to divorce or separation. The Flat Rock Baptist Church noted in April 1813 
that Peter Young and his wife Polly had separated, “and each of them beings talked to 
express that they have no idea of living together again.”  Such expressions earned their 
immediate exclusions from the fellowship.
105
  In other instances, churches refused 
individuals membership because of their domestic situation.  In January 1810, George 
Nation attempted to join the Tick Creek Baptist Church of Shelby County, Kentucky, but 
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objections arose “in consequence of his first wife’s leaving him and refusing to live with 
him.”  He had subsequently married another woman, and the church body concluded that 




 Churches’ decisions in divorce cases did not occur in a vacuum, and state 
authorities often looked to members’ actions when deciding such matters.  For instance, 
when William Babb petitioned the Tennessee State Assembly for a divorce from his wife, 
Elizabeth, in 1822, he did so with the backing of his fellow church members, 79 of whom 
signed a supporting statement.
107
  Some judges also reviewed churches’ disciplinary 
activities when mitigating spouses’ quarrels.  In 1834, Archibald Logan and Eleanor 
Robb, “both nearly 70 years of age” married in Lexington, Kentucky.  By 1838, “their 
domestic peace was disturbed by intemperate complaints and upbraidings [sic]” made by 
Eleanor.  For his part, Archibald did little “to soothe the deeply moved feelings of his 
discontented and irritated wife.”  It did not take long for their marital woes to attract 
public attention, which, “instead of stifling” their discontent, as Justice Robertson 
exclaimed, “seemed only to inflame [Eleanor’s] heated passions.”  As both were 
members of local Presbyterian Churches, Archibald sought the intervention from his 
fellow church-goers.  But this too only “added fuel to the fire.”  Eventually, Archibald 
left their home, the necessity of which, he later insisted, was “the only alternative 
consistent with [the couple’s] honor and happiness, the decorum of their neighborhood, 
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and the interests of the church.”108  Logan, by going to his neighbors and fellow church 
members for aid, along with Justice Robertson’s apparent perplexity over the church’s 
failure to pacify the discontented Eleanor, demonstrates that the relationship between 
religious authority and that of the state was envisioned as more fluid and less 
dichotomous than has been previously suggested.  
 Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Nathan Green followed a similar course in his 
1844 decision in the case of Payne vs. Payne, turning to church members for assistance in 
determining the disputants’ character. Eliza Payne sought a divorce from her husband, 
W.L. Payne, for “gross abuse” and threats of “physical violence.”  Green noted that both 
were members of the local Methodist Church.  “The ministers of that church, and other 
members, speak of the [Eliza’s] Christian character in the highest terms; but that of the 
defendant in equivocal language.”  Most disturbing to Green was witness testimony 
which claimed W.L. Payne, “at family devotion, prayed the Lord to deliver him from his 
wife, in whatever way he might think best.”  Although both were church members, Green 
concluded, Eliza surrounded “the family alter [sic] as a matter of duty and pious 
privilege,” while her husband “profanely call[ed] upon God” in order to threaten his wife, 
and thus, her remaining in the marriage would be “intolerable.”109  
Although courts resorted to strenuous investigations of each spouses’ behavior, 
and the overall domestic situation which led to the divorce petition, most Baptists still 
decried the ease of civil divorce.  In 1825, the Long Run Association of Baptists, one of 
Kentucky’s largest such bodies, received a query from a member church on whether “a 
man who puts away his wife” or vice versa, was an adulterer if he then married another.  
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The Association responded that according to the Scriptures, any man who put away his 
wife, except for the cause of her adultery, himself committed adultery.  “And we came of 
opinion,” the body concluded, “that an act of the Legislature of the State cannot justify a 
course of conduct” that God condemned.  Anyone, then—even with a legal divorce from 
the state—who married a second time was guilty of adultery and should be held to the 
discipline of his or her church.
110
  Over two decades later, area-Baptists still lamented the 
law of the land regarding divorce.  The Baptist Banner exclaimed in the late 1840s that 
Kentucky’s law of marriages was “not a bit more binding upon the parties than jumping 
over the broom-stick.”  Virtually “any pretense,” the paper insisted, could be brought up 
by husband or wife and the “Legislature and courts” would find it sufficient for a divorce 
decree.  More than a blemish upon the marriage institution, such practices were 
“destructive to the morals and purity of society, a disgrace to the parties” and their 
extended families, and “a foul stain upon the escutcheons of the Commonwealth.”111  
Despite these laments, when churches did take up matters of domestic strife, they 
were likely to find that the interested parties did not appreciate the intrusion.  Church 
cases revolving around domestic relations held the potential to cause a larger fissure in a 
church’s social fabric and could signify individuals’ weariness over their neighbors and 
fellow brethren prying into their private affairs.  The Elk Lick Primitive Baptist Church 
in Scott County, Kentucky excluded James Neale for adultery in August 1846.  Five 
members, however, voted against exclusion, two of which, Jacob Neale and Penelope 
Jones, refused to fall in line with the church majority on the matter.  A committee was 
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formed to labor with the dissenters.  They reported in September that Neale and Jones 
remained unreconciled with the church’s actions.  When a vote was taken whether to 
continue them in fellowship, a majority voted for their excommunication.  Five more 
dissenters voted against this action, which led the majority to sanction their exclusions as 




 Similarly, in November 1845, the Pleasant Grove Church brought up Brother and 
Sister Netherton for separating.  The case wore on for nearly four months as the church 
sought explanation from the disputing couple.  Brother Netherton, after being censured 
by the church, eventually made satisfaction to the charge and immediately thereafter 
requested a letter of dismission.  Netherton may have requested dismissal from the church 
because he did not appreciate his fellow church members’ prying into his private affairs.  
Sister Netherton, making clear her thoughts on the church’s role in the case, however, 
“refus[ed] to hear the church” on the matter and was excluded in March 1846.  The 
church clerk, in a rare candid moment expressed what surely many Baptists felt when 
such cases swept through their congregations: “Oh that the church could be freed from 
such perplexing difficulties.” In the following years, the church did free itself of such 
difficulties involving its white members.  Of the five cases centering on adultery, 
seduction, or marital separation that the Pleasant Grove Church heard from 1846 through 
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Throughout the period, trans-Appalachian Baptist churches disproportionately 
disciplined the sexual and family lives of their black members, especially their enslaved 
brethren.  Baptists and other Protestant groups of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth 
centuries encouraged slaves to marry, holding them to the same standards of martial 
fidelity as white church members.
114
  Charges against enslaved members’ fornication and 
adultery fill post-Revolutionary church minute books.  For instance, the Harrod’s Creek 
church quickly excluded “Sister Fanny belonging to Br. Evins for the sin of fornication” 
in August 1820.
115
  At other times, the church court became a venue in which to punish 
large numbers of slaves at one time, as was the case in November 1804 when Asa 
Tompson, a member of the Bryan Station’s Church and future sheriff of Fayette County, 
Kentucky, charged five “black members for the sin of adultery.”  Three of the accused 
belonged to Asa Tompson, one to Clifton Tompson, and another to a “Tandy” and it is 
unclear whether the last was a church member or not.  Asa and Clifton Tompson insisted 
that they had “dealt with” the accused and that “they all confest [sic] the fact.”  Despite 
this alleged confession, not one of the accused adulterers answered the church’s citation 
and all were excluded from church fellowship, which may signal that some slave 
members did not welcome church authority over their sexual lives.
116
  Ultimately, 
however, membership in a church, and its institutional recognition of slaves’ marriages 
was conditional, and seen as a privilege by church bodies, perhaps more so for enslaved 
members who had been deemed by the wider society as naturally immoral and unfit for 
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the marital compact.  To become a church member was to fall under the jurisdiction of a 
higher authority.  Harrod’s Creek Baptist Church succinctly relayed this vision when in 
1820 its brethren excluded slave-member Milly for her alleged adultery, not only from 
the church fellowship, but from “the privileges of the Laws of God.”117 
Free and enslaved blacks were not always passive victims of Baptists’ quest to 
instill monogamous marriage practices, as they too stepped into the mix, utilizing the 
mechanism of church discipline to articulate their own visions of spousal relations.  Bro. 
Austin, a member of the Red River Baptist Church and the property of Josiah Fork “made 
known to the church” a difficulty between him and a female member in October 1814.  
After an investigation, it appeared that Austin was dissatisfied with Sister Rachel, 
because he thought her “conduct toward her husband did not comport with that of a 
Christian.”  Two male slaves testified to the same, and the church body excluded Rachel 
in April 1815.
118
  Likewise, in 1824, John, a slave and member of the David’s Fork 
Baptist Church entered a charge against his fellow slave brethren, Polly and Condorus, 
the property of a non-member, for the sin of adultery.  The church excluded the 
transgressors the following month.
119
  More than simply a tool for social control, or a 
way of disseminating their own values of marriage upon their slaves, church discipline 
served as a instrument for slaves to police their own communities.  John’s charges against 
the slaves of another master and Brother Austin’s accusations against Rachel show slaves 
taking advantage of their churches’ governing authority to regulate their fellow 
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bondsmen’s familial relations.  The slave neighborhoods’ gossip networks could prove as 
central to instilling godly discipline as white’s accusations.  
Although Baptists stressed the importance of faithful marriage for their black 
members, and placed much weight on charges brought by slaves against their fellow 
bondsmen, church bodies were intimately involved in regulating slaves’ marital relations 
and did not tolerate slave members’ acting without the authority of the church body.  
When James, the property of a non-member, “exercised a gift contrary” to the order of 
the Bryan’s Station Church, and had “likewise undertaken to marry Negroes,” a 
committee was formed to investigate.  The case was laid over for nearly a year until July 
1792 when James confessed to holding “Publick meetings” and “marrying black people.”  
The church acquitted him after he agreed to cease his transgressions.
120
  James’s actions 
directly challenged the authority of the church by preaching without its authorization, and 
the fact that he married black people compounded the situation.  In a similar October 
1795 case, Sam, also a slave and member of Bryan’s Station Church was charged for 
holding “disorderly” meetings and “marrying black people.”121  The members of Bryan’s 
Station Church were not against slaves getting married.  Indeed their promotion of slave 
marriage can be witnessed through their continual charges of adultery leveled on their 
slave members. Between their constitution in 1786 and 1860, Bryans’ Station Church 
leveled thirty-two charges of adultery upon black brethren, while in turn, only charging 
one white member with the same crime.
122
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Early Baptists did not always exclude slaves convicted of adultery, and at times, 
implicitly recognized the difficulties the slave institution created for maintaining marital 
relations.   In order to preserve the peace of the fellowship, some churches simply 
acquitted slaves in adultery cases, avoiding the necessity of rectifying slavery with 
notions of Christian monogamy.
123
  In July 1810, the Tick Creek Church of Shelby 
County, Kentucky cleared “Henrey [sic] belonging to Brother Dupey and Rose belonging 
to Brother Hansborough” of adultery.  Henrey and Rose already had spouses, but despite 
this, the church thought that “they had better live together as husband and wife than to 
part.”  The church clerk did not record the details of the case.  Perhaps both of their 
spouses had been sold off to distant regions, and Tick Creek members realized that any 
familial stability for its enslaved members was better than isolation.  Or, just as likely, 
Brother Dupey and Brother Hansborough worked out the particulars themselves, and 
encouraged the rest of the church to let the matter rest.
124
  In any case, examples such as 
the underlying tensions inherent in a system that at held slaves accountable for fulfilling a 
lifelong contract while simultaneously denying their ability to voluntarily enter into any 
other contract.   
A church’s authority over its enslaved members was subsumed by the master’s 
authority over his bondsmen.  Not only did churches often seek a master’s permission for 
a slave to become a member, but one’s marriage was subject to his will as well.  At times 
churches also served as institutions for punishing those acting without their owner’s 
sanction.  This proved the case in May 1806 when the Red River Baptist Church 
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suspended “Sister Bess for marrying a man against her master’s will.”125 Despite this 
however, some Baptist churches sought to stabilize slave marriages.  Tick Creek 
members resolved in September 1810—most likely in response to the case of Henrey and 
Rose—that “We believe it is contrary to scripture and good Order for Masters who have 
Servants to part them from their Husbands and wives,” but also parted slave spouse 
should not “marry again whilst their former companion is living.”126 
Churches’ quest to regulate slave marriages proved even more difficult when 
marriages crossed the line between slave and free.  In July 1821, a report came to the Red 
River Church that Bro. Luke, a slave, was “married to a free woman.”  After forming an 
investigative committee for the matter, the church took up a query from a member 
inquiring whether it was “right for a slave member of the Baptist Church to marry a free 
woman?”  The church voted, concluding, “that is not right.”   The following day, the 
male members present withdrew to hear the report of the committee regarding slave 
Luke’s transgressions.  Luke had not “sinned by marrying as reported,” the committee 
stated, but he had committed fornication, “for he had copulation with a girl which we do 
not conceive he had any right to claim as his wife.”  Luke’s actions, they continued, were 
not “even agreeable to the customs of slaves.”  The church subsequently 
excommunicated Luke from the church fellowship.
127
  The church’s comments do 
indicate that some Baptists acknowledged the difference between their visions of 
marriage and “slave customs” regarding family life.  Yet their actions also demonstrate 
the peculiarity of slave marriage itself.  As the husband, Luke, upon marriage, would 
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theoretically assume the duties of household head.  But how could one who is a slave 
assume patriarchal duties of a husband?  How could he provide for his household, a 
household he may not even be able to live in?   
Churches navigated similar situations when a free black male married an enslaved 
woman, and these cases too illuminate the tension between the marriage contract, the 
slave system, and church authority.  When Caleb, a free black man, was charged by the 
Fox Run Baptist Church with adultery in October 1824, he claimed that he had only 
married another woman because his first wife was “in [the] possession of Br. Oswald 
Thomas” and Thomas had forbidden Caleb from seeing her.  “After a thorough 
investigation,” the Fox Run Church collectively agreed “on a view of the whole 
circumstances of the case” to acquit him.128  Even as a free black man, Caleb could not 
assume the patriarchal responsibilities of a husband, could not even visit her, as his wife 
already fell under the authority of Thomas. The forced separation of married black church 
members occurred often enough that Baptist governing Associations received queries 
from affiliated churches on the matter while other evangelicals took to the press in search 
of answers.   As early as 1786, Kentucky’s first Association received a query asking 
whether it was “lawful for a slave being an orderly member and compelled to leave his 
wife and move with his master about five hundred miles, then to take another wife?”129  
In1812, the Long Run Association, urged its member churches to “act prudently and 
tenderly toward that afflicted people” when “a black member, having his wife taken from 
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him and removed to a distant part” married another.  Interestingly, the Association said 
nothing of how to deal with a female slave if the roles were reversed.
130
   
Similar debates appeared in the religious press during the antebellum period as 
evangelicals sought to delineate churches’ role in recognizing and maintaining slave 
marriages.  One anonymous writer, Onesimus, insisted in 1830 that God had “placed the 
essential principles of marriage within [slaves’] power.”  Being “human” and thus 
“rational creatures” slaves were fully capable of understanding the “obligations of a 
voluntary pledge.”  A slave was “on equal ground with his master” in regards to marital 
responsibilities and was “equally bound to fulfil his engagement.”  The church, however, 
had “nothing to do with it,” even when slaves were forcibly separated from their partners.  
“The guilt,” Onesimus insisted, resided with “the man” who separated the spouses, “and 
the misfortune to the slaves.” Churches had the right to punish masters who sold their 
slaves for covetousness or “cupidity.”  But even so, they should “sympathize with the 
suffering party, and encourage his submission” to his contractual obligations.  Separation 
did not end the marital contract, Onesimus concluded, claiming there was “just cause to 
doubt [a slave’s] religion” if he or she “violate[d] a pledge of this solemn kind for a 
temporary gratification.”131  Onesimus, though holding slaves accountable for marital 
fidelity, believed that owners were central parties in their slaves’ marriage contracts and 
thus could also be punished by the church for separating spouses.   
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Unsurprisingly, this was not a universal view.  Corinthinus, responding to 
Onesimus in early 1831, disagreed, and pointed to state law’s failure to recognize slave 
marriages.  If “there be no legal marriage with our slaves, there is no marriage at all,” and 
“consequently, [slave marriages] are not under the letter of the gospel discipline.”  
Indeed, slaves’ “orderly or disorderly” conduct should be subject to church discipline, but 
to insist that slave marriages were lawful was an attempt “to change the original order 
and design” of the marriage institution.  If Onesimus desired to recognize slave marriages 
based upon consent or affection, that was one thing, but forbidding separated slaves to 
find other partners upon separation, was not within the jurisdiction of the church.
132
  Too 
much stress had “been laid upon masters who separate slaves from their companions.” 
Corinthinus did not proclaim such masters blameless, conceding instead that blame was 
“divided” amongst any number of people depending upon the situation.  The importance 
of Corinthinus’s argument, however, lies in his deference to state authority over slave 
relations.  Workings of church tribunals in relation to slave marriages were subject to the 
jurisdiction of civil law.  Since there was “no legal way to marry” slaves, churches could 
not punish slaves for adultery or masters for forced separations, because, he concluded, 




Despite this view by some, churches continued to treat slaves’ family life, and 
marriage in particular, as “under the letter of gospel discipline.”  For instance, like its 
sister church at Bryan’s Station (who leveled 32 charges against black members for 
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adultery and only 1 against white members from 1786-1860), the David’s Fork Baptist 
Church focused its discipline toward its black members.  From 1803 to 1860, church 
members took up 57 adultery charges.  An overwhelming 55 of those were against black 
members.  Likewise, of 10 fornication charges, 7 were leveled against blacks.  In other 
household matters, too, the church exerted greater authority over its black relations than 
white.  The church recorded charges of spousal separation or abandonment against 3 
blacks and only 2 whites, while 7 blacks and 3 whites faced charges of mistreatment of 
family.
 134
  This churches’ disproportionate focus is made even greater when we consider 
the timing of these charges.  After 1830, 100% or adultery charges within the David’s 
Fork Church were directed toward black members.  Likewise, black members were the 
only ones to be accused with mistreating their family through the late-antebellum period.   
Not all churches directed their disciplinary focus solely towards black members, 
as the churches making-up my complete data set actually saw a brief period where the 
percentage of adultery charges against whites grew after 1830.  From 1800 to 1830, 77% 
of adultery charges went against black members.  That number retracted to only 64% 
from 1831 to 1860.  But this rate fell almost identically with an across-the-board decline 
in excommunication rates—a sign of growing tolerance, or at least hesitation over church 
involvement in the matter.  From 1800 to 1830, 75% of those facing a single charge of 
adultery were excommunicated from their churches, while only 64% of accused 
adulterers faced the same fate from 1831 to 1860.  Meanwhile, in cases of divorce, 
separation, or abandonment, the excommunication rate fell from 50% between 1790 and 
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1830, to 45% from 1831 through 1860.
135
  As churches either ignored such transgressions 
all together or treated them more moderately, religious observers took notice, decrying 
the weakened state of discipline’s authority over the marital contract.  
 
In 1856, the Tennessee Baptist dedicated a number of columns to the issue of 
divorce and second marriages.  Having received “several queries touching [upon] the 
marriage of persons divorced” editor J. R. Graves published an anonymous piece 
lamenting the shortcomings of churches in disciplining their members’ marital relations.  
Referencing the gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, Graves noted that any man who 
divorced his wife and married another, committed adultery.  The same went for the wife.  
If she married again, then she was guilty of adultery.  “Here,” the writer lamented, “is one 
instance where the laws of our land are in open conflict with the plain word of God.”  
The editorial did not lay out plans to change state law, but rather reminded churches that 
they “must exclude the brother or sister who marries after a divorce.”  Much more was at 
stake than the transgressors’ eternal salvation or even the sanctity of the church body.  “If 
men and women could marry, and upon tiring of each other, procure a divorce and marry 
again…without being considered guilty in the eyes of God or men,” then “the marriage 
institution” might as well as be “at once abolished, and Free Love be the order of the 
day.”136   
The article provided enough stir that it was re-published in The Western Recorder, 
along with a critical response from the anonymous writer, “Z”.  Z exclaimed that if 
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churches acted upon the author’s advice—to exclude members guilty of remarrying—it 
“would be so destructive of the peace of the churches” and “the happiness and usefulness 
of many of its most pious members.”  Z agreed that adultery was a valid cause for 
divorce, and that the innocent party should be able to remarry.  He went further, however, 
proclaiming that spousal desertion—a sign of an “alienation of affection” which “defeats 
all the designs of marriage”—was also a valid condition for a second marriage.  Anything 
less acted “as a restraint upon the natural liberty of the innocent.”137  Underlying this 
exchange (like the between Onesimus and Corinthinus) was the issue of church authority 
versus state law.  In Tennessee, spousal desertion proved a valid condition for divorce, a 
fact some religious observers lamented.  Replying to Z, the anonymous writer admitted 
that adultery was the one justifiable cause for a second marriage after a divorce, and that 
“[n]o earthly laws can trample down the laws of God, or make that right which has 
[been] solemnly pronounced [a] wrong.”138     
 Bubbling tensions between legislative enactments and scriptural injunctions 
continue to fester in the pages of the Tennessee Baptist through 1856.  One editorialist, 
Amicus, noted that the subject of divorce and remarriage was of vast importance.
139
  “The 
fearful increase of divorce cases in our State, particularly, calls loudly for repudiation,” 
he exhorted, noting that at least two hundred divorce cases, mostly over “trifling causes”, 
had appeared “before our Court [in] the last two sessions.”  Amicus allowed that the 
“word of God” stated that only adultery was a justifiable cause for absolute divorce.  But 
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for him that was not reason enough to dispense with the prevailing legislation.   The 
“laws of our land”—indeed, all states with the exception of South Carolina—provided for 
divorce and remarriage for causes other than adultery.  Although in some cases these 
laws conflicted with God’s laws on the subject, this did not render state legislation void.  
“These laws are backed by no small authority,” he asserted, “and are recognized as valid 
by the Lord Jesus Christ himself,” and, as professing Christians, “we are expressly 
commanded to obey [state laws].”  Echoing the common consensus on the institution, 
Amicus reasoned that marriage was both a moral and civil contract, and in cases of 
desertion, especially, the “moral part of the contract” had already been “nullified.”  The 
“civil part of the contract” fell “under the jurisdiction of the civil law.”  Individuals who 
sought “divorces for ample legal causes,” were “legally clear and by no means chargeable 
for adultery” by church tribunals.  And they certainly should not “be turned out of the 
church for marrying after a fair legal investigation and absolution by the decree of the 
court.”  Amicus made clear that the guilty party in the divorce, whether in cases of 
adultery or desertion, were sinners “of the deepest dye,” but that some concessions had to 
be made.  Reality demonstrated that divorces “have, do, and will forever occur,” and 
thus, “they must be disposed of in the very best way possible,” and that did not include 
excommunicating the innocent party for remarrying.
140
 
Amicus’s editorial clearly lifted the authority of the state above the laws of God in 
matters of divorce and second marriage.  The state enacted such laws “for the wise 
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regulation, the safety, and welfare” of their communities, as well as “for the protection of 
[Tennesseans’] individual rights and interests.”141  Upon taking up divorce cases, 
churches should defer to legislation and court decrees.  Of course, not everyone agreed 
with Amicus.  An “Old Fashion Baptist” lamented in 1858 that many men divorced their 
wives for less than Scriptural reasons, that “American legislators and learned judges 
justify the marriage of parties divorced,” and had thus legalized adultery. It was to the 
“everlasting shame” of those individuals who strove to “induct [divorce and remarriage] 
into Baptist churches” by claiming it was “a very harmless institution.”142 
After the Civil War, some Baptist observers still lamented the state of affairs 
when it came to divorce, second marriage, and adultery.  If anything, their comments 
buttress the argument presented here that church bodies had grown lax in policing their 
members’ domestic relations, conceding the “legislation of Christ to the legislation of 
man.”143  In two essays published in late 1868 and early 1869, Jirah D. Cole, D.D., 
decried the state of marital affairs that had developed in the Western states over “the last 
quarter of a century.”  A number of groups, he insisted, had been waging war on the 
marriage institution, and their effects were visible through “the growing laxity of 
opinions regarding the sacredness of marriage” manifested not only through “legislative 
enactments” making divorce more easily obtained, but churches’ retention of such 
members who were “guilty of a palpable infringement of the law of marriage” as set 
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down by the Gospel.
144
  “The evils of human legislation on the subject of divorce,” he 
insisted, “have invaded the Christian churches of the present day, and entrenched 
themselves therein.”  It was widely known and discussed that there were “in very many 
of our Churches, in these Western States especially, members in good standing” who had 
separated or divorced from their spouse and married another.  “They have secured the 
sanction of human laws to a so-called divorce,” but one which “the law of Christ 
repudiates.”  In receiving, and then retaining, these transgressors’ as members of their 
fellowship, church bodies were “continually encouraging the whole train of wrongs, from 
the incipient domestic disagreements to an adulterous life under the name of a second 
legal marriage.”  By raising the “legislation of man” above that of Christ’s teachings, 
Cole concluded, the faithful had “silently submit[ted] to the usages of the times.”145  
Churches’ deference to the “usages of the times” was a constant concern for 
preachers, editorialists, and many Baptists throughout the trans-Appalachian West and 
across the United States.  Although many observers in the late-eighteenth century 
believed that the upstart Baptists threatened the southern household and the entire social 
order, over the course of the first-half of the nineteenth century evangelical culture 
moved toward the mainstream of southern society.  Baptist churches still insisted upon 
broad authority over their member’s actions.  But in regards to household relations, 
church discipline, rather than serving as a countercurrent, largely mirrored local state-
based law when taking up cases between quarreling or adulterous spouses.  Even in their 
recognition of slave marriage, churches’ authority was often overshadowed by 
slaveowners’ prerogatives and further hindered by slaves’ legal incapacity to enter 
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contracts.  Furthermore, changes in cultural and legal understandings of the household led 
to a disciplinary decline after 1830.  During the post-Revolutionary and antebellum 
periods, as state governments delved deeper into American households, they formed 
immediate legal relationships with many dependents and gradually undercut the 
household-head’s power in domestic matters.  Divorce legislation, especially, tinkered 
with the terms of the marital contract and clashed with Baptists and other evangelicals’ 
scripturally-based views that marriage was an indissoluble endeavor.  This, along with 
the growth of a middle-class propagating Victorian values of domesticity and family 











CHAPTER 3. PROPERTY DISPUTES AT CHURCH AND AT LAW: ECONOMIC 




“Did he sue his brother before infidels or not?” 1 
 
 
In November 1831, Jacob Creath Jr. became guardian to the infant son of the 
recently-deceased Sydney Bedford.  He also agreed to manage Bedford’s estate, which 
included four slaves.  Henry Foster and two other men entered as securities on Creath’s 
behalf, all agreeing to serve as such until the ward Bedford came of age in 1848.  Foster 
belonged to the David’s Fork Reformed Church outside of Lexington, where Creath 
regularly preached.  After hearing that Creath planned to relocate with his wife, ward, 
and slaves to Missouri, however, Foster made clear in October 1839 that he would 
withdraw from the contract if Creath left Kentucky.  Creath refused to release Foster 
from the bond, as the ward would not be of age for another nine years, and claimed that 
the original agreement made no stipulations about his remaining in Kentucky.  Seeking 
release from his security—and a return of the money he put forth in the original 
agreement—Foster sued Creath and others at the Fayette County Circuit Court.2  The 
David’s Fork Church soon took up the dispute as well, deciding that Foster had 
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committed no wrong.  Having already moved to Missouri, Creath exclaimed “If I was 
[still] in the neighborhood, I would live and die out of religious society, before I would 
trust my character and property with [the church] again.”3 
Creath responded to the matter with a sixteen-page pamphlet touching on his prior 
relationship with Foster, complete with his version of the dispute and explanations for 
Foster’s actions. He charged Foster with gambling, speculating, and slander, insisting that 
the whole affair stemmed from Foster’s covetousness nature. In the end, though, Foster’s 
turn to secular law, and the subsequent failure of the David’s Fork Reformed Church in 
resolving the dispute (at least to his liking), upset Creath just as greatly as Foster’s 
covetousness or his slanderous utterances.  “Foster put legality above morality,” Creath 
lamented, “I put the divine laws above human laws.  I complied with the spirit of the laws 
of man—he trampled the divine laws under his feet.”4 Indeed churches such as the one at 
David’s Fork called upon their brethren to respect civil law when it did not conflict with 
Scripture.  The Baptist preacher George Waller noted in 1818 that professing Christians 
must “strive to fulfil the law of Christ, through which we shall not dishonor the laws of 
our Government.”5  Creath may have “complied with the spirit” of secular law, but Foster 
had committed the sin of suing “his brother before infidels.”6   
Creath’s accusations against Foster and the David’s Fork Church reflect a broader 
reconceptualization of churches’ roles as legal venues during the post-Revolutionary 
period.  Throughout the early-nineteenth century Baptist churches and their counterparts 
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across the West and South sought to contain property-related disputes within church 
walls.  They insisted members refrain from “going to law” and assumed jurisdiction over 
a range of disputes typically considered matters for common law, equity, and criminal 
courts. Church record books are peppered with disputes over trespass, land, probate, 
slave-sales, and theft.  More than simply sites for white members to pursue recourse, 
churches also took up disputes between slaves as enslaved men and women leveled 
charges of theft against each other and sought an authoritative, public site to secure their 
property claims.  Of course, masters and non-slaveholders also utilized church tribunals 
to enforce Kentucky and Tennessee’s consolidating racial order of the post-Revolutionary 
period.  So, from the initial settlement of the trans-Appalachian region in the late 
eighteenth century, churches worked as important institutional-sites for legal production.  
By the 1830s, however, individuals looked less to their churches for dispute resolution 
and moral regulation. Historians such as Christine Heyrman, Randy Sparks, Christopher 
Waldrep, and Gregory Wills have noted the decrease in recorded disciplinary proceedings 
in southern evangelical churches after the 1820s, with further diminishment thereafter.
7
 
But none have looked to how the changing economic and legal landscape of the early-
republican and antebellum-periods weakened church authority over property-related 
disputes.  
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This chapter is concerned with those disputes in north-central Kentucky and 
middle Tennessee.  Like many places in the United States, both areas witnessed extensive 
economic and social change during the first decades of the nineteenth century.  
Individuals’ engagement with national and international markets increasingly supplanted 
face-to-face transactions.  Debt, once considered a moral failing, developed into another 
condition of the marketplace. By 1840, too, when Creath penned and published the 
account of his dispute with Foster, a social-relations-by-contract discourse had assumed 
precedence in American legal and intellectual thought. Contract-law theory recognized 
individuals (white males) “as reasonable, rational, and equal,” and served as the 
foundation for all social relationships.  Rather than stressing communitarian ethos, such 
as those disseminated by some religious groups, contract doctrine elevated liberal 
individuals bound only by “commitments as expressions of their own wills.”8 Antebellum 
legal thinkers heralded law’s dispassionate and predictable outcomes, and throughout the 
early nineteenth century, state law—with its devotion to liberal individual property rights 
for white men—assumed precedence over legalities rooted at the local level, such as 
church disciplinary practices.    
These legal, economic, and social transformations—compounded by the region’s 
growing gentry-class that propagated middle-class values and notions of family 
privacy—undercut churches’ authority over their members’ economic matters.  Within 
this changing atmosphere, some churches, rather than insisting upon their jurisdiction, 
often sanctioned members’ recourse to state-based legal venues in order to avoid 
implicating the fellowship in messy economic disputes. Moreover, when churches did 
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litigate members’ property disputes, their actions were at times entangled with local 
courts’ operations, while others directed their proceedings to restoring brotherly 
affections instead of decreeing an award.  Like Jacob Creath, many church-goers 
expressed dissatisfaction with church rulings.  They pointed to faction, jealousy, and 
covetousness as the prime movers in church-based arbitration, a far cry from that 
practice’s central purpose of maintaining harmonious member-relations.  In contrasting 
their churches’ legal activities with those of the state, these same individuals implicitly 
raised the workings of courts’ perceived objective, predictable jurisprudence over the 
particular, prejudiced rulings of their local churches.
9
  Religious treatise writers lamented 
such passionate disciplinary actions, and like contemporary legal theorists, sought to 
formalize churches’ legal operations by publishing tracts devoted to its authoritative 
scope, proper procedures, and punishments.  Despite this attempt to reinforce “Baptist 
jurisprudence,” many church bodies had already ceded authority over property-matters to 
local and state courts, largely reformulating their tribunals from law-producing sites to 
venues through which to protect member-relations and help solidify the region’s 
hardening racial hierarchy.    
     
Over the past two generations, legal historians, focusing largely on small New 
England communities, have argued that during the colonial and immediate post-
Revolutionary periods, the courthouse became the primary arena for dispute resolution. 
The professionalization and formalization of the colonial legal system—facilitated by an 
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expanding commercial economy and an increase of disputes which stretched across town 
and county borders—led many Americans to seek recourse through courts rather than 
churches. During the early republican era, legal scholar Christopher Tomlins asserted two 
decades ago, law, as opposed to other organizing discourses such as republicanism, 
evangelical Christianity, or political economy, emerged as the young nation’s “modality 
of rule.”10   Yet as historian Laura Edwards points out, although southerners embraced 
law as the “modality of rule” in the early nineteenth century, “they still saw it as their 
modality of rule, a view supported and sustained by the legal system’s localized 
institutional structure, which kept it in close proximity to most people’s lives.”11  For 
church members and other neighborhood residents across the South and West, this local 
institutional structure included both courthouses and houses of worship. 
Despite the strengthening of state-based legal institutions that Tomlins and others 
have demonstrated, Baptist churches in central Kentucky and middle Tennessee provided 
recourse for members disputing over a variety of offenses typically assumed to be under 
the jurisdiction of state authority.  When moderators opened the floor at routine business 
gatherings, church meetinghouses transformed to church tribunals.  These tribunals’ 
operations mirrored the procedures of local courts.
12
  After a member leveled an 
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accusation against another individual, the church “legally” cited the latter to their next 
meeting.
13
 Silas Evans reported that he received such a citation from his Louisville 
church as he walked the city’s streets.  The written document, dated and signed by the 
church clerk, notified him that “certain charges” would be “preferred” against him that 
night “at the regular Monthly Meeting of the Walnut Street Baptist Church.”  The citation 
encouraged him to attend, for he would “have an opportunity” to respond.14 In cases of a 
difficult nature, the church appointed investigative committees to converse with the 
parties and witnesses before reporting back to the church body.  Church records and 
observers statements are dotted with legal-language—“trial,” “plaintiff,” “defendant,” 
“witnesses,” “testimony,” etc.—and signal law’s discursive permeation of presumably 
spiritual spaces and rituals.
15
   
Becoming a church member required the baptized to keep watchcare over their 
fellow brothers and sisters and refrain from suing one another at local courts. This 
insistence paved the way for church bodies to assume jurisdiction over a variety of 
criminal or property-related matters.  In January 1806, for instance, the Mount Pleasant 
Baptist Church excluded Brother Davies for “killing [sic] a hog supposed to be Br. 
Masey’s property.”16  That same year the Long Run Baptist Church heard complaints 
from Brother Collins against Brother Chimmith for “detaining his property from him 
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illegally” by “attempting to keep one of his negro girls.”17 The Cane Run Church 




In the first decades after settlement, local and state courts in Kentucky, especially, 
were overwhelmed with land disputes. From the initial settlement period and beyond, 
local courts in Kentucky and Tennessee often found their dockets bogged down in land 
quarrels emanating from the chaotic settlement of the region.  Overlapping claims and 
fraudulent surveying practices, combined with a lingering animosity between individual 
settlers and a speculating, often absentee, elite engendered large amounts of litigation, 
leading one historian to claim that by the mid-1780s “lawsuits entangled almost every 
tract in central Kentucky.”19 To sum up the land situation a decade later in 1797, 
Kentucky’s surveyor general reported that grants for nearly twenty-four million acres had 
been approved.  The state, however, contained only around twelve million acres.  
Needless to say, litigation abounded well after statehood in 1792 and into the early 
nineteenth century.
20
 The overwhelming number of land-dispute cases in early Kentucky 
highlighted an uncertainty of legal authority among Kentuckians, as politicians, jurists, 
lawyers, and observers argued over the proper legal mode and site for resolution of such 
disputes.  With the sheer volume of litigation increasing during the early-statehood era, 
individuals across the social spectrum questioned the ability of finding justice in the legal 
system.  
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  The eventual triumph of a more privatized property regime backed by the rule of 
state law during the early-republican period did not rule out other forums for litigation.  
For many settlers, the rule of law “was synonymous with the misrule of lawyers.”21  This 
suspicion drove some to seek land-dispute mitigation elsewhere.  Although legal scholars 
such as Morton Horwitz have argued that extra-judicial arbitration in the antebellum 
United States succumbed to the increasingly formal and professional legal system early in 
the nineteenth century, the practice persisted in Kentucky much longer.
22
 After statehood, 
as disputed land suits inundated local and state courts, the Kentucky legislature passed 
measures which strengthened extra-judicial arbitration, serving as a foundation for 
subsequent enactments through the antebellum period.
23
  
Mired in their own throng of land disputes, ordinary Tennesseans often distrusted 
local justices and sought alternate venues for recourse.  Like Kentucky, speculators in 
late-eighteenth-century Tennessee often engaged in fraudulent practices, overlapping or 
padding property boundaries which led to confusion over land titles.  In 1800, the court 
system had hardly changed since the state’s territorial period. The county court, the most 
prominent symbol of government authority, registered land sales from the federal 
government and marked boundaries between tracts. The Justices of the Peace who made 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., 82. 
22
 Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 147-154: Disputing parties in Kentucky could resort to 
extra-judicial arbitration if they agreed upon referees, who would then be empowered by the court to 
subpoena witnesses, etc, and decide on the case.  Their decision was sent to the court, which took it as its 
own decree.  Furthermore, the decision could not be overturned nor appealed unless there was evidence of 
the arbitrators’ partiality towards one party.  See, “An Act Concerning Awards,” C.S. Moreheard and 
Mason Brown, A Digest of the Statute Laws of Kentucky, of a Public and Permanent nature, From the 
Commencement of the Government to the Session of the Legislature, Ending on the 24th February, 1834, 
with References to Judicial Decisions, in Two Volumes (Frankfort: Albert G. Hodges, 1834), 143-148. 
23
  Carli N. Conklin, "Transformed, Not Transcended: The Role of Extrajudicial Dispute Resolution in 






up these courts often came from the ranks of the wealthiest in the county. Even those 
justices not directly involved in large-scale land speculation tended to guard larger 
claims.  Moreover, hindrances such as the distance and high-costs of initiating a suit at 
law, exacerbated by the use of technical legal jargon, often swayed many small-holders 
from seeking relief through the courts.  Although these latter factors spurred on calls for 
legal reform during the first decade of the nineteenth century, they certainly also 
convinced many post-Revolutionary Tennesseans to seek recourse elsewhere for their 
land disputes.
24
  For church members, their local congregations proved a willing arbiter 
of such conflicts, especially when one or both of the disputants were church members.  
Kentucky and Tennessee churches mitigated a range of land disputes, including 
those revolving around land sales, tenancy, and trespass.  Churches, of course, did not 
solve all land-disputes and did not possess the state’s authority to enforce their decrees.25  
They relied upon the fear of eternal damnation and the social repercussions arising from 
excommunication from the fellowship.  In 1799, for example, Brother Ashurd of the 
Mount Pleasant Church in Kentucky requested that body to investigate a land dispute 
between himself and Brother Chilton, a member of a nearby church.  The church 
appointed two male members to go to Ashurd’s land and determine whether “he did get 
half of the Land in Value or not.”  On August 24, the committee reported that Br. Chilton 
“had the Advantage in Quantity 196 Acres, and the quality entirely superior to that of 
Brother Ashurd.”  The church took these facts under consideration, but were unsure what 
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to do next, since Br. Chilton “had not agreed to choose his Men” to arbitrate, and further 
“seemed to [be] astonish’d at it, (or rather at our proceedings) and the Minds of the 
members were Severally [sic] divided.”  In September, members of Mount Pleasant 
admitted that “the Matter had not been rightly manag’d,” and wished “to say no more 
about it at present, except one should take the other under legal dealings before either of 
the Churches they belong to.”26  Although the dispute had already divided the brethren, 
the church body still thought it best that any “legal” actions taken be done so within 
church walls.  
 Resolution through churches often proved less expensive and much quicker than 
litigation at local courts. Whereas legal suits at the courts could drag on for years and 
rack up considerable legal fees, churches generally dispensed with cases within weeks 
and did not charge fees.  Some churches, however, did decree monetary penalties.  In 
March 1814, Sister Humes of the Flat Rock Church charged Brother Christian Young 
with “trespassing on her land” and removing timber.  The church appointed a two-person 
committee to investigate the matter and cite Young to the next business meeting.  Within 
the month, Young appeared at the Flat Rock meetinghouse “and acknowledged the 
trespass which grieved Sister Hume.”  He apologized to the church for his transgression 
and agreed “to pay in three months to Sister Humes ten shillings and six pence.”  He also 
pledged “to use no more of her timber.”27  The Harrod’s Creek Baptist church heard a 
similar case five years later.  Brother Jacob Booker and his wife, Cathy, were charged 
with trespassing on another member’s land and cutting “down a large poplar” tree.  The 
Bookers made acknowledgement to the church at a Friday meeting the following week—
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held specifically for adjusting this dispute—but may not have been content with the 
church’s role in the matter as they immediately requested dismissal from fellowship.  In 
any case, as the church granted Booker and his wife letters of dismission, the offended 
member must have been satisfied with the church’s proceedings or they could have 
objected to the Bookers’ request to exit the fellowship.28 
 Other cases, however, dragged on much longer, implicated numerous church 
members, and required assistance from outside the immediate church body.  The Tick 
Creek Baptist Church of Shelby County, Kentucky spent nearly a year trying to resolve a 
complicated land dispute in the mid-1810s.  In August 1815 Brother Roulet Rice 
complained against Brother Robert Tyler for his actions in a recent land purchase from a 
non-member. Two members of the church, Brother and Sister Neal, occupied the land 
bought by Tyler.  According to Rice, Tyler intimated that he would let the Neals have the 
land outright if they paid him the purchase money and “a reasonable compensation for his 
trouble,” which, Rice claimed, “I think [Tyler] stated that 40 or 50 dollars” would be 
sufficient.  Tyler had also reportedly hinted that he was willing to settle the matter 
through negotiation between the parties.  Yet when they met, he rejected the 
compromises previously reached.  Rice reported that Tyler had done the same in another 
transaction as well, and also denied disparaging statements he had made in the presence 
of witnesses.
29
  At their following meeting in September, the church voted that Tyler had 
been wrong, and admonished him for his actions relative to the Neals.  The controversy 
continued through the rest of that year and into the next, leading the Tick Creek Church 
to request assistance from six nearby churches.  In January the committee of visiting 
                                                          
28
 The Harrod’s Creek Baptist Church, September 1819, SBTL. 
29





brethren confirmed that Tyler had been wrong, and the church claimed they were 
satisfied with their previous admonishment.  Rice did not let the matter rest, and in July 
of 1816, almost a full year after it heard the initial charges, the church formed a 
committee of seven to reconcile Rice and Tyler, and reported satisfaction between the 
two in August.
30
  Tyler’s quest to profit off the land, to the detriment of Brother and 
Sister Neal who occupied it, contradicted the communitarian ethos propagated by the 
church.  Tyler, it seemed, placed speculation and profit above the good of the church 
community.   
While Baptists did not denounce the pursuit of profits, they did decry members’ 
contracting debt with little or no means to pay back money owed. Observers, noting that 
simple instances of debt or speculation were not necessarily illegal, wished churches 
would pay more attention to such matters.  As early as 1792, the Bryan’s Station Church 
resolved that it was “not agreeable” for a church member “to suffer themselves to be sued 
or warranted for a plain just debt while they have property enough in their hand to 
discharge” the matter.31 Moreover, the editor of the Christian Baptist prayed that 
churches would take greater interest in the financial dealings of their members.  If a 
member was sued for debt or breach of covenant, whether or not it was with another 
professing Baptist or not, it fell within his church’s jurisdiction.  “No man can be sued [in 
courts] justly unless he have [sic] violated some law of Christ, or departed from the spirit 
and design of christianity [sic].”  This proved true “under the code of laws which govern 
our commercial intercourse in this country,” he continued, and churches possessed the 
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responsibility to investigate all instances of speculation, indebtedness, or covenant 
breaking amongst its membership.
32
  
Baptist churches in Kentucky, Tennessee, and throughout the Upper South 
brought up members on charges of indebtedness during the post-Revolutionary period.  
This served to not only punish transgressors, but to resolve the matter and maintain 
internal member-relations and, in some cases, to provide a monetary resolution to the 
conflict.  In 1811, Brother Rucker complained against Brother J. Shepherd at the Buffalo 
Lick Baptist Church “for refusing to pay a just debt.”  The church formed a committee 
which investigated the matter, ruling that Shepherd owed Rucker three barrels “& half a 
bushel of Corn.”  At the next church meeting, Shepherd expressed dissatisfaction with the 
committee’s decision.  Yet he did not push for the church to leave the matter alone, or 
seek to settle outside of the church fellowship.  Rather, he wished “to leave the matter to 
Brethren chosen” by himself and Rucker.  The church encouraged both members “to 
bring forward what testimony” applied “to their case” in order “to settle the matter to 
satisfaction.”33  As the church record book made no more mention of the dispute between 
Shepherd and Rucker, the self-chosen arbitrators must have successfully mitigated the 
dispute.   
Other churches simply suspended indebted members until they paid their debts.  
A Kentucky Church ordered that Bro. Poindexter, having detained “money after several 
promises of payment” would be acquitted if he made “payment on or before our next 
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meeting.”34  The Garrison Fork Church of Tennessee did just so in 1816, suspending 
member Ransom Pruit from church privileges until he could produce payment receipts 
for all his creditors (including at least one who was not a church member).
35
 Other 
churches, too, ordered debtors to pay their creditors.  In the spring of 1823, the Red River 
Church resolved that Brother Matt Williams owed $9.12 to Bro. Betts for some bacon the 
latter had purchased but for which he never paid.  At the church’s meeting in June, the 
clerk recorded that Williams came forward and paid his debt.
36
  In these instances, both 
reconciling the disputing brethren and resolving the point of contention—by decreeing a 
financial liability—proved equally important.  Rather than pursue these debts owed at 
local courts, risking the admonishment of their fellow brethren, potential delay, and legal 
costs, individuals such as Batts, Rucker, and Pruit’s creditors, relied upon church 
authority and successfully obtained monetary recompense.  
Perhaps more prickly property disputes for Baptists were those involving slaves.  
As church members sparred over this peculiar form of property, their local 
meetinghouses transformed into venues through which slaveholders and non-slaveholders 
confronted slaves’ “double character” as both persons and property, brothers and sisters 
in Christ and expendable commodities.
37
 Historian Monica Najar has argued that by the 
second decade of the nineteenth century, Upper South Baptists “ceded the issue of the 
morality of slavery to the civil state when it proved too divisive.”  Churches continued to 
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take up disputes over slave property, however.
38
  Such disputes not only highlighted the 
strengthening racial hierarchy within trans-Appalachian churches during the early-
republican period, it reflected how masters’ religious and social reputations were 
intimately bound up with their slaves’ actions.39  
  In March 1798, for instance, the Red River Church charged Brother James 
Waddleton for making false representations about a slave woman he had sold to fellow 
member Thomas Finch.  The church investigated the matter during the spring of that 
year, noting that the dispute between the two brethren “appears to be precarious.”  
Initially Waddleton welcomed the church’s investigation, reporting “by Bro. Brown that 
he was willing that the Church should take his affair into consideration.”  The clerk did 
not record specifics, but Mary Finch, Thomas’s wife, testified to the church that 
Waddleton had claimed “that the negro girl was set for any business & to go on errands.”  
After purchasing the girl, however, the Finches grew dissatisfied with her and apparently 
believed that Waddleton had swindled them.  The church, “after deliberation,” declared 
Waddleton guilty and cited him to appear.  Having his character questioned in the front of 
the church body, he refused to attend and “expressed his intentions to withdraw from the 
Church.”40  The church’s ruling surely percolated throughout the neighborhood, 
informing members and non-members alike of Waddleton’s less-than-upright business 
practices.  The fact that the case stretched on for over a year, too (Waddleton 
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continuously ignored the church’s summonses), ensured that the gossip networks of 
Adams, Tennessee and the surrounding region caught wind of and spread the matter.  
Perhaps even worse, a white woman had pointed out his failings, which were further 
symbolized by the female slave’s inability (or perhaps unwillingness) to live up to her 
master’s representations.   
Baptist churches also took up cases of conflict between their slave brethren.  
These cases had the potential to involve both members and non-members in church 
proceedings and signify the wider importance of churches as authoritative legal sites for 
masters to punish their slaves.   In April 1825, word reached one Tennessee church that 
Ben, an enslaved member body, “had struck a black woman” and “hurt her very much.”  
Ben and the unnamed victim were both property of a non-member, James Carr.  An 
investigative committee reported that Ben acknowledged that he had “struck the woman 
with the helve of the axe,” but that he “seemed rather to justify himself in the act.”  One 
church member claimed that he had spoken with Carr, who “informed him that the 
woman was badly hurt, so much so that she had done but little service since” the 
altercation.  Upon deeming the evidence against him “sufficiently supported,” the church 
excluded Ben.
41
  Whether Ben faced further punishment from the non-member Carr is 
unknown.  Yet, in providing testimony to the church, Carr clearly supported its charges 
against his slave. Although the church simply excluded Ben from its fellowship, such a 
consequence could cut off slaves from their sites of social and religious interaction. For 
slaves who were the property of small-holders, especially, church services afforded these 
often isolated bondsmen and women valuable social contact with other slaves “within 
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their neighborhoods.”42 Whites, central actors in slave neighborhoods, understood this 
dynamic, leading many slaveholders and non-slaveholders alike to punish slaves’ 
transgressions through their local church body.  
More than passive subjects of discipline, however, slaves used church tribunals to 
punish thieves and legitimize their property claims.
43
   In the eyes of state law, slaves 
could not own property.  Yet as legal historian Dylan Penningroth demonstrated just over 
a decade ago, slaves, though considered by state law to be chattel property themselves, 
claimed rights to various forms of property, often with the tacit or outright consent of 
their masters.
44
 Between 1800 and 1880, he contends, “an extralegal economy took shape 
in the South,” one whose traces barely made it into statute books or local courts, but 
operated “in yards, cities, and back roads across the South.”  This economy—which 
whites tolerated and at times took part in it—was controlled largely by members of the 
black community.
45
  Utilizing public ceremonies and public spaces, slaves secured 
acknowledgment of their property from both their masters and fellow slaves.  And, in 
cases of theft, some slaves resorted to special committees to ferret out the culprit, while 
others resorted to verbal accusations and arguments over alleged thievery.   
Theft cases between slaves not only legitimized slave property holdings, but could 
implicate multiple masters and ultimately lead the church to extend its authority beyond 
the bounds of the immediate neighborhood. In November 1824 a Tennessee church heard 
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charges against Bro. Luke, the property of Jethro Fork, for acting “disorderly in detaining 
an Old bed.” Luke had been given the bed by Violet, the slave of David Smith, and had 
agreed to deliver it to Violet’s daughter, who belonged to another man.  Luke “converted 
[the bed] to his own use instead of delivering it agreeable to bargain,” however, and had 
since left the neighborhood.  Although Luke had “obtained a letter of dismission, and 
moved away,” the church sought to rectify the situation.  Members directed the clerk to 
“get his letter back.”  Luke was subsequently excluded in March 1825.  The clerk did not 
record who brought the complaint to the church body, but the charges against Brother 
Luke most likely emanated from the wronged Violet who had trusted him to deliver the 
bed. Having moved, of course, too, Luke may not have had the opportunity to deliver the 
bed, and took it with him.  In any case, the theft charge leveled at him highlights how 
slaves utilized their church bodies as venues to police the slave quarters, and how 
churches at times extended their authoritative reach to former members who had departed 
from the immediate watchcare of the congregation.  Moreover, the church’s hearing of 
the case demonstrates the white members’ acknowledgement that Violet possessed a 
proper claim to the property in the first place, and that Luke had a responsibility to fulfil 
his agreement to deliver that property.  Local churches, then, served as sites for slaves to 
not only claim rights to property but to punish those who ignored such claims.
46
   
More often, however, church tribunals served as venues through which masters 
and other whites exerted their authority by regulating the behavior of their bondsmen.  
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Throughout the antebellum period, masters took advantage of church tribunals to punish 
their slaves.  Such charges not only illuminate whites’ anxieties over what they believed 
were blacks’ furtive natures, but also a grudging recognition that slaves worked together 
in accumulating property. The Tick Creek Bethel Church recorded charges against 
Wiggin, the property of Brother Ned Larkin in the fall of 1814, and excluded him with 
the apparent blessing of his master.
47
  Thomas Graves charged his slave, Harry, at a 
central Kentucky church in 1801 for stealing his “stockings.”  Six months later the same 
church heard charges against a female slave, Letty, for “stealing from her mistress.”48 In 
1826, the Beech Creek Baptist Church in Kentucky charged slave-member Adam with 
making a contradiction in saying that Brother Farmer had “given him a dictionary.”  At 
the same meeting, the contradiction accusation transformed to a charge of theft and the 
church excluded Adam for “having a book that was not his.”49  Rose, belonging to Sister 
Willis, was charged “for concealing stolen money” by the Little Cedar Lick Church in 
1842.
50
  The following year, Pastor Thomas Dudley, watched on as the Bryan’s Station 
Church excluded his bondswoman, Cealey, for “concealing stolen property.”51 The 
charge of “concealing stolen property” hints at the underground economy of slave life in 
the trans-Appalachian West.  If Cealey and Rose had been the actual perpetrators of the 
theft, rather than simply accomplices, the clerk would surely have made the delineation.  
Their actions as accomplices, however, led t0 their exclusion from the privileges of 
church membership and much of the social interaction that came with it.   
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Although a slave could potentially be cut off from his or her site of religious and 
social community, church tribunals, without the power to corporeally punish 
transgressors, served perhaps a more lenient venue through which to be punished than the 
secular courts.  Take for example the slaves Sam and Humphrey, who in April 1813 were 
charged at the Fayette Circuit Court of stealing four shirts, three waistcoats, one pound of 
sugar and “sundry other articles.”  A fellow slave, Dick, testified in the case, but at some 
point he too was implicated in the thievery.  The Fayette County jury dismissed the 
charges against Sam, sentenced Humphrey to ten lashes at the whipping post, and Dick to 
twenty strikes with the whip.
52
  Across town and less than a year later, the David’s Fork 




Punishing their slaves in church courts also held potential monetary benefits for 
slaveholders. Local courts often levied court fees upon owners if their slave was found 
guilty of theft.  A jury for Fayette County Circuit Court convicted Jim, the property of 
Elijah W. Craig, for the theft of “a sorrel horse” which he rode for “several days by 
which the horse was greatly impaired.”  The court decided “that Jim shall be taken to the 
public whiping [sic] post and there receive thirty-nine lashes on his bare back.”  
Furthermore, the court ordered Craig to pay the legal costs.
54
  In cases when it was an 
option, recourse through the church could benefit slaveholders monetarily and forgo the 
risk of bodily punishment—and potential lost labor—to their bondsmen. 
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Antebellum Baptist churches in Kentucky and Tennessee disproportionately 
punished slave members for theft (Figure 2).
55
  For the population as a whole, slaves 
represented one-third of the Inner Bluegrass residents in 1820.
56
  In the Middle Tennessee 
district, from 1810 to 1830, slaves averaged about 22% of the region’s population.57  In 
regards to church membership, historian Christine Heyrman has estimated that in 1835, 
free and enslaved blacks made up about 25% of the membership of southern Baptist 
churches.
58
  According to my data set which spans select Baptist churches of central 
Kentucky and Middle Tennessee, 75% of theft cases recorded involved black 
transgressors. Moreover, black members were 60% more likely to be excluded for theft 
than whites, and 400% more likely to be excluded when the theft charge was simply one 
transgression among others (Figure 3).
59
   
Figure 2. 
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Church tribunals heard a disproportionate number of theft accusations aimed at 
their black and enslaved brethren for a number reasons.  As a form of property 
themselves, slaves’ claims to property were always tenuous and contested.  The necessity 
of publicly displaying their property in order to claim rights over it may have also opened 
slaves to charges of theft, either from their fellow bondsmen or their masters. In some 
instances, too, slaves’ pilfering derived from sheer necessity.  One Kentucky slave noted 
that he and his fellow bondsmen believed it was “a kind of first principle” for those who 
labored had “had a right to eat.” Another claimed it was his “moral right” to take small 
amounts from the “abundance” he had helped to produce.60   
Such assertions echoed throughout the slaveholding region.  The former slave 
Henry Bibb, who had worked in the cotton fields of the Deep South, insisted that “I had a 
just right to what I took, because it was the labor of my own hands.”61 Historian Walter 
Johnson has noted that food rations for some Mississippi Valley slaves proved so meager 
                                                          
60
 Both slaves quoted in, Aron, How the West was Lost, 147. 
61
 Bibb quoted in Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom 





that their stealing provisions became a requirement. After emancipation, former slaves 
asserted that white ministers focused almost exclusively on the issue of theft, reminding 
slaves they should not steal their “master’s turkey” or their “master’s chickens” or their 
“master’s hawgs.”62   This may have been why, although accusations of theft against 
enslaved Baptists revolved around a variety of forms of property, provender items 
routinely appear in such charges. In 1811 the Red River Baptist Church charged Hannah, 
the property of a Mr. Langston, with “taking sugar that was not her own, [and] boiling the 
same away to a small quantity & secreting it.”63  The Big Cedar Lick Church charged 
Kate “for concealing stolen goods and money” in 1814.64  Mr. S. Smith’s Peter was 
charged by the Bryan’s Station Church for “theft in taking his Masters Bacon.”65 
Interestingly, the appellation of “Mr.” rather than “Brother” signifies that Peter’s master 
was not a member of the church, but that he, or someone directed by him, brought the 
complaint to the church, perhaps knowing or hoping that Peter’s exclusion from the 
church body would be punishment enough for his transgression.  The church clerk, 
unfortunately, did not specify who brought the initial complaint against Peter, so we do 
not know whether this was a case in which the master sought to punish his slave directly, 
or just a prying church-member—perhaps even a fellow slave—who witnessed or heard 
of Peter’s theft and who sought out the authority of the church in order to purify its 
membership ranks.   
Theft accusations against black members proved to be disproportionate, too, 
because by the antebellum period, Baptist churches in central Kentucky and middle 
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Tennessee increasingly proved unwilling to involve themselves in the property-related 
disputes of their white brethren.  As Figure 2 shows, churches from the data set did not 
record any charges against white members for theft after 1836.  Instead, church tribunals 
emerged as sites through which to police black members.   This resulted from a larger 
reformulation of the practice of discipline within some trans-Appalachian Baptist 
churches which redirected the bulk of disciplinary charges against black members.  
David’s Fork Baptist Church—not to be confused with Creath’s Reformed Church—
located just outside of Lexington exemplifies this process. At that church, both whites 
and blacks routinely faced charges through the first two decades of the nineteenth century 
(Figure 4).  Yet, by the mid-1820s, charges against black members overtook those 







From 1831 to 1860, the church recorded only 49 charges leveled against white 
members, and over one-third of those focused upon members’ non-attendance at 
meetings or their interaction with another religious body: in other words, charges related 
directly to membership duties.
66
  In contrast, in the twenty-seven years preceding 1830, 
the church recorded 182 charges against its white members. The slow decline of charges 
against whites picked up in the late 1820s, amidst the controversy emanating from 
Alexander Campbell’s “Reformation” movement, a religious insurgency which stirred 
emotions and split churches across the trans-Appalachian West.  As I argue in the next 
chapter, doctrinal strife altered how members’ understood their churches’ role in 
mitigating disputes or dispensing discipline.  But this transformation also resulted from 
the changing economic and social landscape of Kentucky’s Bluegrass Region, and 
Lexington in particular. The increase of charges leveled against black members emanated 
from the changing race-relations of the region. 
By the second decade of the nineteenth century, Lexington was home to a large 
African American community, made up of both slave and free individuals and rooted in 
church institutions. Free blacks could be found peddling foodstuffs in the town square 
outside the markethouse, while slaves roamed the city on task from their masters.  Of 
Fayette County’s 1,484 slaves, nearly half (739) worked in ropewalks, inns, mercantile 
shops, and brick manufactories.  Many lived in the cramped urban quarters in Lexington, 
socializing, worshipping, and trading with other blacks in the city.  Nearby farmers also 
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hired out slaves to labor in the city’s cotton and hemp industries.  Such slaves and those 
of the city proper gravitated to Lexington’s churches during the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, spurring on the growth of African American community.  
Many slaves flocked to the preaching of Peter Durrett, a freed-slave known as 
“Old Captain”.  By 1810, on the heels of religious revival, Durrett served a congregation 
of around 500 members. Although many whites welcomed the spiritual uplift of the black 
population, their large numbers and general autonomy under Durrett posed a significant 
threat to the wider region’s social and religious order.67  Town trustees, who had long 
allowed Durrett’s preaching in the city, fretted over the Lexington’s growing black 
population and Durrett’s influence over it.  The trustees and local white religious leaders 
sought first to bring Durrett under the control of the Elkhorn Association of Baptists, 
before sanctioning another local free black, London Ferrell—who the whites believed 
they could more readily manipulate—to preach in the city.  Ferrell established the 
African First Baptist Church which fell under the control of the city’s white First Baptist 
Church.  Membership numbers in the former body remained small until the late 1820s 
and Durrett’s death, when the church reached over 300 members.68  
White men who partook in the city’s bustling commercial marketplace and 
elevated attitudes of economic liberalism looked at blacks’ avenues for economic gain 
and community-building with suspicion. The white community had feared a slave 
rebellion since the turn of the century when reports of Gabriel Prosser’s uprising crossed 
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the Appalachians.  Not long after, the Kentucky Assembly passed legislation which 
prohibited the importation of slaves from outside the state.  Rumors of a slave revolt in 
Lexington persisted through the subsequent decades, leading to further white surveillance 
of the area’s black community.  Lexington’s board of trustees authorized the construction 
of watch houses, which served as reminders for whites to stay vigilant.  By the War of 
1812, as we will see, not only had central Kentuckians embraced a diverse market-
economy, they had solidified the more fluid racial relations of the previous century.
69
  
This process occurred largely through the state’s legal system, such as the watch house 
and coordinated slave patrols, but also through informal networks such as church 
disciplinary practices.   
Tennessee witnessed similar developments in race-relations as did north-central 
Kentucky during the early-republican and antebellum periods.  Despite local efforts to 
restrict their economic and social autonomy, slaves in and around post-Revolutionary 
Nashville still found degrees of independence.  In 1802, town leaders in Nashville passed 
measures which restricted slaves from hiring themselves out (with or without their 
owners’ permission) and leveled fines against merchants who did business with slaves 
and upon whites who countenanced slave gatherings after dark.  The city also passed a 
slave curfew, and five years later appointed a slave patrol and enacted a prohibition 
against liquor sales to slaves.  These restrictions proved easy to get around, however, as 
masters continued to hire-out their slaves.  For their part, slaves persisted in selling goods 
at local religious revivals or the city market.  Such urban experiences allowed slaves a 
broader autonomy than their field-laboring counterparts.  Yet, as the greater-Nashville 
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region “civilized,” Ray argues, “slaves’ relative autonomy faced increasing public 
contestation.”  Free-blacks in Nashville faced also saw a restriction in their autonomy 
during the period.  Although they had never attained the same rights as their white 
neighbors, free blacks had mingled with white society during the 1790s and early 1800s.  
Taking advantage of a loophole in the state’s 1796 Constitution, some black freeholders 
were able to vote, participate in the militia, and gain a prominent position in regional 
affairs.  As late as 1825, for instance, “ninety-six militiamen from Rutherford County 
complained that the free black population had excessive influence over the county’s 
[militia] company elections.”70   
Slaves and free blacks had also found slivers of equal recognition in the region’s 
churches during the early-republican period.  Some churches, such as the Big Cedar Lick 
Baptist Church, allowed all members a vote on matters of fellowship.  The Mill Creek 
Baptist Church likewise granted blacks the liberty to preach.
71
 But this slight recognition 
was dampened by the disproportionate excommunication of free- and enslaved-blacks for 
theft, especially after 1830.  So, while in some instances slaves could benefit from church 
tribunals—using them to secure property claims and punish thieves amongst their own—
as Baptists across the Upper South largely set aside their emancipationist impulses during 
the first decade of the nineteenth century, and as Kentucky’s Bluegrass Region and 
Middle Tennessee cracked down on black autonomy in general, churches followed suit, 
singling out black brethren for crimes seldom enforced against white members.  
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When churches did take up their white members’ criminal transgressions, their 
decisions often hinged upon decrees leveled by local courts.  In matters of a criminal 
nature, church bodies had little choice but to acknowledge their shared jurisdiction with 
state-based courts.  Church members accepted this legal reality.  In the summer of 1836, 
the First Baptist Church of Nashville resolved that every member “shall be subject alike 
to her jurisdiction,” but further that no member, “inconsequence of connection with [the 
church]” shall “be deprived of any right, of any kind,” whether “social, domestic, 
political, &c, which as a man and a citizen he may lawfully and innocently exercise.”  
Although this statement—Article VIII of the church’s constitution—may have been 
meant to assure slaveholding members that the church would not interfere with their 
property rights, it was also a recognition by the church body that it shared jurisdiction 
over each member with the wider world, and specifically the state.  Five years later, the 
church deferred authority to the state in a matter of discipline. Having taken up charges 
against a member for fraud, the church postponed their own decision and suspended the 
offending brother “until a judicial decision shall be had in his case.”72   
A member’s transgression of state law itself could garner charges from the church 
body. In August 1818, the Red River Church admonished Brother John Johnston for 
disorderly conduct.  Although they initially continued him in fellowship, the church 
concluded at their following meeting, “from satisfactory evidence,” that he continued “to 
walk disorderly in breaking the peace or violating the laws of the State,” and should be 
excluded.
73
 Throughout the period, however, members of Red River disagreed on how a 
member’s violation of state law impacted his or her standing in religious society.  In the 
                                                          
72
 Records of the First Baptist Church of Nashville, June 1841, SBLA. 
73





early 1840s, disagreements within the church became so divisive that the clerk wrote a 
nearby church at Fyke’s Grove, asking whether they should continue fellowship with a 
member “that stands convicted by the laws of his country for [a] certain offence.”  
Members of Fyke’s Grove insisted “that it was wrong to privilege [the offending 
member] to the immunitys [sic] of the church” after he had been “convicted by the laws 
of the land.”  Agreement between the churches remained elusive, and nearly two years 
went by before the Fyke’s Grove church reported that “despite the difficulty,” they 
desired “to live together in union and peace” with the Red River Church.74 
In other cases, churches revisited previous rulings in member-disputes after the 
matter had moved to the secular legal arena, uplifting actions taken by local courts over 
rulings of church majorities.  In the summer of 1816, the Red River Church voted that 
Brother Bell was not guilty of taking “unlawful interest” while conducting a slave sale. 
Over a year later, however, in November 1817, the church reconsidered the case “on the 
matter of [Bell] taking Usury.”  It seemed Bell’s fate at the hands of his fellow church 
members was bound up with a recent decision of the Robertson County Circuit Court, 
where a jury had found him guilty of usurious practices.  Because of his conviction, the 
clerk noted the church believed “the cause of religion or the Religious causes suffer[ed] 
in [Bell’s] hands.”  In January 1818, the church again revisited Bell’s case, exclaiming 
that “we cannot clearly say that Bro. Bell was guilty of taking Usury,” yet “for the 
veneration we have for the Court & Law of our Country, we publickly [sic] reprobate the 
idea of any of our members violating the stated laws of our Country.”  Considerable 
debate between the members revealed that a majority did not agree with the court’s 
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decision.  Nonetheless, after further debate, and Bell’s testimony, when asked if they 
were satisfied with Bell’s actions, members emphatically answered “NO,” and 
excommunicated him from the fellowship.
75
   
Indeed, such cases demonstrate the interconnections between state-based and 
church-based legalities during the early nineteenth century. Church decrees were 
influenced by outside factors, such as actions taken at the local courthouses, even if, as in 
Bell’s case, the church did not entirely agree with the court’s decision. This forces us to 
re-think the autonomous claims that churches claimed over their internal actions.  The 
bounds of authority were never fully delineated, but remained murky.  In these cases, 
courts did not direct the church to take any action against the convicted member, but 
outcomes at court could and did inform member’s actions within the church.   
This process also worked in reverse, as actions taken at the church meetinghouses 
had the potential to effect cases pleading at courts of law. For instance, in September 
1803, Hiram Mitchell, a member of the South Elkhorn Church of Fayette County, visited 
the Bryan’s Station Church meetinghouse and complained of Bro. John Pickett “for 
entering a suit against him in Law contrary to gospel rule.”  The previous April, Pickett 
had filed suit against Mitchell, claiming that Mitchell’s wife, Nancy, made slanderous 
remarks which significantly injured his character and good standing in the community.   
Pickett sought five hundred pounds in damages, and the Fayette Circuit Court summoned 
the Mitchells to its June session.  The case was laid over until September, but before a 
decision could be put down, Mitchell spoke up at the Bryan’s Station Church meeting.  A 
church appointed committee conversed with Mitchell and Pickett and satisfied both 
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parties.  The case pending in the circuit court was apparently withdrawn, as the 
September declaration is the last record in the existing case file.
76
  
It is unclear why Pickett initially entered the suit in the Fayette Circuit Court 
rather than immediately approaching the church body.  Since Mitchell was a member of a 
neighboring congregation, Pickett may not have known that Mitchell was even a Baptist.  
Or perhaps Pickett did not think that his church could successfully mitigate the dispute.  
Whatever the reason, the resolution of their case demonstrates the ability of church courts 
to influence the outcome of a case which began in the secular legal system.  Scholars 
have investigated the importance of “setting” in the resolution of disputes.  When a 
dispute moves from one arena to another, say the church to the courthouse, or vice-versa, 
this has the potential to alter the outcome of the case.
77
   Furthermore, it can alter the very 
nature of the dispute itself.  Pickett and Mitchell’s dispute began with Nancy Mitchell’s 
alleged slander of Pickett, but it transformed from a simple slander to a dispute between 
two Baptists, members of two separate congregations, with apparently different visions of 
how or where the matter should be resolved.  In this case, at least, the boundaries of 
church and secular authority were blurred, as both parties utilized available resolution 
outlets which best met their immediate needs. 
Church tribunals, rather than autonomous judicatories, were entwined with larger 
social and cultural transformations, transformations which by the 1830s had significantly 
weakened their authority over white members’ property-related matters.  Though 
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providing some recourse for blacks, churches emerged as institutions that upheld the 
region’s profoundly unequal race-relations.  And, as we have seen, in many cases, 
churches deferred to actions taken within state institutions.  Historian Christine Heyrman 
has noted that by the 1830s, Baptist church clerks across the South “inscribed ever fewer 
pages of church books with the details of their members’ waywardness.”  This, she avers, 
proved an acknowledgment that a “meddling” church “was more likely to alienate than 
reform the laity.”78 Heyrman’s contention is primarily focused upon matters of familial 
relations, and not property relations, but her timing holds true for the latter as well.  
  Churches increased reticence to mitigate their members’ property-related 
disputes, however, resulted from the changing economic and social backdrop of the 
region, and not solely from an effort to retain member-allegiances. By the antebellum 
period, a dynamic market-economy had taken hold in the Kentucky- Bluegrass and 
Middle-Tennessee regions.  As a political economy founded upon notions of liberal 
individuals eclipsed the moral economy centered upon communitarian ethics, churches’ 
role in mitigating the property-related disputes of their brethren receded.  Not only did 
members’ civil disputes hold the potential to drive wedges in the church fellowship—the 
opposite goal of church discipline’s focus upon the protecting the peace—but the sin of 
covetousness, denounced by Baptists and other religious groups, became harder to 
identify amidst the speculative, acquisitive cultural milieu. Debt was reconfigured from a 
moral failing to a near requisite of doing business in the expanding capitalist system, and 
sinful economic behavior became harder to identify.  Refinement and gentry values 
radiated from the urban centers of Lexington and Nashville, heralding both acquisition 
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and family privacy.  In turn, churches slowly lost power—and in some cases deferred it—
over their members’ economic matters.    
 
As in many areas of the republic, north-central Kentucky and Middle Tennessee 
witnessed rapid economic and social change in the half-century after the Revolutionary 
War. During the 1770s and 1780s, Euro-Americans had settled the greater-Lexington 
area in hopes of taking advantage of the “best poor man’s country.”  Their expectations 
for finding agrarian independence through landownership were significantly curtailed by 
the arrival of the gentry in the 1790s.  Although many of these latter newcomers added to 
their substantial wealth by taking advantage of the chaos arising from disputed land titles, 
they also established churches, courthouses, and helped integrate transportation and 
market networks.  This in turn transformed Lexington into an economic hub for the 
surrounding region.
79
   By the second decade of the nineteenth century, the Inner 
Bluegrass region had transitioned from an agricultural-oriented society to one in which 
entrepreneurs, manufacturers, lawyers, and merchants dominated the political and social 
landscape.  Textile manufacturers had made inroads on the household production of 
many goods, while other budding industries and technologies pushed aside the 
independent artisan.   
Lexington by 1810, historian Craig Thompson Friend notes, had developed into 
“the most urban of western towns.”80  A population influx of lawyers, merchants, 
artisans, and free blacks helped make up the city’s 4,279 residents.  A vibrant 
manufacturing industry, mainly revolving around hemp production, strengthened the 
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city’s budding economy.  Over the course of the first two decades of the nineteenth 
century, a new-money gentry emerged from the ranks of manufacturers and other 
entrepreneurs.   “As the nineteenth century proceeded,” Friend continues, “refinement, 
capitalistic investment, and lines of distinction spread from Lexington outward.”81  Along 
the way, individuals’ relationship to the wider community transformed.  As the previous 
chapter demonstrated, family households became increasingly atomistic.  In the more 
refined areas of Lexington, a burgeoning middle-class subscribed to and propagated 
divisions between public and private.  This weakened sources of communal regulation 
over familial matters, and freed the “self-made” men of Kentucky to pursue economic 
advance with less moral responsibility.  Indeed, by the mid-1830s, the “extra-moral 
workings of capitalism seemed more rewarding” for central Kentuckians “than traditional 
patterns of familial and communal obligation.”82 
The Middle Tennessee area witnessed comparable economic transformations 
during the first decades of the nineteenth century.  At the turn of the century, the region 
stood at the edge of white civilization, virtually inaccessible to many of the major trade 
outlets and beset by recent skirmishes with Natives.  As Nashville served as the primary 
port along the Cumberland River, early on in the nineteenth century, city boosters—made 
up of planters, lawyers, and merchants—pushed for farmers in the surrounding area to 
plant more cotton. Once picked, the cotton was filtered through Nashville’s flourishing 
manufacturing sector or through its port, eventually making its way to the international 
market.  By the 1810s, Nashville and the surrounding countryside had shed a self-
contained, “economy of necessity” and embraced the new commercial world.  As 
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historian Kristofer Ray argues, the commercial boosters who led this charge “ultimately 
dragged all of the region’s residents into a faceless economic system.”83 Historian John 
Larson notes that amidst the social transformation wrought by the market revolution of 
the early-nineteenth century, “Individual identity dissolved into anonymity, commitment 
into contract, vocation into work, a living into a wage.”84  Baptists and other church goers 
were not exempt from these experiences.  Whereas since the Revolutionary period 
churches had sought to mitigate their property-related disputes, the emergence of contract 
relations between individuals weakened churches ability to effectively mitigate their 
members’ economic disputes. 
The new market economy of the nineteenth century, with its inducements toward 
speculation and deceit, opposed the harmonious communitarian ethos that Baptists, 
prescriptively anyways, sought to establish in their church bodies.  The Elkhorn 
Association of Baptists declared in 1826 that too many Christians resorted to 
“unwarrantable and criminal means” in their pursuit “to mass wealth.”85 Five years later, 
preacher James Black exclaimed that worldliness was infiltrating church meetinghouse 
walls throughout the state.  He lamented that only a fraction of members routinely 
attended church business meetings, and those who did were often distracted by outside 
concerns.  “How discouraging to a minister,” Black concluded, “after he has travelled 
several miles, in order to meet his appointment at the court of the Lord; to find probably 
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not more than twelve or fifteen members collected, and they probably conversing on 
politics, agriculture, or commerce.”86 
For Baptists, amassing great wealth, or covetousness, served as a gateway to 
economic risk, which, though increasingly necessary to succeed in the new economic 
marketplace, “alienates the affection of Christians” and “strengthens the bands of 
infidelity.” Greed and unfair business practices were bad enough for nineteenth-century 
Baptists, but their potential to lead to adversarial legal contests further disrupted religious 
society.
87
  Alexander Campbell, writing in 1828, two years before his split with the 
Baptists, agreed.  Breach of covenant, assuming debt beyond one’s means, and 
speculating were as serious offences as “theft, lying, and slander.”  For, when “we hear of 
a [C]hristian compelled to pay his debts by law, or to atone for the breach of covenants 
by fines; when we see one asking securities to obtain money on which to speculate, or see 
him eagerly engaged in the pursuit of wealth or any earthly distinctions,” Campbell 
averred, we must consider such conduct as a great “libel on [C]hristianity.”88   
Although Baptists sought to avoid this “libel” by containing such matters within 
their meetinghouse walls, from the early nineteenth century on, many churches 
sanctioned members’ recourse to local courts for their contract and property disputes. As 
in criminal cases, churches’ permission for members to sue in court highlights the 
integrated relationship of church authority and that of the state.  Moreover, this deference 
to state-based courts implicitly constructed the bounds of religious and civil authority, 
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with churches’ gradually relinquishing control over members’ economic matters.   For 
instance, a Tennessee Baptist Church summoned Brother Levi Powell in July 1821 to 
answer for a debt he owed Brother Wheles.  If Powell refused to hear his fellow brethren, 
then the church encouraged Wheles to “pursue the ordinary maner [sic] to recover” the 
money owed to him.
89
  Other churches, too, proved unwilling to get involved in messy 
civil disputes of the brethren.  Members of the Little Cedar Lick Church in Tennessee 
agreed with their brethren from Alabama.  In 1828, they granted Brother William White 
“liberty to commence suit against Sister Stevenson and others.”90 Similarly, in June 1809, 
the Red River Baptist Church liberated “Bro. Darnell from the injunctions of 




In contrast, other members displayed their uneasiness over their churches’ role as 
arbiter for their economic disputes. In January 1815 Brother Drake reported to the Big 
Cedar Lick Baptist Church in Tennessee that Bro. Brinson “had failed to comply with a 
contract between the two men.”  Brinson and Drake agreed to submit the matter to an 
arbitration committee, whose decision would be final.  The committee, however, found 
no damages, decreeing that “each of them [should] endeavor to bear his own burthen.”92  
Nearly two years later, in December 1816, the church charged Drake with three 
transgressions.  Not only did he commit an “assault and battry [sic] on the boddy [sic] of 
Josiah Brinson,” he also took “out a peace warrant” against him.  The church’s final 
charge arose form Drake’s questioning of its authority, specifically by his declaration that 
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“the Church never should settle any thing for him again.”  Drake’s wishes came true, as 
the church excluded him from the fellowship, and thus placed him out of its authoritative 
jurisdiction.
93
  Yet his actions after the initial contract dispute with Brinson in early 1815 
demonstrate that he did not agree with the arbitrators’ decision that no damages were 
present, or that he should “bear his own burthen.”  Instead, he sought the protection of 
secular authorities, securing a peace warrant before taking the matter into his own hands 
by apparently assaulting Brinson.   
The expanding market-economy of post-Revolutionary America held 
repercussions for churches’ disciplinary efforts. Across the republic, Americans’ 
engagement in regional and international commercial exchange increasingly supplanted 
local, face-to-face transactions. The assignability—a creditor’s ability to transfer one’s 
debt to a third party—of notes and bonds undercut the social relations which had 
previously formed the exchange, the immediate relations necessary for effective church-
based arbitration.  Moreover, debt was redefined from a moral failing to an economic 
risk, the price of doing business in a capitalist economy.
94
  Alongside, law, especially at 
the state level, emerged as a more formal and professional enterprise, devoted to 
protecting individuals’ property rights and facilitating this dynamic economic 
marketplace through predictable and objective decrees.  Church bodies, prone to faction, 
lacking legal formalism, and undercut by the very contractual membership ushered in by 
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, often found themselves unable to 
authoritatively resolve their members’ civil disputes. 
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Church tribunals only served as effective legal sites when members 
dispassionately judged each other’s disputes.  Witnesses, committeemen, and voting 
members, when “called upon to testify, judge, and advise,” had to be objective or risk 
their prejudices tainting the proceedings.  Even a slight “defect, in their temper, 
testimony, judgment or advice, may turn the scales against success.”95 As Jacob Creath 
Jr. would certainly agree, individuals possessed a right to due process in both church-
based and state-based courts.  By the 1830s and early 1840s, many disputants, however, 
decried the unfair, factionalist-produced decrees emanating from their local 
meetinghouses.  Church leaders throughout the country, too, witnessing a decline in 
disciplinary activity, set out to strengthen churches’ law-making functions by formalizing 
their procedures, stressing the importance of predictable and dispassionate mitigation.  
The very stability and continued progress of their respective organizations were at stake.  
Their efforts fell in line with leading legal thinkers of the antebellum period who, as 
Morton Horwitz writes, “sought to depoliticize the law” by insisting “upon its objective, 
neutral, and facilitative character.”96    
As early as the 1820s, trans-Appalachian Baptists began calling for a more 
uniformed system of discipline, though not until the 1840s did church leaders take serious 
steps to formalize its procedures. The First Baptist Church of Frankfort composed a letter 
in 1823 to the Franklin Association asserting “that every society should have a 
compendium of discipline under which offenders of every grade might be easily arraign’d 
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[sic], reclaim’d [sic] or sencured [sic].”97   Two decades later members would get their 
wish. In the 1840s, a number of ministers devoted tracts to church government and 
church discipline.  Eleazer Savage gave two reasons for publishing his Manual of Church 
Discipline in 1844.  “Disciplinary measures, as they exist,” he contended, “are more 
frequently the offspring of passion, than principle.”  Moreover, church members 
possessed no guide “to scripturally instruct church members, as to the different kinds of 
offences” and “the proper methods of treating them.”98  
The Reverend Warham Walker concluded his own treatise, Church Discipline—
also published in 1844—claiming that an adherence to the principles elucidated within 
his text, “by any church, would be found highly conducive to its true prosperity.” He 
continued: “The discipline of a church, if it be conducted according to the law of Christ, 
will be characterized by harmony, simplicity, and regularity.  The law leaves nothing 
doubtful, in respect either to the mode of disciplinary actions, or the spirit in which it 
should be performed.”  Walker further warned those churches that governed discipline 
“by no rule, save their own discretion,” that their path could be “fraught with peril.”99  
Those churches risked “introducing corruption, disorder, and dissension” into their ranks, 
maladies which eventually would render them “incapable of united, vigorous, and well 
directed action” towards their secular or regular enemies.100    
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William Crowell’s The Church Member’s Manual, appearing in 1847, proved so 
popular that three years later, he published a condensed version as a handbook.  In 1873, 
a new revised version was issued.
101
  Like Savage and Walker, Crowell stressed the 
importance of discipline.  “The course of the church should always be uniform and 
consistent in the its treatment of offences,” he wrote, lamenting that some churches 
“notice some offences and pass by others.”  He then elaborated a number of procedural 
requisites for proper administration of church-based justice, including sections devoted to 
ruling according evidence, the various punishments available for churches, and the 
treatment of excluded persons.
102
 In sum, Crowell devoted over sixty pages to the various 
procedures, attributes, causes for, and types of church discipline.   
These religious-treatise writers’ quest for a formalized church disciplinary system 
fell in line with contemporary legal thinkers who heralded the necessity for law’s 
objective, formal nature.  The treatise writers focused on formalizing the practice of 
discipline, elevating universal practice over particulars. By the 1830s, the American legal 
profession had developed a treatise tradition which sought to present law as scientific, 
emanating “not from will but from reason.”  Law, prominent legal intellectuals insisted, 
was “an objective, neutral, and apolitical system.”103 As the jurist James Kent stressed in 
his Commentaries on American Law, it would be “extremely inconvenient to the public if 
precedents were not duly regarded, and pretty implicitly followed.  It is by the notoriety 
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and stability of such rules, that professional men can give safe advice to those who 
consult them; and people in general can venture with confidence to buy, and to trust, and 
to deal with each other.”  If judicial decisions were ignored, he continued, “we should 
disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of property.”104 Indeed, by the late antebellum 
period, state legal reformers in the South increasingly infringed upon local authority over 
property matters, claiming the state’s protection of property was in the public interest.105  
Local legal venues persisted throughout the period, with legal reformers deriding 
localized law’s inherent flexibility and unpredictable nature.  Parties in property disputes 
at church meetinghouses made similar arguments, and their indictments of churches’ 
juridical proceedings and decrees hint at a larger reconceptualization of law, its location, 
and sources of governing authority during the first-half of the nineteenth century.  
In his quarrel with Henry Foster, Jacob Creath Jr. insisted that the David’s Fork 
Reformed Church had failed in is scriptural duty to mitigate member-disputes. The 
church’s decision, in his view, was compromised well before its official decree.  Creath 
charged that from the beginning of its proceedings the church had erred in handling the 
case.  At one point during the trial, Foster reportedly ““flew into a violent rage.”  For that 
action alone, Creath exclaimed, Foster should have been marked and turned out of the 
society of good men.”106   The church instead pronounced Foster innocent “on his own 
bare word,” without evidence, and “contrary to all the laws of all civilized 
countries…contrary to all Protestant Christendom.”    Only after declaring Foster 
innocent, for example, did the church encourage Creath to send any evidence he 
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possessed.  The timing of this request unnerved the preacher.  “Can such a church be 
called a habitation of justice?” he asked.  What if a secular court “should give a verdict 
first, on the accuser’s word and then seven months afterwards call for evidence?  What 
would the community say of such a court?”  And, furthermore, “whose character or 
property would be safe in such hands?”  The church, rather than upholding the Scriptures 
and fairly resolving her members’ disputes, had failed to properly pursue justice.  “I have 
begged this church to settle this matter,” Creath exclaimed, but “she would not.”107  
“An Older Jacob Creath, Jr.”108 
The church’s decree reflected larger problems within the church body at David’s 
Fork, complications that hindered its ability to dispense discipline and resolve disputes.  
Covetousness and speculation proved one of the central charges that Creath had leveled 
against Foster, but he extended the charge to include the entire church, exclaiming that 
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the church had become “a nest of traders and Southern speculators.”109  With its character 
in question, Creath believed the church could no longer objectively serve as a site for 
dispute resolution.  By contrasting its operations to the workings of secular courts—
asking what if “the courts of the country” operated in such a way so as to give a verdict 
before receiving all the evidence—and declaring that he could no longer trust his 
character and property with the church—Creath hinted that the David’s Fork Reformed 
Church had lost credibility as an effective law-producing site. Insisting it had departed 
from all “Protestant Christendom,” he implicitly raised the “civilized” operations of the 
Commonwealth’s courts above those of the church body. As his former brethren at 
David’s Fork seemed reluctant to sufficiently investigate the matter, the feeling may have 
been widespread throughout the church community and beyond.
110
    
Witnesses, observers, and participants across the trans-Appalachian West echoed 
Creath in accusations against their local churches.  William Collins expressed as much 
not long after Creath’s dispute with Henry Foster. In the spring of 1841, Collins, a 
member of the Elizabeth Church of Particular Baptists in Bourbon County, Kentucky, 
had in hand thirteen tons of hemp.  William Anderson, a life-long acquaintance of 
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Collins’s and fellow member of the Elizabeth Church, expressed interest in buying the 
crop, but needed to do so on credit.  Following a church meeting in April, Anderson and a 
handful of other church members assembled at Collins’s home to broker the deal.  There, 
according to Collins, the two drew up contract terms, eventually agreeing to those 
stipulations two days later.  Upon receiving payment of up to $300 on May 1, Collins 
contracted to deliver that quantity of hemp to Anderson, with the rest to follow at his 
discretion over the summer and fall of 1841.  Anderson further agreed to make payment 
in whole with ten percent interest by June 1842.  In late April, amidst a wet spring, 
Collins called upon Anderson to ensure he still wanted the first part of the hemp 
delivered.  Not having completed his hemp-house, Anderson declined receiving delivery 
at that time.  Collins ultimately delivered over two tons in June, but received no money 
from Anderson.  Despite Collins’s agreement to deliver the remaining eleven tons of 
hemp at his discretion, Anderson—still having not paid his initial installment due on May 
1—wrote Collins, insisting he send no more until Anderson directed him to do so.   
“After waiting several days and receiving no money,” Collins later wrote, “I concluded 
that he had violated the contract, and that therefore I was absolved or released from any 
further obligation according to law.” Collins did not trust his personal judgment, 
however, and called in help from “some eight to ten persons, all of whom coincided with 
[his] own opinion.”111   
Collins’s appeal for substantiation of his position proved simply the first step of a 
long mitigation process that navigated from informal arbitration with church members 
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serving as referees, to a church vote, and eventually to the Bourbon County Court.  After 
hearing testimony from a female church member who had been present when Collins and 
Anderson had agreed to the contract, the two arbitrators ruled that Anderson had indeed 
violated the contract, and owed Collins for the two tons already delivered.   Both parties 
agreed with the ruling, but Anderson did not immediately hand over the note.  At the 
August church meeting, two members agreed to enter as Anderson’s security for his debt 
to Collins.  “I then felt that I was perfectly safe,” Collins insisted, “having three Particular 
Baptists bound by honor,” and Anderson agreed to draw up a note for Collins.  A few 
days later, however, he demanded that Collins “make confession to him or [they] could 
not live together in [the] Elizabeth Church[.]”  Collins refused, and Anderson “lodged a 
complaint” against him at the July church meeting, claiming injury done “in purse and 
feelings.”112 
The dispute continued for months, with Collins, Anderson, and numerous other 
church members leveling accusations at one another.  Part of the problem, according to 
Collins, was Anderson’s refusal to turn over a promissory note for the hemp.  At one 
point, Collins told Anderson that he “had proved the contract by testimony sufficient to 
indict any man in Bourbon county for murder,” and further that his actions justified an 
exclusion from the church.
113
  Anderson responded by accusing Collins of usurious 
practices, fraud, disorderly conduct, and Collins’s son, with false swearing.  After 
numerous failed attempts, the Elizabeth Church eventually called a special meeting to 
settle the difference.  By this time, Collins had grown tired of Anderson’s stalling, and 
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believed the church was hardly in a position to settle the matter effectively, as “all the 
members had taken sides,” hindering the potential that they could reach and objective 
decisions in the case.
114
  Instead of tackling the facts of the dispute, however, the church 
voted they were distressed with both Anderson and Collins.  Collins stood and expressed 
his confusion on the vote, and left the meetinghouse.  The church eventually resolved that 
Collins had erred in so quickly absolving the contract and that Anderson was at fault for 
not adhering to the decision of the previous arbitration committees. At one point, as 
Collins tried to explain himself to the church, the moderator cut him off, claiming his 
words reflected badly upon the church body.  “It then seemed to me,” Collins later wrote, 
“that I could say nothing but what was deemed out of order or unnecessary.”  He 
relented, and upon request from the moderator, Anderson again refused to turn over the 
note.  A motion and second for both men’s exclusions from the church passed.115 
Unsurprisingly, Collins believed the church had made a mockery of the whole 
affair, and, like Creath, hinted that the local court proved more effective than the 
congregation for such a contract dispute.  The moderator had even reportedly “remarked 
that it had been the worst managed case he ever knew.” Following his exclusion, Collins 
asked one member why the church did not allow him and Anderson to settle the matter at 
law.  The brother replied because a law suit would engender “cross swearing among the 
members of the church, and a jury might decide differently from a committee, which 
would place the church in an awkward position.”  Another member admitted that the two 
men’s exclusions were handled as one vote—a rather rare occurrence—because 
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“otherwise, there would have been a split in the church.” The church’s actions may have 
protected the coherence of the membership body, but its failure to protect its members’ 
individual rights upset Collins, convincing him of the necessity of state law.  “I conclude 
from it that if professors of the religion of Christ can act as here stated,” he exclaimed, “I 
have lost little in being excluded from their fellowship and communion.”116  After the 
exclusions, Collins eventually initiated suit against Anderson, “and there was cross-
swearing, sure enough.”  Collins prevailed, though the court only awarded him a little 
over $100, some $300 less than the amount he claimed Anderson owed.
117
   
Collins insisted on multiple occasions, however, “that is was not the money [he] 
was contending for,” when he sought arbitration from the church.118 Soon after the 
dispute began, one neighbor told Collins that word had circulated about his backing out 
of the contract.
119
 Surely the awareness of rumors spreading throughout the neighborhood 
and the surrounding area of his alleged failure to live up to his contract with Anderson 
drove Collins’s actions during the church proceedings.  Once that legal venue buttressed 
the rumors by excluding Collins—labeling him as both a less-than-straightforward-
businessman and unrepentant moral transgressor—he first found solace at the local court 
before making “public in pamphlet form the causes that led” to the degradation of his 
civil and religious identities.
120
  He claimed to be perfectly satisfied “that all who heard 
the trial,” and, he noted, “they were a good many,” were “satisfied” that he deported 
himself throughout the endeavor “above board,” taking “no ungentlemanly advantages” 
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 His account—though describing primarily the church’s handling of the 
case—ends with him triumphant in a court of law, and that arena’s ruling eclipsing 
actions taken by the church, his rightful property and reputation restored.      
Not far from the Elizabeth Church, members of the Washington Baptist Church 
were embroiled in their own disagreements over church discipline and the “exercise of 
arbitrary and lawless power” during the mid-1840s.122  More so than the charges of 
Collins and Creath, however, the consternation aroused within the Washington Church 
centered upon actions taken by their sister churches and governing association.  In 1845, 
the printed minutes of the Bracken Association noted rumors of Elder Gilbert Mason’s 
(minister for the Washington and Lewisburg Churches) past transgressions.  The 
accusations stemmed from alleged actions taken by Mason when he served as preacher at 
the nearby Mayslick Baptist Church during the early 1840s. Along with five other 
charges, Mason was accused of “serious impropriety as to the disposition” of monies 
collected for Georgetown College.
123
  The Washington Church took up four of the six 
charges against their pastor immediately after the conclusion of the association meeting 
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in September 1845, and “[Mason] was unanimously acquitted.”  The church decided they 
had no jurisdiction over the two other charges.
124
   
Three months after the association’s meeting, however, the Mayslick Church held 
a council—attended my members of churches in both the Bracken and Elkhorn 
Associations—which touched upon the charges against Elder Mason.  Having already 
been dismissed from the Mayslick Church on good terms in 1843, and accepted as the 
pastor of the Washington Church soon after, members of the latter charged the Mayslick 
proceedings were illegal, “altogether unauthorized, and unprecedented in Baptist 
jurisprudence.”125  Any effort “to arraign, try, or even prefer charges against any 
individual member, out of his own immediate church,” Washington Church members 
asserted, “is an act of usurpation; and is wholly unauthorized by Baptist Law, or scripture 
teachings.”  Not only did the “Mayslick Council” overstep its authority hearing charges 
against a member of another church—who was not present and had already made 
satisfaction for the offenses in 1842—but the council ignored overwhelming witness 
testimony in favor of Mason.
126
 
The Washington Church disregarded the decision of the Mayslick Council, and 
the controversy continued throughout 1846. In January, the Washington and Lewisburg 
Churches published a reply to the Mayslick Council, which further stoked the 
controversy and led to another gathering of an advisory council in July.  After hearing 
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testimony and examining evidence, the Lewisburg Council—as the July meeting came to 
be known—ruled that Elder Mason deserved “expulsion from [his] church.”127 The 
Washington Church retorted that the Council’s proceedings against Mason were tainted 
by prejudice and illegality, and refused to follow its recommendations. Similar to the 
cases of Creath and Collins, Washington Church members believed their pastor’s 
reputation was being trampled by extra-legal procedures propelled by passion and 
faction.   
  In defending their position to the Bracken Association, the church called upon 
Judge Adam Beatty, a circuit court judge in Mason County who had participated in the 
Lewisburg proceedings.  Beatty submitted a long letter in Mason’s defense, claiming that 
after Mason defended his actions to the Council, the delegates changed the charge—in 
relation to the Georgetown donation— from embezzlement to breach of trust.  Thus, he 
continued, the council made “it a crime in Elder Mason to have defended himself 
against” the embezzlement accusation, “by the production of evidence showing that he 
was not guilty of the charge!!”  Its procedural tactics shocked the judge. “Was such an 
anomaly ever before witnessed in a judicial tribunal?” he asked. “Could any thing [sic] 
else but a judgment of condemnation be expected from a tribunal, which was of opinion 
that an endeavor, on the part of the accused, to defend himself, served only to aggravate 
his offences.” Moreover, the council had found Mason guilty of slander based upon 
evidence of confession.  This evidence, the judge continued—pointing to a ruling made 
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals—holds “‘very little weight’” in state-based courts.  As 
twenty-seven individuals corroborated the preacher, in contrast to the confessions of a 
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few, “this species of testimony ought not to have the weight of a feather in deciding the 
facts of [Mason’s] case.”128 On another charge related to a debt owed to a Mr. Kirk, 
Beatty claimed there was ample evidence to disprove the accusation, yet the council 
voted the charge sustained.
129
  Despite Beatty’s defense of both Mason and the 
Washington Church, delegates to the Bracken Association cut ties with the Washington 
Church in 1846 for its refusal “‘to abide by and perform the decision of the [Lewisburg] 
Council in Elder Mason’s case.’”130 
  The Bracken Association’s actions particularly incensed members of the 
Washington Church.  Not only had the Association severed ties with the Washington 
Church, but it had adopted a resolution calling for Mason’s retirement.131  In turn, 
Washington Church members invoked a number of Baptist authorities—including John 
Taylor and Warham Walker—who highlighted the danger of power-usurping 
associations. For Mason’s congregants, in dissolving ties with their church and casting 
aspersions against their pastor, delegates to the Bracken Association had acted from 
passionate malice, wielding “lawless power” against the church’s scriptural rights: 
We are greatly deceived if what we have set forth does not convince all candid 
and dispassionate men, whose minds have not been warped by preconceived 
opinions, that the action of the Association at its present meeting…has been a 
violation of the first principles of justice, and inconsistent with Baptist law and 
usage, in cutting off the Washington Church from its association with its sister 
churches, and thus attempting to degrade and dishonor the said church for doing 




                                                          
128
 Ibid., 25. 
129
 Ibid., 28. 
130
 Ibid., 3.  
131
 Ibid., 9-11. 
132





Although Creath, Collins, and members of the Washington Church disagreed on doctrinal 
principles—Creath a Reformer, Collins a Particular Baptist, and the Washington Church 
of the Regular Baptist Order—each could agree that they had been wronged by the 
workings of prejudiced tribunals.  And as Judge Beatty pointed out, Mason’s reputation 
had been castigated by a Council that paid no heed to the rigors of law. For them, and 
surely other church-goers throughout the region, their churches lacked the attributes of 
state law’s professional, formal, and objective procedures and outcomes.  The fact that 
each of the above disputes centered upon white men’s property and reputations 
compounded the matter, and impelled the respective parties to detail their disputes’ 
particulars in published form.   
Yet a central theme in each account was the contrast between church-based and 
state-based legal venues.  For Creath, no “civilized” tribunal of a secular nature would 
proceed as did the David’s Fork Church.  The Washington Church and her supporters, 
too, denounced the “arbitrary” rulings of the association’s councils.  Not only did they 
lack authority, but had acted contrary to both state and Baptist law.  Collins also relished 
finding recourse at the local court, noting that he had become “perfectly satisfied lawing 
such men as Anderson.” He concluded his pamphlet noting the subsequent disciplinary 
paralysis which infiltrated the Elizabeth Church following his exclusion.  Pointing to one 
case under consideration, he exclaimed, “having been, I think, for five months before the 
church,” without movement, “I really fear the church is almost afraid to make an attempt 
to regulate her own business.”133  
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Such outcomes were exactly what writers like Savage, Walker, and Crowell 
hoped to avoid when they published their treatises devoted to church discipline in the 
1840s.  In each case the deciding tribunal strayed from procedural corrections and fell 
into the pit of passionate resolution.  This is not to say that passion or faction was absent 
from churches prior to the late-antebellum period.  But, amidst the expanding, integrated 
marketplace of the early nineteenth century, as debt transformed from a moral to 
economic failing, and as refinement spread outward from urban centers such as 
Lexington and Nashville, individuals, church-members and not, sought more formal, 
unprejudiced, and predictable mitigation for their property disputes.  This led to a 
weakening of church authority over white members’ property-related matters and a 
disproportionate focus on black members’ transgressions.  In other instances, as we will 
see over the next two chapters, doctrinal disagreements which pervaded early-nineteenth 
century Baptist churches often implicated property.  The factionalism and schism 
produced by the period’s transforming religious culture also helped transform how 
individuals envisioned their churches as sites for legal realization.  As law-makers and 
church-goers engaged in the cultural process of separating church from state, such 
controversy further constructed the boundaries of religious and civil authority in the 










CHAPTER 4. “THE PUTRID [SIC] CARMAGE OF CONTENTION”: RELIGIOUS 










In April 1831 the Fox Run Baptist Church of Shelby County, Kentucky gathered 
for their monthly meeting.  Following prayer and reception of new members, the 
moderator opened the floor for the airing of grievances.  Brother John Ford claimed that 
fellow-member James Drane had failed to comply with a contract to which the two men 
had previously agreed.  The church clerk initially recorded little detail, but did note that a 
committee was formed “to examine into the merits of the case, and their Decision [was] 
to be final.”  The committee subsequently ordered that Drane pay Ford “a reasonable rent 
for the use of the 35 acres of land” or otherwise let Ford retain the land until he thought it 
proper to give full possession of the tract to Drane. At the following meeting in May, the 
church admonished Brother Jeptha Brite “for opening his doors to disorderly preaching.”  
The two cases appear to have little in common, and are actually rare in that the church 
body did not level any exclusions from the church fellowship, nor is there record of either 
man making acknowledgement to any wrong doing in order to remain a full member of 
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the Fox Run Church.
2
  A closer look reveals that the two men were in-laws; Brite’s wife, 
Elizabeth, was a Drane by birth.  And the “disorderly preaching” that took place at the 
Brite home was the handiwork of one or both of the Creaths, a family whose affinities 
with the dissenting views of Alexander Campbell were well known throughout the 
region.
3
    The defendants’ collective action over the next weeks—with the apparent aid 
and support of their wives—speaks to the changing nature of church authority over 
matters of dispute resolution during the 1830s, as well as to how insurgent religious 
movements altered how individuals envisioned and engaged with law in post-
Revolutionary Kentucky.   
Fox Run’s charges against James Drane and Jeptha Brite encapsulate Baptists’ 
efforts to regulate their members’ household relations and their business matters.  
Following the charges, Drane and Brite, along with their wives, submitted a remonstrance 
to the church.  Both couples asserted that a factionalist spirit had pervaded the church 
body.  The Dranes resented the civil award levied in favor of John Ford and against them, 
while the Brites claimed that the church held no authority over who they invited into their 
own home.  Their grievances hint at individuals’ reconceptualization of church authority 
discussed in the preceding two chapters: that changing understandings of the household 
(in this case family privacy) led to a decline in disciplinary efforts aimed at household 
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regulation, and that for many, economic transformation necessitated a passionless, 
predictable legal system for resolving property- or business-related disputes. The cases 
against Drane and Brite, however, were complicated by the trans-Appalachian West’s 
changing religious culture.  Baptists throughout Kentucky and Tennessee, after nearly 
fifty years of institutional growth and membership expansion in the region, witnessed a 
prolonged period of internal dissension and church schism during the 1820s and 1830s.  
The religious insurgency associated with Alexander Campbell and Barton Stone’s 
“Reformation” movement, while siphoning members from Baptist churches (and as we’ll 
see in Chapter 5, producing heated litigation over church property), also subtly altered the 
ritual of church discipline.      
During the 1820s and 1830s the region’s religious landscape scorched with 
dissension as Baptists argued over a variety of doctrinal matters, but especially as the 
teachings of Campbell and Stone gained prominence and adherents. Campbell’s calls for 
the supremacy of the individual over the collective will of the congregation, along with 
his denunciation of creeds, confessions of faith, and any religious body not deriving from 
the scriptures, found fertile ground among the region’s Baptists. By the time the Fox Run 
Church admonished Brite for allowing a Campbellite to preach in his home in 1831, area 
Baptists had experienced years of schism within their churches, governing associations, 
and “neighbourhoods.” Notions of church and community did not completely erode, of 
course, but for some individuals, internal dissension and church schism transformed how 





peace of the community.
4
 Motivating factors for a seeming reluctance, on the part of 
some churches, to enforce hitherto common disciplinary practices are difficult to 
ascertain, but this chapter contends that as member relations became strained by the 
influence of the Stone-Campbell movement, church discipline receded and church bodies 
grew less willing to enforce their law-making powers. The practice of church discipline 
did not completely cease amidst the Campbellite schisms of the period. It continued, 
especially in rural areas, throughout the nineteenth century.
5
 Bogged down with internal 
dissension and schism, however, many afflicted churches recorded fewer or no charges 
during the controversy.  This examination, then, illuminates how changes in the religious 
culture affected individuals’ vision of the wider legal culture.  
 
Despite slow growth from the end of the Revolutionary War through the 1790s, 
Baptists and Methodists kept up with the region’s overall population growth during the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, constructing both an institutional infrastructure 
and welcoming a large number of members.  Their Presbyterian counterparts did not fare 
as well.  From the statehood period on, doctrinal disputes and divisions wrecked 
Kentucky’s Presbyterian churches.  By 1820, the denomination in the state, including 
those aligned with the Cumberland group (a more revivalist faction which had broken off 
from mainline Presbyterians during the first decade of the nineteenth century) numbered 
only about 3,700.  Ten years later that number more than doubled to 7,610 members 
                                                          
4
 On community see the introduction in Bruce H. Mann, Neighbors and Strangers: Law and Community in 
Early Connecticut (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987). 
5
See in general, Gregory A. Wills, Democratic Religion: Freedom, Authority, and Church Discipline in the 





worshipping as 120 church bodies.
6
  Presbyterianism in Tennessee progressed even 
slower.
7
 Methodists proved more successful than Presbyterians.  By 1830 Kentucky 
Methodists numbered just over 28,000 members affiliated with 51 circuits and stations, 
and 93 ministers.
8
 Methodist regional conferences based in Tennessee (but including 
members from parts of Georgia, Mississippi, and northern Alabama) grew from just 
under 3,000 in 1803 to nearly 70,000 in 1840.
9
  Like the Methodists, Baptists in 
Kentucky expanded throughout the first decades of the nineteenth century.  Boasting 574 
churches affiliated with 34 associations and just under 40,000 members in 1830, the 
Baptists, though divided due to various doctrinal disagreements, were the largest 
denomination in the state.
10
 Their Tennessee brethren by the mid-1830s claimed over 
27,000 members worshipping in five hundred congregations.
11
  
Despite the steady growth, trans-Appalachian Baptists—and their Protestant 
cohorts in general—constantly worried about the progress of religion in the region.  
Indeed fears of irreligion and deism’s progress haunted religiously-minded Americans 
during the post-Revolutionary period.
12
 In 1798 Lexington resident Robert Stuart 
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lamented that “[p]erhaps there never was a day when men of virtue were so few.  The 
Infidelity; the Profanity; the dissipation & almost universal depravation of morals which 
at present pervade every part of our country, is truly alarming.”  Christianity, Stuart 
continued, “is now banished from our polite circles” and had “become the sneer of 
ridicule.”13  Stuart and other’s fears were surely pacified over the next few years as a 
Great Revival swept through the western frontier.  Historian John B. Boles asserts that 
following the revival, “religion for a time came to monopolize the popular mind in 
Kentucky.”14  
The give-and-take between religious fervor and spiritual drought was a constant 
theme during the first three decades of the nineteenth century. Nineteenth-century Baptist 
historian John Spencer claimed that in just a matter of a few years after the revival, deism 
and infidelity, which had been “almost silenced” during the period of religious fervor, 
“began to vaunt itself again.”  The Elkhorn Association reported only 9 new baptisms, 
and across Kentucky, 1808 proved “the gloomiest year” of the young century.  By 1810, 
however, Spencer insisted, “some light showers began to relive the thirsty land, and more 
fruitful seasons followed.”15 This ebb and flow of spiritual success and dearth was 
encapsulated in a letter received by Kentucky resident Capt. Thomas Buckner in 1819. 
“Religion and Atheism take their turns in this town,” the correspondent wrote, “but at this 
present writeing [sic] religion weighs predominant.  Three mile sermons and half a mile 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Eric R. Schlereth, An Age of Infidels: The Politics of 
Religious Controversy in the Early United States (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).  
13
 Robert Stuart to Mrs. Fleming, 19 March 1798, Fleming-Edmonds Family Papers, Folder 7: 
Correspondence, 1793-1798, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Kentucky (hereafter FHS). 
14
 Boles, Religion in Antebellum Kentucky, 28. 
15





prayers are all the rage at this time.”16 Yet nearby in Shelby County just four years later, 
Martin Baskett lamented that even professors of religion “in our country have gotten 
proud and love the world better than the Cross.”17  Soon after in 1825, Baskett changed 
his tune, noting that he had recently received “some pleasing accounts from different 
parts” of Kentucky about revivals.18   
Despite this relentless anxiety over religion’s progress or regress, sectarian strife 
and doctrinal dissension proved a perhaps greater concern.  The Great Revival not only 
helped to push evangelicalism towards the mainstream, it ensured a large amount of 
religious diversity, which in turn, placed stress on the existing church institutions in the 
trans-Appalachian West.
19
  For the Baptists, their greatest threat emerged with Alexander 
Campbell’s increased critiques of their doctrine and form of church governance during 
the 1820s.   But Campbell, Stone, and their teachings were not the only divisive influence 
circulating among the region’s Baptists in the 1820s and 1830s.  The Rev. R.B.C. 
Howell, upon becoming editor at The Baptist (later the Tennessee Baptist) in 1838, 
assured his readers that the newspaper’s theological positions would not change.  "I have, 
from the beginning, still am, and ever expect to remain," Howell asserted, "a Baptist of 
the 'Old School.'" This certainly did not mean, however, that he was caught up with any 
of the "mummeries" recently propagated, and then “so rife in Tennessee." Howell 
repudiated "Parkerism, Campbellism, Mormonism, anti-effortism, antinomianism, and 
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every other similar fantasy.”20 His assurances touched on some of the largest divisions 
within the Baptist denomination as well as the rise of competing doctrines and sects that 
wrecked the religious landscape during the antebellum period.   
Other than Mormonism and antinomianism, the “mummeries” which Howell 
referred to stemmed from opposition to the Mission movement.  The mission 
movement’s roots were in the east, where evangelical Congregationalists and 
Presbyterians feared for the West’s presumed moral laxity.  With hopes of establishing a 
Christian Commonwealth that included the Trans-Appalachian region, eastern 
evangelicals organized a number of benevolent and missionary societies during the 1810s 
and 1820s—including the American Sunday School Union (1814), American Bible 
Society (1816), American Tract Society (1826), and the American Home Missionary 
Society (1826). Many Baptists not only supported these establishments, but went on to 
organize their own foreign missionary organizations, including the Triennial Convention 
(1814), the American Baptist Home Missionary Society (1832), and the Baptist General 
Tract Society (1824).
21
   
The missionary cause reached the West with Luther Rice’s itineration throughout 
Kentucky and parts of Tennessee in 1815-1816.  Through Rice’s efforts, along with the 
dissemination of mission circulars, a number of western churches and associations were 
brought into the missionary fold.  Unlike their more theologically liberal opponents, anti-
missionists (often labeled “anti-effort” or “Primitive”) did not wish to construct 
expansive denominational apparatuses that stretched beyond the local level.  Instead, 
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anti-missionists clung to a traditional, Calvinistic understanding of God’s sovereignty.22  
Fragmented by doctrinal disagreements themselves, however, anti-missionists never 
coalesced as a denomination.  Their opposition to the missionary cause and the clamorous 
reaction they engendered among pro-mission Baptists linked these disparate religious 
groups.  And although some anti-missionary churches took part in regional governing 
associations, their critique of unscriptural religious institutions such as bible and tract 
societies bled into other Baptists’ critiques of associations and their potentially dangerous 
ability to usurp congregations’ powers.  Campbell’s denunciation of all ecclesiastical 
structures other than the local congregation echoed those of anti-missionists, but for most 
Baptists, his anti-mission impulses may have been the least worrisome aspect of his 
doctrine.  Even still, anti-missionists’ message proved popular throughout the trans-
Appalachian region.  
Daniel Parker emerged as one of the most vociferous critics of the missionary 
system during the 1810s.  Living in Tennessee, not far from the Kentucky line, when the 
mission cause first gained popularity in the West, Parker soon moved to southeastern 
Illinois and began more actively propagating his anti-mission views.  In 1820 he 
published A Public Address to the Baptists Society in which he castigated missionary 
societies—and specifically the “Baptist Board of Foreign Missions”—as not only 
unscriptural but dangerous to Baptists’ democratic form of church governance.23  Later in 
the decade, Parker advanced the “Two-seed” doctrine, his theological basis for anti-
missionism.  God, Parker claimed, created Adam and Eve in his likeness (the good seed), 
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and after the fall of man, he planted in Eve, and all the daughters of Eve, the “seed of the 
serpent.”  Thus, those born of the former seed were the children of God; the latter, the 
children of the devil.  In bringing the Gospel to foreign lands, to the descendants of the 
devil’s seed, Missionary societies embarked on a worthless endeavor.24 
In some ways, Parker’s anti-missionary views echoed those of the popular Baptist 
preacher, John Taylor, whose message gained traction among many trans-Appalachian 
Baptists in the opening-decades of the nineteenth century. Taylor would later deride 
Parker in 1830, claiming that both he and Campbell were “distracting the Baptists in the 
Western country” (he also claimed it was possible that neither man was religious at all).25  
In 1819, however, Taylor published his Thoughts on Missions in which he infamously 
claimed that missions smelled of “the New England Rat.”  He compared the missionary 
system with the Catholic Church’s selling of indulgences during the pre-Reformation 
period, denounced theological schools devoted to educating ministers,  and decried the 
“artful measures of those great men [missionary agents]” in pilfering money from 
common church members. “How is it,” Taylor exclaimed, “these white-handed gentry, 
always stretched out for money, and like the horse-leech, ever crying give, give!!” Similar 
to Parker, Taylor warned that the missionary effort was really an aristocratic plot, one 
contrary to the Baptists’ highest authority: the local congregation.26   
Baptists’ fears of governing associations consolidating power over autonomous 
churches compounded divisions over the mission question. One of Taylor’s chief 
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objectives in publishing Thoughts on Missions, had been “to drive [missionaries] our of 
Baptist associations,” organizations whose existence Taylor supported but whose powers 
he always believed should be limited.
27
 Particularly of concern to Taylor and other critics 
was the ability of associations to usurp the disciplinary powers of autonomous 
congregations.  As Taylor noted in 1823, “a number of poor Baptists,” especially, were in 
the habit of using Associations “as a kind of appellate court.”28 Pastor Peter Gayle of 
Tennessee likewise lamented in 1835 that there appeared to be certain groups who were 
“anxious to introduce the system of making Associations Ecclesiastical Courts to regulate 
and bind the consciences” of the individual.  Yet he held out hope that the “good old 
spirit of independence” was advancing in the state, which would never imbue 
associations with “supreme jurisdiction in ecclesiastical government.”29   
Debates over the mission question and the utility of governing associations 
pervaded trans-Appalachian Baptist churches, at times provoking schism.  The Buffalo 
Lick Baptist Church in Shelby County, Kentucky resolved in 1832 that it had no “legal 
authority” to participate “in the new theorys [sic] of the day, such as the Bible Society, 
Missionary, Tract, Temperance, [and] Sunday School.”  Together “with the Baptist 
Convention Scheme” Buffalo Lick members continued are “but man made at best, & 
consequently, [have] more of the love of money, and self, than the Glory of God.”30   In 
Fayette County, Kentucky the South Elkhorn Baptist Church divided in the early 1820s, 
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and the church’s majority faction withdrew from the Elkhorn Association.31  After a brief 
account of the division, the clerk recorded the proper form of church governance.  Most 
importantly, the majority ruled that the church “is a worshipping congregation & is the 
highest Court Christ has fix’d on earth.”  Church bodies were free to leave associations at 
their will, as they “may be in one association today & tomorrow in another.”  An 
Association’s only purpose was as an advisory council, the clerk recorded, “not as some 
would have it, a legislative one.”32 
The contention and schisms such disagreements engendered held the potential to 
alter how churches practiced discipline, and thus, how church members envisioned their 
communities’ broader legal culture.  During the mid-1830s, debates over the pro-mission 
Tennessee Baptist Convention erupted in the Little Cedar Lick Baptist Church.  After 
initially deferring the missionary question to their association in August 1834, the church 
clerk recorded only one disciplinary charge (for an unspecified offence) during the next 
nineteen months.  Nearly three years later a similar dearth in discipline occurred as the 
church experienced a division due to the majority’s vote to join the missionary cause.  In 
June 1837, Elder Thompkins petitioned the church for “dismission for himself and as 
many others of the Brethren and Sisters as wished to be dismissed.”  To its credit, the 
majority acquiesced, dismissing on good terms at least twenty-nine individuals 
(Thompkins included) over the next two months.  They even allowed that any member 
with similar misgivings could leave the church through September without facing 
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excommunication proceedings. After that month, “the order made allowing the Brethren 
and Sisters to join the dismistion [sic]” would “be nul [sic] and void and of no affect.”33    
This allowed the Little Cedar Lick Church to break apart without any potentially 
tumultuous disciplinary proceedings.  Yet it did not stop doctrinal disagreement or 
division from affecting how members interacted with their church as a legal site.  For a 
year preceding the formal withdraw of Elder Thompkins and his followers, the church did 
not record any disciplinary activity.  That silence continued until July 1838, a full twenty-
four months with no record of the church fellowship meeting as church tribunal.   
Moreover, from the time the church initially took up the mission question in August 1834 
until years after the 1837 division, church discipline ebbed.  From 1830 through 1833 the 
clerk recorded one charge per every 5.03% of the church membership.   In contrast, over 
the next four year period (1834-1837)—from the church’s first recorded mention of the 
Tennessee Baptist Convention through the division—that same number fell to just 1.79%.  
That rate remained a low 2.65% over the next four year period (1838-1841), before 
finally surpassing its pre-division level between 1842 and 1845 by rising to 5.83%.
34
  
Little Cedar Lick’s experience during the 1830s is simply one example of how church 
schism and doctrinal dissension altered individuals’ conceptions of their churches as law-
producing sites.  But the same process played out in other churches entangled in various 
doctrinal disagreements or in disputes with competing sects.   
The Bryan’s Station Baptist Church near Lexington was one Kentucky’s first such 
organizations.  Constituted in 1786, Bryan’s Station Baptists met regularly for the next 
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twenty-five years.  By 1801 the church had grown to 421 members.  That year the church 
dismissed 267 members to organize the David’s Fork Baptist Church.  Prior to 1802, the 
church recorded 76 charges against its white members and 34 charges against its black 
brethren during its fifteen-year history.  From the start of 1802 through the first two 
months of 1811, the church clerk made note of an additional 88 charges against whites 
and 66 against blacks, a total of 164 charges against whites and 100 against black 
members in the church’s first twenty-five years of existence.  By 1811, however, the 
church found itself on the brink of schism.  The difficulties stemmed from an inter-
church dispute between members of the Bryan’s Station Church and a nearby 
congregation at Town’s Fork, and implicated numerous other churches in the area as well 


























In 1810, the majority of Bryan’s Station met with other disgruntled church-
factions and formed the Licking Association of Particular Baptists.  The minority, 
dissatisfied with the majority’s doctrinal stances and desiring to remain with the Elkhorn 
Association, declared in January 1811 “that they were no longer under the jurisdiction of 
the church” at Bryan’s Station.  Two months later, the majority excluded the 35 member-
minority (including 9 black members, at least 8 of whom were slaves) for disorderly 
conduct in relation to fomenting division within the church or withdrawing from 
membership without letters of dismission.
35
  Over the course of the next year (April 
1811-February 1812), the church excluded another 10 members for joining the schismatic 
group. In contrast to its first twenty-five years of existence, the decades following the 
1811 schism witnessed a drastic decline in the church’s disciplinary activities.  From 
1812 through 1860 the church only recorded 102 charges against its white and black 
members (51 each).
36
   Though the majority remained largely intact after the 1811 purge 
of recusants, those who stayed behind pursued discipline with less rigor. 
 
For many Baptists, however, Campbell and Stone’s divisive influence throughout 
the region—and in Kentucky especially—proved the greatest threat to their institutional 
stability.
37
 The “Reformation” (or “Restoration”) that many Baptists derided so intently 
during the antebellum period resulted from the convergence of two religious movements.  
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In 1832, after nearly a decade of critique, Alexander Campbell and his fellow 
“reformers” joined with Barton W. Stone, and the adherents of his Christian Church.  
Unable to agree upon a name for the united movement, members of the new sect were 
known as Christians, Disciples of Christ, or Reformers.  Their churches were identified 
alternatively as Christian Churches or Churches of Christ.  During the 1820s, Baptists 
primarily referred to them as Campbellites or, sarcastically, as “reformers,” their 
ministers “proclaimers,” and their influential doctrine, derogatorily, as “Campbellism.” 
Historians have since referred to the coalition as the “Stone-Campbell” movement.38 
Barton Stone, born on Christmas Eve 1772 in Charles County, Maryland, was 
baptized in the Church of England, but converted to Presbyterianism in the early 1790s.  
In 1796 he became an ordained minister licensed by North Carolina’s Orange Presbytery. 
Stone itinerated briefly through West Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, before finally 
settling in 1797 with Presbyterians at Cane Ridge and Concord in northern Kentucky. 
Despite his ordination and travels, he harbored uncertainty over some aspects Calvinism, 
including doctrines of the Trinity, predestination, and reprobation.  He was called in 1798 
to become pastor of the united congregations at Cane Ridge and Concord, but upon 
extensive examination of the Westminster Confession of Faith, he initially declined 
ordination by the Transylvania Presbytery because of his doubt over some of the 
Confession’s doctrinal points.  The Presbytery, thinking his uneasiness extended solely to 
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the Trinity, and not to predestination, election, and reprobation, deemed him sufficient 
and subsequently ordained him.  
After attending revivals in southern Kentucky during the summer of 1800, Stone 
led a five-day camp meeting back at the Concord Meetinghouse.  Thousands reportedly 
attended those services, but it was overshadowed by the Cane Ridge Revival in August of 
the following year, which drew an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 individuals to hear 
preaching from Baptist, Presbyterian, and Methodist ministers.  The revivals confirmed 
Stone’s discomfort with the doctrines of predestination and reprobation.  Soon thereafter, 
he began insisting that all sinners could be saved simply by coming to and believing in 
Christ.  Some of his fellow Presbyterians accepted Stone’s new theological stances, but 
others in northern Kentucky derided his unorthodoxy.  In September 1803, Stone, along 
with four other ministers facing charges from the Kentucky Synod, withdrew from that 
body.  Shunning sectarian designations, they insisted that the only appellation a true 
believer needed was that of “Christian.”  Over the next seven years, internal divisions 
among the Christians (and continued doctrinal arguments with prominent Presbyterians 
such as David Rice) resulted in Stone’s lone leadership of the sect by 1811.   Over the 
next decade Stone established churches in Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky.  By 1830 the 
Christian Church numbered more than 16,000 members dispersed through the Trans-
Appalachian West from Alabama to Indiana, as well as along the east coast in Virginia 
and North Carolina.  That year, Stone, for a second time, proposed a union between his 
Christians and Alexander Campbell’s reformers.39 
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Alexander Campbell40 Barton Stone41 
 
Alexander Campbell was born in the Broughshane Parish of Ireland on September 
12, 1788.  The son of a Seceder Presbyterian minister, Campbell grew up in a devout 
family and joined his father’s church as a teenager.  At the age of twenty Campbell set 
out to join his father, Thomas, who had earlier immigrated to the United States.  A ship-
wreck derailed Campbell’s first attempted voyage—while confirming his life calling as a 
minister—and redirected him to Glasgow for a year of study.  There, Campbell imbibed 
the Scottish Common Sense philosophy which would inform his Scriptural interpretations 
throughout his life.  Moreover, church leaders in Glasgow influenced his thinking on 
everything from congregational autonomy, weekly communion, the exclusion of creeds, 
and the restoration of primitive Christianity.  He grew disgusted with the sectarian 
bickering that pervaded his own church as well as the Scottish reform movement in 
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general.  In 1809, Campbell and the rest of his family migrated to the United States, re-
united with Thomas Campbell, and settled in Washington, Pennsylvania.  Alexander and 
Thomas quickly set their sights on promoting Christian unity, forming the Christian 
Association of Washington which later became the Brush Run Church. Campbell married 
in 1811 and took up a farm in what is now Bethany, West Virginia.
42
  
In 1812, both Campbell men repudiated infant baptism and aligned with the 
Baptists’ doctrine on full immersion for converted believers, the beginning of a nearly 
two-decade tumultuous relationship between the younger Campbell and that group.  
Through the 1810s, Campbell tended his farm, taught school, and itinerated for the 
Baptists.  He never officially joined the denomination, but remained connected with that 
group until the late 1820s.  Two of Campbell’s early churches belonged to Baptist 
associations, and in 1823, he started publishing the Christian Baptist.  He germinated 
some controversy in 1816 when in a presentation known as the “Sermon on the Law” he 
insisted that rather than being bound by Mosaic Law, Christians were “under grace,” thus 
elevating the New Testament above the Old.  Some at the time and since have pointed to 
this moment, and subsequent debates that followed, as the beginning of his reformation 
movement.  But controversy took hold in the 1820s, as Campbell used the pages of the 
Christian Baptist to herald a “reformation of the apostolic order based upon the New 
Testament.”43 Critics seized on Campbell’s doctrine, forming an opposition periodical 
known as the Baptist Recorder.  Amidst this controversy, Campbell and Stone aligned 
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into one movement in 1832, and Stone’s Christian Messenger announced “the union of 
Christians in fact in our country.”44    
To an outsider, the main theological differences between the Stone-Campbell 
movement and mainline Baptists—the former’s heralding the authority of the New 
Testament over the Old,
45
 its adherence to baptism for the remission of sins, and 
especially its renunciation of creeds, confessions of faith, and other human instruments of 
church government which were central to many Baptist churches—may appear slight.  
Yet individuals involved in the schisms took the divergences seriously, and distinguished 
the distinctiveness of each group (as historian Edmund S. Morgan once noted, “the most 
hotly contested religious differences among Christians have often been differences of 
degree; the shift from orthodoxy to heresy may be no more than a shift of emphasis.”).46  
Jasper Morris remembered in the 1840s a schism that took place in the Mason County 
Baptist Church the previous decade.  He insisted that the two churches had since “been 
two distinct and separate sects having…different rules of church government.”47 Another 
observer, James Ingels, echoed Morris’s assertions, noting that Baptists and Reformers 
“entertain[ed] different principles of religious faith both in theory and practice.” Ingels 
departed the Bethlehem Baptist Church soon “after the Campbellites commenced 
preaching there,” because, he claimed, “their doctrines didn’t suite me.”48 Even when 
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church-goers were not educated on the nuanced doctrinal subtleties between Reformers 
and Baptists, they insisted upon the two groups’ separateness.  One Baptist claimed “I 
don’t know [the Reformers’] rules, but I do know they do not hold the same faith and 
doctrine that we do.”49  
From the late 1820s on, Baptists obsessed over the influence of Campbell and his 
followers.  The editors of the Baptist Banner devoted column after column of their 
regular periodical to anecdotes of Campbellite hypocrisy, charges of blasphemy, and 
details of the doctrine’s continued advancement amongst Baptist ranks.  In some 
instances, Baptist writers sought to convince readers that Campbellite leaders deceived 
their followers.  An 1836 article noted that one reformed church in Kentucky met every 
week (opposed to Baptists who generally communed monthly) for service and solicitation 
of donations for the poor.  Yet, “there arose much confusion and debating in this 
congregation of the reformation,” the editorialist insisted, “when it appeared that the 
greater portion and nearly all of this fund for the poor (we think that is what they call it) 
had been paid to the ‘proclaimers!!!’”50   At times, the reports veered toward a McCarthy-
like obsession with rooting out the dissenters, and editors admitted as much. The Franklin 
Association of Baptists charged its member churches to “make no compromise with 
error; mark them who cause divisions; [and] divest yourselves of the last vestige of 
Campbellism” in your midst.  Likewise, the Banner proclaimed “Some of our readers 
may suppose that we devote too much of our paper in noticing the Campbellites, but we 
think the state of things in Kentucky imperiously demands it.”  Kentucky was “doomed 
to be a battle ground,” as the reformers “are organizing and have already commenced a 
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systematic attack upon” the Baptists of the state.  They traveled in all directions, the 
editor continued, bringing their false doctrine to the populace, “it therefore becomes us to 
be on the alert and to repel the various slanders and misrepresentations that are afloat.”51 
John L. Waller, the editor of the Baptist Banner from 1835 to 1841, probably 
genuinely feared the Campbellite influence in his state.
52
  Yet he was also reared with the 
stories of his ancestors’ religious persecution during the late eighteenth century.  The 
editor’s great uncle, also named John, was well-known among early Baptists.  The elder 
John Waller had been rumored to be an “exceedingly wicked man” in the 1760s, but 
found Christ during the latter part of that decade and became a renowned preacher of the 
Baptist faith.  He was one of three arrested in 1768 when authorities seized Lewis Craig 
at the Spotsylvania meetinghouse.  Six years later, in March of 1774, Virginian 
authorities again arrested Waller for preaching without a license.  He continued to pray 
and preach from his jail cell, before being brought to trial.  Waller refused to post bond as 
two other of his persecuted cell-mates had, and remained in jail for two more weeks until 
he was finally released.  Early-American Baptists prided themselves—and many still 
do—on their persecuted past, and it is not inconceivable that Waller, the editor, employed 
hyperbole when warning his brethren of the Campbellite phalanx advancing through his 
state.  Even so, the Stone-Campbell movement represented a genuine threat to many 
trans-Appalachian Baptists.  It reminded them, though they did not face the same state-
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sanctioned persecution as their colonial-era predecessors, that they had their own battles 
to fight, their own reasons to stay vigilante.
53
   
Like Waller, Baptists throughout Kentucky equated their encounter with 
Campbell’s rising influence with war.  Leaders of the Baptist Church in Washington, 
Kentucky charged in 1844 that the “tenants, doctrines, & views preached” by the 
Reformation Church “are at war with the principals & doctrines of the Baptist Church.”54 
Indeed, Baptist historian John Spencer insisted that in Kentucky, the Campbellite-Baptist 
struggle “was a civil war,” as “strife pervaded every department of society.”55  Though 
Spencer wrote over a half-century after the schism, antebellum-Baptists shared his 
sentiments, worrying that Campbell’s views were hazardous to both religious and civil 
society.  James Fishback, a prominent Baptist minister in the Lexington area, admitted in 
1834 that there were “many good men & women among those who call themselves 
Reformers,” but he insisted “that the principles by which they are distinguished from 
other Protestant Christians” were “of a dangerous tendency” both to the individual 
morality and more “generally upon the good order & piety of society.”56  
To others the Campbellite plague appeared to affect all of Kentucky.  After 
receiving news of Campbell’s popularity from his brother, an observer in Elizabethtown 
replied that “from what you say about the principles and Doctrine of A. Campbell I 
infered [sic] that you tho’t all Kentucky was in a distressing state.”  He admitted that “in 
some parts the Baptists have been witchedly [sic] mangled,” but that the day was coming 
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when the Lord would lift up his “true followers.”57  Likewise, M.A. Crute wrote her aunt 
in 1844, lamenting that the “Campbellites appear to be carrying the day” in her Kentucky 
neighborhood.  “There has been considerable excitement about them and much 
controversy,” she continued.  “They receive new members almost every week.  I have 
less faith than ever in religious controversies,” as “nothing is better calculated to make 
infidels than angry religious disputes.”58  
To Tennessee Baptists, the situation appeared just as dire.  The Reformation 
movement gained ground in Tennessee after 1827, the year in which a major split of 
Tennessee Baptists occurred over an increased Arminian influence in the state.  Church-
historian J.H. Grime noted a number of ministers and churches that broke from their 
Calvinist counterparts in the 1820s as Campbell’s “new-fangled notions” waged “war 
against the Articles of Faith” of Tennessee Baptists.  Although he exclaimed that the 
region had “been a battle ground between Baptists and Campbellites,” he continued 
boastfully in the early-twentieth century, “to-day, as then, the Baptists hold sway.”59  The 
state of affairs seemed more contested in the late 1820s and early 1830s. R.B.C. Howell, 
editor of the Tennessee Baptist and pastor of Nashville’s First Baptist Church, noted that, 
since Nashville served as “Headquarters of the Reformation” in the region, the 
movement’s “ablest exponents” resided in its immediate vicinity, “and the influence they 
exerted, both in the city, and throughout the country, was of immense magnitude.”60 
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Though “destruction reigned supreme” in the region’s Baptist churches, the struggle 
developed the group’s preachers and laity into “theological combatants,” Howell 
exclaimed, “ever ready to meet an enemy, and strike him down.”61 Tennessee Baptist 
minister John Bond likewise averred that during the 1820s “all the churches (more or 
less) of the Concord Association” as well as churches throughout the region, “were in 
perfect ferment by the leaven of Campbellism.”62 
Although annual association meetings, as we will see below, witnessed their fair 
share of turmoil revolving around Campbell’s influence, dissension and church schism 
pervaded local congregations and church neighborhoods, bringing the doctrinal disputes 
to bear on church goers across the region. The Clear Creek Baptist Church of Woodford 
County, Kentucky suffered prolonged controversy during the 1820s.  John Taylor 
exclaimed that “the church had been so overwhelmed with sorrow and confusion with 
those contentions [debates over creeds, charges of heresy, etc.]” in the late 1820s, that “a 
number among [the church’s] best members had taken [dismission] letters and gone 
elsewhere.” The neighboring congregation of nearly 300 members at Shawnee Run, a 
“once happy church,” also split over doctrine with “one part falling in with the fooleries 
of Campbell.”  After faction and “bitter conflict” began spreading through the South 
Benson Baptist Church, Taylor exclaimed, “those buzzard-men [leaders of the 
“Reformation”] smelled the putred [sic] carnage of contention, and flew with speed, 
perhaps 20 miles,” to effectuate a division.63  Describing the Mt. Vernon Baptist Church 
following its 1834 schism, Roadham Rout claimed it “has been toarn [sic] asunder by 
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  Reverend James Black remembered that in the 1830s, “the 
majority of the Bethlehem [Baptist] Church went off into the doctrine of the Reformation 
or Cambelites [sic] as they were called.”65  
Rev. Howell likewise insisted that “Campbell’s doctrines were gaining ground 
throughout Middle Tennessee.  Ministers and congregations were failing into them on 
every hand,” including Nashville’s First Baptist Church.66  Under the preaching of Phillip 
Fall—whose pastorate, according to Howell, “produced continued dissatisfaction, 
excitement, and discussion”—the church fully aligned with the Reformation by 1828.67  
In 1826-27, factions from the Buffalo Ridge and Sinking Creek Baptist Churches in East 
Tennessee aligned with Stone’s teachings. By 1835, just three years after its formation, 
forty-seven churches throughout Tennessee were affiliated with the Stone-Campbell 
movement.
68
 More than controversies involving only church members, such schisms 
implicated residents throughout the wider church neighborhood.  As Spencer Anderson, 
unaffiliated with any church, reported after the local Baptist congregation split over 
Campbell’s influence: “the peace of the neighbourhood is broken and as I consider on 
account of the division in the Church.”69  
 
During the 1820s and 1830s, rather than experiencing harmonious relations 
between and within congregations, Kentucky Baptists experienced a period of prolonged 
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dissension and schism.  The Elkhorn, Long Run, and Franklin Baptist Associations, made 
up of churches largely from north-central Kentucky, serve as useful case studies through 
which to uncover how an increase in internal disputes over doctrine affected the workings 
of Baptist church tribunals.  Kentucky Baptists organized the Elkhorn Association in 
1785, the first such body west of the Appalachians.  Initially constituted with only five 
affiliated churches, within ten years the Elkhorn Association housed thirty churches with 
just under 2,000 members.
70
  By the turn of the century, membership in Elkhorn’s 
affiliated churches more than doubled to 4,853.
71
  Between 1826 and 1840—from the 
first rumblings of Campbellism through the next decade—the Elkhorn Association 
averaged 3,742 members, and continued to be a leading governing organization for 
Kentucky Baptists.
72
   Elkhorn’s counterpart, the Long Run Association, resulted from 
the “Great Revival” of religious sentiment that swept through frontier regions at the turn 
of the nineteenth century.  Responding to the rise in membership, twenty-six churches 
from seven different counties (including one in the Indiana territory) came together in 
1803 and formed the Long Run Association. By 1810, Long Run had added thirteen more 
churches, bringing its total membership to 2,851 and making it the largest association in 
the state at that time.  For the next thirty years, the association averaged nearly 3,200 
members and remained one of the principal governing bodies amongst Kentucky 
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  Constituted by eight churches formerly connected to the Elkhorn, Long Run, 
and North District Associations, the Franklin Association held its first meeting in 
September 1815.  Fifteen years later, it boasted 19 affiliated churches claiming a 
membership of 1,728.  Though never as large as Long Run or Elkhorn during this period, 
the Franklin Association averaged nearly 1700 members during the 1820s, and was made 
up of churches from in and around the state capitol of Frankfort, and thus served as an 
important organization for the Baptists’ institutional network.74    
Campbell’s rising popularity in the West infiltrated and challenged the growth of 
churches composing the Long Run Association during the early 1820s. Two years after 
he preached to the congregation in 1823, the Church of Louisville queried the Long Run 
Association about the justification of various organizations.  “Is there any authority in the 
New Testament for a Religious body to make human Onsets, and confessions of faith[?],” 
she asked.  And what of associations themselves, does the New Testament authorize such 
bodies, “if so what is it?”  Following Louisville’s lead, the Shelbyville Church asked 
“Are our associations as annually attended of general utility?”75  Delegates referred the 
queries to the member-churches for a vote, and requested each to send a reply in their 
1826 letter.  The queries stirred up some consternation in member churches, as the 
exclusion-per-member rate for all of Long Run’s reporting churches jumped from just 
1.04% in 1825 to 4.56% the following year, its highest level in over two decades.
76
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The Elkhorn Association also witnessed disorder among member-churches due to 
Campbell’s teachings.  In 1827, two sets of delegates arrived from Lexington’s First 
Baptist Church, each claiming to be the true representatives of that body.  The minority 
faction, which sought to change the church’s appellation from “Baptist” to “Church of 
Christ,” had excluded seven “of the most prominent members opposed to them.”  The 
majority in turn excluded forty-two members associated with the dissenting faction.  
Elkhorn’s delegates stated their hesitance over interfering “in the internal government of 
the Churches composing her body,” but were convinced that the majority formed the true 
First Baptist Church of Lexington.  They also warned the minority group “of the awful 
danger and alarming tendency of causing divisions in society by [the] introduction of a 
system of things by which the name and character of the Baptist denomination would be 
essentially changed.”77   
As early as 1825 the Franklin Association noted that the subject of “heresy and 
unsound doctrine” was “a very frequent subject of conversation” and questioned the 
efficacy of “Christian union.”78  The association similarly denounced Campbell and other 
reformers in 1827.  Their attack—insisting that Campbell and Stone were “puissant 
pugilists”—was brought on by Campbell and Stone’s refutation of Franklin’s 1826 
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Circular letter which had stressed the importance of creeds and questioned the ability of 
anti-creedists to maintain the “unity, purity, and harmony” of their churches.  For, 
“without respect to a Creed,” the letter read, a church “is reduced to the cruel necessity, 
of harboring under her wings, the vilest heresies that now disgrace the Christian name.”79  
Though proclaiming to be under attack by heretics and their false doctrine, 
Kentucky Baptists witnessed a revival that lasted from 1827-1830.  From 1827 to 1828 
alone, Elkhorn’s churches reported an increase of 1,500 members.80 Across the state 
during the three-year revival, Baptist churches received over 15,000 new members.
81
 The 
religious fervor that prevailed, however, owed a great deal to the growing popularity of 
Campbell’s teachings, and for the rest of the 1820s, discord pervaded the region’s Baptist 
churches.  Nineteenth-century Baptist historian John Spencer, noting that the revival 
“probably suspended” many of the schisms bubbling during 1825 and 1826, admitted that 
it “greatly favored [Campbell’s] reformation,” and insisted that the revival had left 
Baptist churches in Kentucky “proportionately weakened in moral power.”82   
Associations throughout the state, continued to deal with doctrinal dissension 
engendered by Campbell’s movement during the last years of the decade.  Elkhorn’s 
1829 circular letter noted the “great agitation” spreading through the region’s religious 
society, but reminded brethren “that in all cases of difficulty and grievance, there are 
proper tribunals to which we may resort for satisfaction, to which each individual 
member is accountable for his sentiments.”83  At the following meeting in 1830, Elkhorn 
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dropped communication with the Church at Versailles for “receiving into her 
membership” Jacob Creath, Jr. who had “in faith and practice, departed from [Elkhorn’s] 
constitution” and who had been active in “constituting minorities.”  After appointing a 
committee to investigate the standing of another member-church, and its rumored 
departure from Elkhorn’s constitution, the delegates voted to cease “further 
correspondence with churches and Associations that hold to certain doctrines of Mr. 
Alexander Campbell.”84 In 1829, delegates to the Franklin Association, along with their 
sister Associations, ended correspondence with the Mahoning Association for adhering to 
doctrines of “A. Campbell.”  A letter from the association in 1830 reminded its affiliated 
churches that “[b]efore Alexander Campbell visited Kentucky, you were in harmony and 
peace.”  But amidst his scourge, instead of “preaching, you now may hear your church 
covenants ridiculed” as the “fell spirit of discord stalk in open day through families, 
neighborhoods, and churches.”  The printed minutes for that year also included thirty-
nine excerpts taken from Campbell’s publications which the Franklin Baptists claimed 
were fallacies.
85
   At the same time, the Long Run Association sought to shore up their 
stance on creeds, making clear in 1830 that it was “constituted on a Baptist Philadelphia 
Confession of faith” and that the Campbellite doctrine stood “in direct opposition to the 
existence and general dictates of our constitution.”  The report concluded by urging the 
transgressors to “discontinue their writings” and cease their “rebellion against the 
principles of our associational existence.”86  
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The doctrinal dissension wreaked havoc in Kentucky’s Baptist churches, 
siphoning off members and affecting ritual practices. At times, whole church bodies 
departed from the Baptist faith and adopted Campbell’s doctrinal views. For instance, 
Benjamin Allen, pastor of the Harrod’s Creek Baptist Church, “carried about seven-
eighths of [that] church into the heresy of Campbellism” in 1831.87  Others, like 
Lexington’s First Baptist noted above, split into opposing factions.  The Long Run 
Association reported a loss of just over 1,100 between 1829 and 1831.  Likewise, 
Elkhorn churches noted a decline of 892.
88
  In just one year, 1829 to 1830, Kentucky 
Baptist churches suffered a loss of over 5,500 members.
89
  “All the intelligent of the 
denomination saw [by 1830] that the cause of Christ was languishing,” Spencer wrote, 
“that the churches were diminishing in numbers, and still more in piety, intelligence and 
the enforcement of discipline.”90  Throughout his multi-volume work on Kentucky 
Baptists, Spencer reverted to harsh language, especially when discussing anti-missionists 
and anyone associated with Alexander Campbell.  Yet a closer look at the disciplinary 
practices within individual churches bears out his insistence.  The dissension, coupled 
with the revivalist-induced influx followed by a schism-induced withdrawal of 
individuals strained member relations and altered how Baptists envisioned their churches 
as legal sites. 
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The Flat Rock Baptist Church of northwest-Shelby County divided over 
Campbell’s teachings in August 1831.91 At that month’s business meeting, twenty-one 
church members, a minority, met and composed the letter to the Long Run Association 
requesting recognition as the true church of Flat Rock.  “[A] majority of the church,” they 
claimed, had, “for some time passed [sic]” departed from “not only the Faith but also the 
Rules and Regulations of the Baptists.”  In the decade previous the split, the church clerk 
recorded charges ranging from “going with vain company,” to intoxication, fighting,  
adultery, mistreatment of children, “joining the Methodist Society,” and “going to law” 
with a fellow member.
92
  From 1815 through 1825 (the year the Long Run Association 
referred the queries over Campbellite doctrine to the churches), the church averaged one-
charge-recorded per every 5.5% of the church membership.
93
  For the last five years of 
that period (1820-5), that same average reached 7.34%.  In contrast, over the subsequent 
decade (1826-36) that rate collapsed to a mere 0.85%, including no recorded charges for 
nearly seven years, from October 1829 to July 1836 (See Figure 6).
94
 From the first signs 
of doctrinal disturbance within the Long Run Association in 1825, the Flat Rock church 
witnessed a decade of declining disciplinary activity, including a complete lack of 
discipline in the years immediately prior to and following the 1831 schism. The church 
body, no longer a site for impartial resolution from one’s religious peers, instead became 
a site of distrust and doctrinal contestation. 
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Figure 6.  
Deeper in the Bluegrass, the David’s Fork Church of Fayette County also 
experienced internal dissension and schism due to Campbell’s movement, upheaval that 
by the end of 1820s helped transform how white members approached their church for 
dispute resolution or moral regulation. From 1824 through 1829 the David’s Fork Church 
recorded one charge per every 3.49% of its membership.  In 1830, the year a Campbellite 
minority seceded from the church, that average unsurprisingly skyrocketed to 8.71%, the 
highest such figure between 1824 and 1840, and nearly three points higher than the next 
closest year, 1824, which averaged one charge per every 5.88% of the membership.  Over 
the course of the rest of the 1830s, in contrast, the church documented only one charge 
per every 1.52% of the church membership.
95
  This significant drop in disciplinary 
activity is made even greater when we split the charges down by race, and consider—as 
we did in the previous chapter—that after 1825, the David’s Fork Church focused its 
disciplinary practices almost exclusively at its black members.  From 1831 (the year 
following the schism) to 1860, the church recorded 186 charges, only 49 of them leveled 
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against white members, and over one-third of those focused upon members’ non-
attendance at meetings or interaction with another religious body.
96
  Clearly, by 1830 
white members of David’s Fork had re-imagined the ritual of discipline.   The church’s 
disciplinary mechanism had transformed into a forum through which to police the ranks 
of black members, both free and enslaved, while white members showed increased 




Member churches of the Franklin Association suffered similar disciplinary 
reticence amidst doctrinal discord. The Mount Pleasant Baptist Church of Franklin 
County, Kentucky, for a time considered “one of the most prosperous churches in the 
Franklin Association,” divided when a visiting preacher, who had been granted usage of 
the Mt. Pleasant meetinghouse, began siphoning members from the Baptist Church.
98
  In 
July 1825, only seven months after the Baptist church opened their house to Rev. Thomas 
Smith, “and as many other as may choose to join him for the purpose of worshiping 
Almighty God in the way that to them seems right,” the church rescinded the order.  
Though it is unclear what specific doctrine Smith preached, in 1827 the Franklin 
Association coupled him with Campbell and Stone as opponents of the creed system of 
church governance, and at the time of this resolution, Mt. Pleasant members were 
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engaged in debates over their church constitution.
99
 During the ten months after Mt. 
Pleasant Baptists barred Smith’s congregation from using the meetinghouse, they 
excluded seven individuals for joining Smith’s church.  From about the time of Smith’s 
request to use the house in late 1824 through at least 1828, the church did not record any 
disciplinary activity—other than those excommunications related to joining Smith’s 
church.
100
  Prior to the Smith’s appearance and the subsequent exclusions, members had 
consistently turned to the practice of discipline to regulate their community—the charge-
per-member rate from 1820-1824 was 5.9%—citing members, for among other offences, 
failure to attend business meetings, disorderly conduct, and joining the Masons.
101
  From 
1825 to 1828, when the church record book abruptly ends, that rate fell to 3.66%.  If we 
remove the charges revolving around members interacting with an outside religious 
group, the disciplinary rate for those years is zero.      
Likewise, Mt. Pleasant’s sister church of Buffalo Lick, though never explicitly 
dividing over the Stone-Campbell movement, saw drastic cuts in their disciplinary rates 
during the 1820s as dissension pervaded the Franklin Association.  From 1815 to 1825, 
the church leveled one charge per every 5.64% of the membership body. During the next 
decade (1826-1836), that rate fell to just 1.86%. Narrowing the period to 1826—from the 
time the Franklin Association disseminated its letter against the anti-creedists—through 
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the Association’s exclusion of the Hopewell Church for adhering to Reformation doctrine 
in 1833, Buffalo Lick’s disciplinary rate was only 1.49%.102   
Numerous churches, then, witnessed disciplinary declines that correlated with 
dissension germinated by the Stone-Campbell movement.
103
  The practice of discipline 
did not completely cease of course. The Flat Rock church largely resumed its disciplinary 
activities again in the early 1840s.  The David’s Fork Church, too, continued to charge 
members, especially black members, through the antebellum period.  Yet churches 
throughout the region faced a dearth of disputation and moral regulation during the 1830s 
due to the changing religious landscape.   As historian Nathan Hatch has noted, increased 
competition from both the secular and religious spheres—from civic associations and 
other religious groups—for allegiance during this time period meant that “many 
denominations maintained their authority only by seldom exercising it.”104 Perhaps 
Campbell’s elevation of the individual’s interpretation of the scriptures for salvation 
undercut attempts at maintaining a communal order. The continued controversy, too, 
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would have instilled distrust amongst the brethren, causing some individuals to look 
elsewhere for dispute settlement.  
Moreover, churches of the Long Run, Franklin, and Elkhorn Associations, as well 
as with Baptist churches across Kentucky, witnessed a period of expansion and retraction 
during the late 1820s and early 1830s.  Congregants certainly took notice of both 
neighbors and strangers moving in and out of their church, and this may very well have 
altered their sense of community and the role of the church in fostering or maintaining 
social relations. An individual would be far less likely to bring a dispute to his local 
church if his familiarity with or trust in those deciding the case—one of the chief 
advantages of church-based arbitration—had receded due to heightened internal tensions.  
There is also evidence that the Campbellite insurgency affected other aspects of church 
ritual.  John Taylor noted that amidst the dissension at the Clear Creek Baptist Church in 
1829, "the church had no communion at the Lord's table during the whole year; indeed 
they were not in circumstances so to do, and scarcely any have been baptized."
105
  In any 
case, the declining disciplinary rates during the doctrinal controversy demonstrate how 
changes in the region’s religious culture transformed individuals’ conceptions of the 
broader legal culture with which they interacted. 
 
For Shelby County Baptists in 1831, the Campbellites were simply one scourge 
among others that had recently swept through the area.  During the previous year, the 
county had experienced a smallpox epidemic, a scarcity of drinking water, and an 
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increase of “mad dogs” roaming its towns and villages.106  In the eyes of some area 
Baptists, the rabid dogs proved a perfect metaphor for the Campbellites, or as Taylor 
described them, those “hairbrained [sic] reformers,” who “in all their extravagant folly, 
and wicked disorder,” were “tearing churches to pieces.”107  Hair-brained or not, as we 
have seen, Campbell’s movement divided churches, families, and neighborhoods along 
religious lines.  Within the Long Run Association, at least four churches broke apart, 
including those of Flat Rock, Harrod’s Creek, and Floyd’s Fork.  In the Elkhorn 
Association, a number of churches—First Baptist of Lexington, David’s Fork, and Clear 
Creek—divided along doctrinal lines.  The Elkhorn Association also ceased 
correspondence with other congregations, such as the churches of South Elkhorn, 
Versailles, and Providence for departing “from the faith and constitution of the 
Association.”108 Elkhorn’s central-Kentucky counterpart, the Bracken Association, went 
through a similar experience.  In 1830 Bracken’s churches suffered a “thorough and 
Radical” division as “that association cut off or excluded” all those associated with 
Campbell’s movement.109  To the south, the Campbellite influence reduced the Concord 
Association of Middle Tennessee and North Alabama Baptists from 49 churches and 
3,399 members in 1822 to only 11 churches and 805 members five years later.
110
   
Similar to their sister churches throughout the trans-Appalachian West, the 1820s 
proved a period of decreased disciplinary activity for the Fox Run Church.  From 1820 to 
1824, the church recorded one charge per every 2.59% of the membership.  In 1825, the 
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church witnessed a rash of disciplinary cases, leveling one charge per every 12.94% of 
the church membership, up from only 2.22% the previous year.  This drastic increase can 
partly be attributed to the church’s organization of a Sunday morning session in order for 
its enslaved members to take part in church discipline (over half of that year’s charges 
were against slaves for disorderly conduct). Yet the record book demonstrates that 
Campbell’s teachings had also crept into members’ doctrinal leanings.  In August 1825, 
the church excluded Brother Thomas for making “a public declaration” against “some 
doctrines held and believed by this Church (and the Baptists, generally),” that fell in line 
with the then strengthening Campbellite movement.  From 1826 to 1830, the charge per 
member average dropped to only 1.18%, the bulk of these charges directed at black 
members.  In the five years previous to its accusations against the Dranes and Brites, the 
Fox Run Church only leveled charges against one white man, in 1829, for intoxication 
and “whipping his two sisters.”111 
Within this context of doctrinal discord and disciplinary declension, the Fox Run 
church took up the respective cases of Brethren Drane and Brite.  In each, the church 
failed to dispense a traditional punishment, requiring party to make “satisfaction” for 
their actions.  The church simply “disapprobated Brother Brite’s proceedings” for 
allowing such “disorderly preaching”—that of one of the Creaths—in his home.   And 
Drane, it seemed, was only ordered to pay rent on land in his use, but which belonged to 
Brother John Ford.   Presumably, Fox Run members came to these decisions in order to 
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In June 1831, however, the Brites and Dranes submitted a letter of grievances to 
the church and demanded it be recorded in the minute book.  Their remonstrance made 
clear that tensions had been bubbling within Fox Run for at least a year.  “We are 
dissatisfied with [B]rother Wm. Ford,” the letter began, “for his unwarranted insinuations 
and reflections which he cast upon us in the church letter of 1830 to the Association.” 
William Ford had, at the very least, made accusations in this letter that the Dranes and 
Brites were involved with the Campbellites, and perhaps under the influence of one of the 
Creaths.  His subsequent apology, the Dranes and Brites claimed, did “not prove 
satisfactory.”  Furthermore, Ford had not only failed to truly account for the doings of the 
Fox Run church.  He had, along with others, “held a Council—we do not mean a Church 
Council—just before [the 1830 Association meeting] for the purpose of sending Brother 
Woods and Basket, to try [the Drane’s and the Brite’s] Faith by the Creed.”  Apparently, 
the doctrinal leanings of the two families had been under suspicion for some time.  
Having been presented to the Long Run Association in 1830, and spoken of in an 
unsanctioned Council by their fellow church members, the two families believed that 
they had fallen victim to a “spirit of intolerance and persecution” which had arisen within 
the Fox Run Church.
113
 
The letter to the association and the investigation into their doctrinal leanings 
were merely fragments of the Drane’s and Brite’s overall set of complaints against the 
“leading members” of Fox Run.  The church had further refused “to Record the 
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accusation” against James Drane “as it was acted upon.”  The committee formed to 
investigate the dispute between Drane and John Ford determined the matter to be a 
“misunderstanding” and not a willful breach of contract by either party.  Yet the church 
ruled that Drane should “pay fifty dollars for misunderstanding Bro. Ford.” The money 
seemed to be a secondary concern as the Dranes insisted that the church erred in handling 
the case.  For their part, the Brites felt they too had been wronged by the charges laid in 
against Jeptha.  Yes, he had allowed the Creaths to preach in his home, but he did not 
appreciate the course pursued by “those that took an active part against” him.  He and his 
wife Elizabeth had simply invited neighbors and the Creaths into their home “so that they 
could be accommodated with seats.” The church had no authority in the matter, they 
claimed, because there had been no church resolution prohibiting a member “from 
inviting who he pleases [into] his own private house.”  “Now Brethren,” the accused 
concluded, “if this is the way you dispose of business in your courts of Conscience; we 
do not wish to have any more cases in the Court.” 114  
If anything the remonstrance demonstrates how the changing religious landscape 
could infiltrate the workings of a church’s disciplinary system.  According to both 
defendants, the fellowship of the Fox Run church had been broken, and it manifested in 
unfair disciplinary procedures.  The initial charges against each, the Dranes and Brites 
insisted, resulted primarily from a persecutory spirit which pervaded the minds of some 
of Fox Run’s “leading members.”  No longer, with the increase in doctrinal disagreement 
and strained relations (in this case dating back at least a year, and perhaps all the way 
back to 1825 with Brother Thomas’s exclusion), could their church body be expected to 
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serve as a neutral arbitrator, a familiar venue through which to seek resolution.  Once the 
church’s “courts of Conscience” and its ritual practice of discipline (one that both created 
and maintained the fellowship) could no longer be trusted to justly uphold the peace of 
the congregational body, then the church community was fractured.  The Brites and 
Dranes did not attack the church because they necessarily ceased to believe in its 
doctrine, but rather because of how the church practiced law. 
In 1834, three years after the Dranes and Brites demanded exit from the church, 
they joined other Baptist dissenters, many from Fox Run, and constituted the Clear Creek 
Church, a body affiliated with the Disciples of Christ.
115
  Not all Baptists who left the 
denomination under the influence of the Campbellites directly attacked the church’s 
disciplinary procedures.  But few who withdrew from Baptist churches, left a letter of 
remonstrance like the Dranes and Brites.  Their accusations of unfair treatment and their 
contention that the Fox Run Church had been overwhelmed by a “spirit of intolerance 
and persecution” found a receptive audience.  Similar schisms are apparent in church 
record books of 1830s Kentucky.  Churches often excluded members for “discipling,” 
joining the “Campbellites,” or departing from the “faith and order” of the Baptist 
denomination.  
Baptist apprehension for Campbell and his followers persisted through the 
antebellum period.  The Rev. Eleazer Savage claimed in 1844 that both Campbellites and 
Mormons were “heretics,” deserving of swift punishment from church tribunals. As late 
as 1855, rumors swirled through Louisville that the city’s Baptists might reunite with area 
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Campbellites, much to the chagrin of some local Baptist preachers.
116
 Campbell and his 
early followers were immensely successful during the antebellum period.  By the eve of 
Civil War, the Disciples of Christ were no longer an insurgent sect; rather, with a 
membership of over 200,000, they were the fifth largest Protestant denomination in the 
nation.  Campbell’s calls for the supremacy of the individual over the collective will of 
the congregation, along with his denunciation of any religious body not found in the 
scriptures, certainly struck a nerve amongst many early Baptists.
117
  Not only did it lead 
to a significant exodus from churches affiliated with the Baptist Society, but, as we’ve 
seen, also affected the internal workings of the church for those who remained within the 
Baptist fellowship.  
John Taylor insisted that the best way to stop the Campbellites advance upon 
Baptist society was to “give them no place in our meeting houses; and should they 
complain, let them use the common rules of society for redress.”118  Some on both sides 
sought out society’s “common rules” when negotiating access to meetinghouses, as the 
schisms of the 1820s and 1830s propelled church factions and trustees into secular 
courtrooms in order to secure their rights to church property.  In Kentucky, Pastor James 
Fishback claimed that many reformers, especially those who violated others “religious 
rights in seizing upon their meeting houses,” threatened the “peace, concord and 
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happiness” of the state.  This, he concluded, required churches “to resort to the laws of 
the land for her protection and defence [sic].”119  
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CHAPTER 5. “A GREAT CURSE TO THE NABOURHOOD [SIC]”: CHURCH 





“I do not undertake to say which party is in the wrong but there is conciderable [sic] 
hostility in the nabourhood [sic] between the parties.”1 
 
 
In May 1834 the members of the Mt. Vernon Church of Christ in Woodford 
County, Kentucky drafted a resolution detailing their property claim to the local meeting 
house.  The resolution asserted that the church considered “herself as occupying [the] 
house agreeab[le] to the design of the original builders” and donors of the land. 
According to the deed, church members had no authority to use the property “in any other 
way or manner than as a constituted part of the Baptist Society of Kentucky.”  If they 
allowed a preacher of “another sect or denomination” to use the building then they might 
“forfeit” their own rights to the house. Members unanimously approved the resolution.  
Immediately thereafter, member John Curd produced a remonstrance signed by twenty-
one church members criticizing past actions taken by their pastor, Doctor James 
Fishback.
2
  Curd insisted that he and his followers “must withdraw” from the church 
body, and since they possessed “equal rights” to the meeting house, they intended to 
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continue using the building for worship.
3
 Fishback retorted that Curd had ignored church 
rules and sought to organize a new church “consisting of the disciples” of Alexander 
Campbell and Barton Stone.  Although twelve of the dissenters accepted dismissal on 
good terms from the church, Curd and a number of others refused, and the church 
excluded them for, among other things, breach of covenant and fomenting division within 
the church.  Days later, Curd, his fellow dissenters, and a new pastor, “forcibly entered” 
the meetinghouse and declared that they had formed a new church.
4
 Over the summer of 
1834, the two factions fought for control of the meetinghouse and eventually engaged in 
a lengthy legal contest. Rather than rejecting the authority of secular legal institutions, 
Mt. Vernon church members, along with their brethren throughout the region, resorted to 
local and state courts to mediate messy doctrinal disputes that implicated rights to church 
property.  
Legal scholars and historians have examined church property disputes and their 
effect on church-state relations in the United States.  For the most part these studies focus 
on United States Supreme Court decisions.  In particular they have looked to the Court’s 
application of the deference principle in Watson v. Jones (1872),
5
 and its clarification of 
the neural-principles approach a century later in Jones v. Wolf (1979).
6
   These 
examinations are overwhelmingly fixated upon schisms in hierarchically-organized 
denominations, such as the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Episcopalian churches, from the 
immediate post-Civil War period through the early twenty-first century. They do not fully 
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consider disputes within congregationally-based religious groups such as the Baptists or 
church-property conflicts in the antebellum era.
7
 Until very recently, scholars who study 
pre-war property disputes have primarily focused on schisms emanating from the 
sectional-split of the major Protestant denominations between 1837 and 1845.
8
  Prior to 
and amidst these divisions over racial ideology, however, Baptists across the trans-
Appalachian region found themselves entrenched in a competitive religious marketplace 
characterized by doctrinal dissension, church schism, and litigation.  
The experience of the Mt. Vernon church is a clear example of how the pluralistic 
post-Revolutionary religious landscape propelled religious groups to interact with the 
state.  Chapter Four demonstrated how the controversy and schism surrounding 
Campbell’s “Reformation” altered members’ visions of their churches’ as law-producing 
arenas.  Many such schisms engendered property disputation between opposing doctrinal 
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factions.  Mt. Vernon members’ inability to contain the doctrinal dissension led to a 
nearly four year struggle for control over the local meetinghouse. The contest navigated 
through extra-judicial arbitration, the local chancery court, and culminated with an 1838 
decree by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the state’s highest judicatory.  Curd v. 
Wallace, as the case came to be known, like numerous similar cases in antebellum 
Kentucky, exhibits how church and state were linked during the post-establishment era.  
Neither Kentucky nor Tennessee possessed a legacy of church establishment.  Yet state 
governments still influenced religious groups through legislative enactments and court 
rulings. Amidst a presumably “free” religious marketplace, one increasingly 
characterized by dissension and church schism, actions taken by both religious and state 
actors opened the door for the latter to shape ecclesiastical affairs.   
This was not a top-down imposition of state authority.  Lawmakers, state judges 
especially, strived to avoid meddling with ecclesiastical discipline, polity, or doctrine, 
claiming that to do so would be to violate “the spirit and policy of the constitution.”9  
Instead, reacting to the changing religious culture, individuals and church bodies sought 
out state authority to secure their temporal holdings. Local and state courts emerged as 
venues through which individuals debated religious doctrine, claimed religious identities, 
and secured property.  By looking at doctrinally-driven church-property disputes among 
antebellum Baptists—disputes often overshadowed by similar contests arising from the 
sectional controversy—we can uncover how the “democratization” of America’s 
religious culture not only begot “a jurisprudence of disestablishment” fashioned through 
the legal system, but also how it allowed local and state courts to review matters of 
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church discipline and doctrine, and thus, how religious controversy significantly shaped 
church-state relations at the local and state levels.
10
   
Doctrinal schisms and church property contests reveal the role of the state in 
defining sacred space and determining religious identity. Religious experience, scholar 
Belden Lane writes, “is invariably [a] ‘placed’ experience,” occurring in familiar or 
ordinary places and legitimated as sacred through ritual practice.
11
  Lane is particularly 
concerned with how humans come to interpret certain landscapes as sacred, not 
necessarily with the importance of property—meetinghouses, land, etc.—to religious 
groups.  Antebellum church property disputes in secular courts, however, highlight not 
only the continued importance of set-aside religious space (that is, many congregations’ 
identification with specific structures), but the state’s part in legitimizing, circumscribing, 
or defining that space.  Indeed, as scholars have noted, sacred space is often more than a 
site imbued with meaning.  It is a nexus of politics, power, and property. The “sacred 
character of a place can be asserted and maintained through claims and counter-claims on 
its ownership.” For many, a space assumes sacred attributes through appropriation and 
possession.
12
  To secure ownership, to legitimize a group’s appropriation of real property, 
or, in many cases, to protect their meetinghouses from insurgent religious groups, 
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churches had to turn to state authority. State law operated in different, at times subtle 
ways to determine the boundaries of religious space by identifying what religious 
doctrine or denomination could legitimately occupy that space or what group vying for a 
particular place constituted the “true” church.  The state was able to exert authority over 
religious groups precisely because individuals sought to spatially claim certain tracts of 
land, meetinghouses, and other church buildings for professors of specific creeds. 
Local meetinghouses, too, served as physical manifestations of the contested 
religious marketplace.  Antebellum-era disputes over these spaces highlight how access 
to public meetinghouses demarcated the spatial contours of religious tolerance.  Indeed, 
the very act of excluding a sect or denomination from public meetinghouses assisted 
others in defining that space as sacred.
13
 In order to spatially-claim a meetinghouse, 
however, groups had to utilize state authority.  Through church incorporation, land-deed 
reversionary clauses, and specifications in subscription bonds, church members, land 
grantors, and entire communities inscribed religious orthodoxy with rights to church 
property.  In so doing, they assured the state a place in religious life despite the professed 
separation of church and state, in spite of the supposed inability of civil authority to 
“penetrate the veil of the Church.”14 
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The preceding chapters have demonstrated that law emanated from a variety of 
locations and social interactions during the post-Revolutionary period.  This chapter, 
focused primarily upon church meetinghouses, should not be misconstrued as arguing 
that religious experience was beholden to church edifices.  The landscape of religious 
community extended beyond meetinghouse walls to a range of settings.  Many, like the 
Brites and Dranes whom we encountered in the previous chapter, gathered in private 
homes to pray, discuss doctrine, and worship with local preachers.  The well-known 
camp meeting revivals of the period also shifted the experience of religious community 
from permanent structures to riversides and clearings in the woods.  The 1801 revival at 
Cane Run, about twenty miles from Lexington—simply the most notable instance of 
camp-meeting revivalism—drew some ten thousand individuals for four days of 
preaching.
15
 In a letter to his brother about his attendance at an association meeting in 
Davis County, Kentucky, Frank Stone expressed awe over “the greatest concourse of 
people I believe I ever saw.  The woods and the church was almost alive with men, 
women, children, horses, [and] buggies.”16 Some congregations assembled in 
schoolhouses, courthouses, and other civic buildings ordinarily utilized for a variety of 
purposes.
17
    Soon after its organization in early 1816, for instance, the First Baptist 
Church of Frankfort, Kentucky met in the statehouse and courthouse before securing 
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worship time at the city’s public house of worship.18  Nashville’s First Baptist Church 
spent much of the early 1830s holding services in a rented yet “commodious room in the 
Masonic Hall.”19 The religious landscape of the early nineteenth century, like the legal 
landscape, was fluid.  
Still, meetinghouses remained central sites for religious gatherings. Historians 
have noted that during the early-nineteenth century, Baptists and other evangelicals 
defined the church not as the physical space of worship, but as the covenanted group of 
believers. Evangelicals may have had “no qualms about using secular structures,” as 
scholars Anne Loveland and Otis Wheeler note, but access to local meetinghouses proved 
important to both church officers and the laity.
20
  In 1846, Nancy Pierce, noting her age 
to be “some where [sic] in Eighty,” insisted she wanted a Baptist church to worship at her 
neighborhood meetinghouse in Bethlehem, Kentucky (as it had done prior to a church 
schism brought on by Campbell’s Reformation).  She claimed she could walk to the 
meetinghouse, “but not there & back in the same day.”  Yet, “when ever [sic] the weather 
was suitable” she wished to attend services, and there was no other nearby 
meetinghouse.
21
  Local Baptists so intently desired access to the space that members of a 
church in close-by Paris left that body and joined the Bethlehem Baptists with hopes of 
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securing rights to the building.
22
 In their dispute with Fishback and the Baptists, too, 
Curd and his followers based their “equal rights” to the Mt. Vernon meetinghouse on its 
proximity to their residences.
23
  
The post-Revolutionary religious marketplace not only witnessed competition 
over adherents but engendered new understandings of religious space.  For seventeenth-
century Puritans, the meetinghouse inferred “a neutral public space,” often marking the 
center of town and utilized for a variety of spiritual and secular activities.
24
 Over the 
course of the eighteenth century, however, the religious purposes of New England 
meetinghouses increasingly eclipsed their civil functions.  By 1850, more refined church 
buildings devoted solely to religious community replaced the traditional public 
meetinghouse.
25
 In the Anglican-Chesapeake of the colonial era, too, churches were built 
in central community locations and used for both secular and religious undertakings.
26
 
From the early days of settlement, trans-Appalachian inhabitants also purposed 
meetinghouses as both civil and religious spaces. In 1799, for example, political leaders 
in Kentucky held a public rally at the Bryan’s Station Baptist meetinghouse to propagate 
a platform for the state’s upcoming constitutional convention.27    The line between the 
secular and sacred is further blurred when we take into account churches’ legal 
operations throughout this period, as members sought out authoritative dispute resolution 
at their local meetinghouses.  
                                                          
22
 “Deposition of John Kenny,” ibid.  
23
 “Remonstrance,” Bennett et al v. Curd et al, Folder 2, CJWCCC, KDLA. 
24
 Quoted in Loveland and Wheeler, From the Meetinghouse to Megachurch, 7. 
25
 Kevin M. Sweeney, "Meetinghouses, Town Houses, and Churches: Changing Perceptions of Sacred and 
Secular Space in Southern New England, 1720-1850," Winterthur Portfolio, 28 no. 1 (Spring, 1993): 59-60. 
26
 Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1982), 58-61. 
27
 Ellen Eslinger, Citizens of Zion: The Social Origins of Camp Meeting Revivalism (Knoxville: University 





Moreover, a variety of denominations held services at shared public 
meetinghouses. At the Lancaster, Kentucky meetinghouse, the Methodist, Baptist, 
Presbyterian, and Reformation churches all “had their different days” for worship.28 In 
1822, the clerk for the Frankfort Baptist Church recorded that a committee had been 
appointed to converse with the local Methodist and Presbyterian churches in order “to 
afford [the Baptist] Church an opportunity of worshiping” in the public meetinghouse an 
additional two Sabbaths a month.
29
  Before the two churches found themselves 
entrenched in litigation in the 1840s, Newton Clift remembered that the meetinghouse in 
Washington, Kentucky had been “for some part passed [sic] used in common by [the 
Baptists] and the society of Reformers.”30 This spatial ecumenicalism extended to urban 
areas with denomination-specific (private) church buildings.  The 1829 meeting of the 
Elkhorn Association of Baptists, for example, relied upon Lexington-area Methodists and 
Presbyterians who opened their meetinghouse doors for the association’s delegates and 
other attendees to hear preaching.
31
  
In many smaller towns during the post-Revolutionary period, however, religious 
groups often shared common worship space. A recurring sentiment expressed by church-
goers and other observers in church-property disputes was that the buildings or grounds 
in question were “republican” in nature.  Pastor Fishback claimed that many such 
structures in Kentucky—though not the house at Mt. Vernon—had been “built as 
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Republican Meeting houses free for every body [sic] or for preachers of all the religious 
sects to preach in.”32  In the dispute over the Bethlehem meetinghouse, the respondent 
insisted that “[a]ll denominations of Christian Baptists as well as others were permitted to 
use the house until the exclusive use of it was claimed by members” of the complainants’ 
church.  Likewise, referring to the “old meetinghouse” in Lancaster, Jacob Robinson 
insisted in 1855 “that a sufficient amount [of money] could [not] have been obtained to 
have built any other than a republican church,” for “at that time [referring to the late 
1810s] there was a strong feeling in favour [sic] of Republican Meetinghouses.”  Others 
claimed “the church was used as common property.”33  William Huffman, Sr. testified 
that he “never heard of any special claim set up by any denomination” to the Lancaster 
meetinghouse until the day of his deposition.
34
 The notion of a “republican church” or 
“republican meetinghouse” denotes the underlying entanglement of politics and religion.  
The shared community space nurtured one’s civil and religious identity, his political 
virtue and private morality.  
Whether seeking to build a republican meetinghouse such as the one in Lancaster, 
or a private structure for a particular congregation, churches relied upon public donation. 
Once churches had secured a tract of land for the “purpose of erecting a meetinghouse 
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upon”—usually donated by one or two local residents—they turned to raising funds for 
construction.  Member-appointed building committees circulated subscription bonds 
through the surrounding neighborhood, surely hailing the positive effects that a new 
worship space would have on the community.  And many were successful.  A Baptist in 
Tennessee noted that several of his brethren, along with a number of Presbyterians, 
Methodists, and individuals “of no particular church, subscribed liberally” for the 
construction of a Nashville Church.
35
  Another church member who was central in raising 
the money to build the Lancaster meetinghouse felt “clear to say without fear of 
contradiction that two thirds of the money was subscribed by persons who belonged to no 
church.”36  After Tavner Branham and David Harris each donated a half-acre of land for 
the Mt. Vernon house, other local residents chipped in what they could.  Subscribers 
agreed to pay “the sum annexed to [their] respective names,” one-third “in money, the 
other two thirds in corn, wheat, whiskey, pork, bacon, beef, cattle or materials…all at 
market price.”37 Such meetinghouses, whether claimed by a specific congregation or not, 
could help cultivate “[u]niversal peace, good morals, kind feelings, & 
happiness…throughout the neighbourhood.”38 
When disputes subsequently arose over access to meetinghouses, church factions 
pointed to their members’ monetary donations in order to claim rights to the disputed 
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property. At Mt. Vernon, Curd and his co-defendants adopted this strategy after 
Fishback’s church secured an injunction against them at the Woodford County Circuit 
Court. Those who contributed to the meetinghouse, they insisted, did not intend for one 
pastor (Fishback) and his followers to have exclusive possession of the house.  With 
particular attention to female donors, they noted a handful of original subscribers to the 
meeting house who now communed with their church.   Mrs. Branham, the widow of 
Tabner Branham “gave one half acre of the ground” and fifty dollars.  Mrs. Caldwell, 
also a widow, donated “$70 or $80,” and “Mrs. Price[,] a widow whose husband gave 
$100” had all joined the new church and were now, because of the injunction against 
them, “prevented from worshipping their maker in the house they aided to build.”39  The 
Woodford Circuit Court agreed, ruling that original subscribers could not be barred from 
the meetinghouse.
40
 Similarly, a member of Nashville’s Reformation Church, which had 
retained property deeded to the Baptist Church after a schism, claimed the Baptists 
possessed no right to the house, for only one member of the Baptist Church had donated a 
mere “ten dollars.” It was unreasonable to assume that a large majority of members, 
“embracing in their number those who had given the lot, and had been most liberal and 
active in getting the house built,” the writer insisted, should hand over the house “to a 
few persons” who had donated so little.41   In other cases, residents insisted that their 
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meetinghouse could not be sold or repurposed “without a concurrence of all the 
subscribers,” no matter their religious affiliation, or lack thereof.42 
Though often shared by various religious groups and nominally available to all 
denominations, this spatial ecumenicalism had its limits. Land deeds, subscription papers, 
and common understanding indicated the bounds of religious tolerance in the post-
Revolutionary United States. By the turn of the nineteenth century, the federal 
government and most states had outlawed religious establishments.  The legal practice of 
toleration, which had developed in most of the colonies during the eighteenth century, 
historian Chris Beneke recently argued, was replaced by a common commitment to 
religious liberty.  Religious-based prejudice and persecution persisted throughout 
American culture, of course, but, Beneke continues, this was largely unaided by a legal 
system devoted to liberal religious beliefs. I agree with Beneke that not only was post-
Revolutionary America a much more religiously tolerant place than previous, and that the 
cultural process of implementing religious liberty “established important precedents for 
the future” of pluralism, religious and otherwise, in the United States.43  Yet this also 
obscure’s how early Americans utilized the legal system to exclude those considered 
dangerous or unorthodox from common meetinghouses.   Many individuals claimed 
openness alongside exclusion with little apparent qualms.  For instance, observers could 
claim, as JC Bryant did, that local meetinghouses were built as “republican church[es], 
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free for every body [sic],” but these spaces were usually restricted to mainstream 
Protestant denominations.
44
  As Bee Salter remembered, the Lancaster meetinghouse 
“was built for all denominations except the Roman Catholics and Shakering [sic] 
Quakers.”  Yet she continued, insisting, “It was built by the public and was always a 
republican house.”45 Others echoed her sentiments.46 Even Judge Duvall of the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals allowed that the land in controversy had been donated to the public “for 
the use of all religious denominations professing the Christian faith—Roman Catholics 
and Shakers excepted.”47  
This exclusion through legal instruments was common in denominational-specific 
devises as well. John Davis donated an acre of land to the Particular Baptists Society in 
Davidson County, Tennessee, but noted that “other orderly gospel ministers shall have 
privilege to preach” in the meetinghouse when not in use by the Baptists.48 Though not 
specific, “orderly gospel ministers” connoted Protestant Christian, and more likely, 
Methodist, Presbyterian, or Baptist.  Later, Campbell, Stone, and their Disciples of Christ 
would be considered as more aligned with the Christian mainline, but in the 1820s and 
1830s, detractors often labeled them as “disorderly” and “disturbers of the peace.”49 The 
subscription paper for the Mt. Vernon house noted the property and meetinghouse was 
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“for the benefit of the Baptist Society, & when not occupied by them,” it was open for 
any “Gospel Preacher invited by a subscriber.”50  After the 1834 schism, members of 
Fishback’s church claimed that the reference to the “gospell [sic] preachers” was “placed 
in said article for the purpose of excluding Barton Stone and his followers,” that the latter 
and his followers were not preachers of the gospel.
51
  Daniel Williams likewise testified 
that “the words gospel preacher” were inserted into the paper because “all the Baptists in 
the nabourhood [sic] refused to subscribe” to the building of the house “unless the above 
exclusion was made.”52  Without legislation, then, without meddling judges or overt 
institutional collusion, individuals and communities encoded religious orthodoxy in legal 
instruments and claimed local common property for a general set of religious principles. 
 
Beyond subscription bonds and land deeds, however, individuals and churches 
utilized legal mechanisms and state authority to secure their property.  Church 
incorporation, though controversial during the late-eighteenth century, provided religious 
groups a variety of legal powers, not the least of which was the ability pass property in 
succession.  Each state handled church incorporation differently. In New England, as 
parishes were considered public, municipal corporations, individuals residing within their 
geographic boundaries constituted the membership.  Residents were subject to parish 
taxes and liable for its debts.  In an arrangement which persisted until disestablishment 
during the post-Revolutionary period, the parish minister acted as trustee, holding fee-
                                                          
50
 “Exhibit #1,” in Bennett et al v. Curd et al (1836), Folder 2, CJWCC, KDLA. Underlining in original.  
51
 “Deposition of Robert Adams,” ibid.  
52
 “Deposition of Daniel J. Williams,” ibid.  Others disagreed, contending that the subscription paper was 






simple title to any donated or granted lands.  Other colonies and states continued to rely 
on the charter system developed in the mother country—which meant petitioning the 
legislature for corporate status—well into the nineteenth century, only ceasing that 
practice when states adopted general incorporation laws.
53
 
Baptists had an uneasy relationship with church incorporation during and after the 
Revolutionary Era. In 1784, the Virginia General Assembly passed an act incorporating 
the Episcopalian Church in the Commonwealth. Baptists claimed the Incorporation Act 
smacked of state preference for one religious body.
54
 To compound matters, the 
Assembly had awarded the Episcopalian Church all the church buildings, land, and other 
property located throughout the Commonwealth.  Led by their governing associations, 
Virginian Baptists flooded the legislature with petitions attacking church incorporation.  
One petition submitted by preachers Reuben Ford and John Leland—representing the 
thoughts of the state’s four Separate Baptist associations—described church 
incorporation as “pregnant with evil, and dangerous to religious liberty.”  Memorials that 
had been circulated at court days and church meetings called for a repeal of the 
Incorporation Act and the sale of the “public property” held by the Episcopalians.55  
Virginians’ taxes had paid for the glebe lands, and thus, Baptists argued, it should be 
returned to the people. Episcopalians, in turn, asserted that ownership of the land was part 
and parcel with their acceptance of disestablishment and the end of state financial 
support.  If the legislature dissolved the church’s claim to the land, then it threatened the 
very sanctity of private property.  Though the legislature repealed the Incorporation Act 
                                                          
53
 Paul G. Kauper and Stephen C. Ellis, “Religious Corporations and the Law,” Michigan Law Review, 71 
no. 8 (Aug., 1973): 1504-1507.  
54
 Buckley, Establishing Religious Freedom, 67-68. 
55





in 1785, it initially left the glebe lands intact, not providing for their dissolution until 
1802.
56
   
The advantages of church incorporation continued to be debated by both religious 
and state actors well into the nineteenth century.  Old-School Presbyterians and Anti-
Mission Baptists, in particular, believed that incorporation for religious groups held 
potential dangers for both church and state.
57
  Their experience fighting against 
Virginia’s religious establishment did not sour all evangelical groups on the necessity or 
idea of religious corporations, however.  Into the antebellum era, many church groups 
engaged in heated public debates in Virginia over the issue, often arguing in favor of 
church incorporation as the best way to protect their interests.  The state legislature 
proved more reluctant and consistently turned down churches’ requests for incorporation. 
Such an act would be, the legislators exclaimed, “inconsistent with the principles of the 
constitution, and of religious freedom, and manifestly tends to the establishment of a 
national church.”58  Relying primarily on interpretations of the 1786 Statute of Religious 
Freedom, and its implications for the relationship between church and state, historian 
Thomas Buckley notes that the General Assembly left Virginia’s churches “in a legal 
                                                          
56
 Buckley, Establishing Religious Freedom, 82-85. For a complete account of Virginia Baptists’ quest 
against glebe lands see, ibid, 92-115 and Buckley, “Evangelicals Triumphant: The Baptists Assault on 
Virginia Glebes, 1786-1801,” William and Mary Quarterly 45, no. 1 (Jan., 1988): 33-69, in which he 
argues that victory in the glebe contest imparted the Baptists with the political tools and outside support 
that was necessary to pursue later legislative goals and laid the groundwork for them to push their cultural 
values upon the wider American society.  Baptists were also instrumental in crafting church-state relations 
in New England.  In his article, “The Elusive Common Good: Religion and Civil Society in Massachusetts, 
1780-1833,” Journal of the Early Republic 24 no. 3 (Autumn, 2004): 390, Johann N. Neem claims that 
Baptists, in their effort against state interference in their religious matters, used arguments that proved 
“invaluable to defending the rights of associations, thus creating an ideological foundation for an 
autonomous civil society.” 
57
 Buckley, Establishing Religious Freedom, 132-134. 
58





limbo [and] without secure title to property or a recognized status in civil society.”59  
Acts of incorporation were certainly important for religious societies’ claims to property 
and the ability to pass such property in succession.  Yet incorporation from the state 
legislature also legitimated the internal workings of the church itself: the ability to 
enforce group rules, bylaws, and member obligations.
60
  
  In Kentucky, state legislators, perhaps learning from the struggle to the east, but 
also reacting to conditions of the local religious backdrop, sought to better define the 
power and place of churches in civil society. Property disputes such as the one at Mt. 
Vernon can be traced back to the final days of 1813, when an unspecified religious 
congregation from Concord sent a petition to the Kentucky Assembly.  Apparently, some 
years after a tract of land was donated to the members of the Concord congregation, 
“several of the trustees to whom the deed was made” were removed from their position. 
The petitioners, unsure “as to their power to do any thing [sic] relative to said land” and 
“the mode of appointing successors” to the removed trustees, prayed that the Assembly 
would pass a law “appointing certain trustees” and “vesting them with certain powers.”61 
After investigating the matter, the courts-of-justice committee reported “that other 
religious societies” had found themselves in similar circumstances and advised that even 
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though the government should never seek “to control or interfere with the rights of 
conscience,” it was “equally bound” to protect “each man” in his religious practices and 
enable “every [religious] society to hold a small portion of land” for erecting a 
meetinghouse.  The House, therefore, should adopt a resolution in order to protect 
religious societies “from the inroads of the lawless.”  Moreover, the committee 
recommended that a law should be passed pointing “out a mode in which trustees of the 
property can be appointed, changed, or renewed.”62  The state Senate initially rejected the 
bill, before reconsidering it with amendments proposed by a joint committee. The 
Assembly eventually passed the measure, and the governor signed “An Act for the 
Benefit of Religious Societies of this Commonwealth” on February 1, 1814.63   
The first section of the act constructed a framework for Christian groups to elect 
or appoint trustees according the society’s internal rules, provided they record those 
elected with the county courts.  The trustees were invested “with the legal title” of the 
land, and possessed the “power to do any legal act” that may be necessary for “the safe 
keeping and preservation” of the church’s property. Yet, the bill continued, if a “schism 
or division” occurred in the church, the act should not be interpreted as an authorization 
for the trustees to “prevent either of the parties so divided, from using the house or 
houses of worship, for the purpose of devotion, a part of the time, proportioned to the 
numbers” of each party.  Furthermore, the act was not to be understood as authorizing 
“the minority of any church having seceded from, or been expelled or excommunicated 
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from the church” to interfere with the majority church’s appointment of preachers or 
designated time of worship.
64
   
Two decades later, amidst congregational schisms due to the Stone-Campbell 
movement and dissension over the role of missionary societies, the Kentucky Assembly 
provided an even easier method for religious groups, specifically Christian organizations, 
to acquire and maintain a legal identity. In 1835, the Assembly passed “An act to provide 
a remedy for religious societies and communities,” granting churches the power to 
appoint “one or more suitable persons upon their record book” to act as a committee or 
trustees on behalf of the congregation to bring suit to prosecute or recover “any claim, 
right or title” the church had in real or personal property.65  Kentucky’s Revised Statutes 
which took effect in 1852, moreover, strengthened the 1814 Act by forbidding all church 
trustees, (not simply those appointed as successors to the original trustees) from barring 
schismatic factions from meetinghouses.  The latters’ rights could not be impaired unless 
they were excommunicated “bona fide, on the grounds of immorality.”66 
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Even before the Baptist-Campbellite schisms of the late 1820s and early 1830s, 
opposing church factions understood the importance of acquiring corporate form to claim 
property.  The Bryan’s Station Baptist Church near Lexington fractured in early 1811, as 
one body embraced Particularistic Baptist principles.  Just a year later the schismatic 
group appointed a committee “for adjusting and securing” their rights to the 
meetinghouse.  Bryan’s Station’s sister church, South Elkhorn Baptist, witnessed a 
similar division in 1822.   After being excluded from the church by the main body, the 
minority faction, led by none other than James Fishback, constituted a new church (also 
called South Elkhorn Baptist) and appointed trustees “to maintain the title of S.E. 
meeting house ground.”  Upon learning of their opposition’s legal maneuverings, the 
majority church acted in kind, appointing two men as trustees to secure their rights to the 
church property.  Ironically, Fishback’s actions in this dispute were turned against him a 
decade later when his detractors at Mount Vernon selected their own trustees to the 
contested meetinghouse and registered their names with the county clerk.
67
   
The ability of religious groups to appoint trustees and incorporate provided them a 
necessary legal identity to pursue debts, enforce member obligations, and receive or 
convey property. For instance, Thomas Berryman pledged in August 1839 to donate $125 
to the Kentucky Baptist Education Society.
68
  Berryman subsequently refused to pay his 
debt, claiming that the funds collected “were being used contrary” to the Society’s 
originally-stated intentions.  An Owen County jury disagreed with Berryman and ordered 
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he pay “the debt in the petition mentioned & one cent in damages.”69 Incorporated 
religious groups could also rely upon state authority to enforce their by-laws. Recognized 
Christian societies, then, could expect that, as Justice George Robertson of the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals declared in 1842, that “civil courts” would protect churches “in the 
proper and undisturbed enjoyment of their religious exercises, the rightful enforcement of 
their ecclesiastical discipline, and the peaceful occupancy and use of their property.”70 
Control of lands and meetinghouses was particularly important for religious groups, 
affording congregations the ability to receive and transfer real property. In the 1840s, the 
Methodist church in Harrodsburg, Kentucky sold their interest in the local meetinghouse 
to a Baptist church.  Soon after, however a committee representing the Baptist church 
filed a bill against the Methodists arguing the latter lacked title to the property.  The 
Baptists requested the contract be rescinded.  Writing for the Court, however, Judge 
Simpson, ruled that, since the property in question had been vested in trustees, “to hold 
for certain purposes, their deed to the trustees of the Baptist Church certainly conveys the 
legal title.”  In receiving the property, moreover, the Baptists were “secure against any 
proceedings in the common law Courts to disturb their possession, or to deprive them of 
the use thus acquired.”71   
During the post-Revolutionary period, Tennessee lawmakers did not enact as 
extensive legislation concerning church property and schisms as did Kentucky.  In 1817, 
however, they did pass a bill that secured church property for groups receiving up to ten 
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acres of land deeded to either trustees or directly to the congregation.
72
  The measure 
failed to provide property rights for schismatic factions.  Nor did it take into account what 
should happen if a church changed doctrine and assumed a religious identity different 
than the one specified in the deed.  In a way, this provided for natural doctrinal evolution 
in congregationally-based churches.  Some contended, however, that church property 
should remain with the group affiliated with the denomination specified in the legal 
instrument.     
The case of Nashville’s First Baptist Church illuminates how religious 
controversy propelled church bodies to seek out state authority with the hopes of ensuring 
subsequent doctrinal stasis.  In 1821 the church received a grant of land on Spring Street.  
The donor deeded the property to the “United Baptist Church of Nashville,” but over the 
course of the 1820s, the church adopted views associated with Campbell’s Reformation.73  
By the end of the decade, a minority had broken away from the church and re-constituted 
a body based upon Baptist principles. For six years the new church battled their former 
brethren, now the Reformation Church, for the Spring Street meetinghouse.  First 
Baptists’ longtime pastor, R.B.C. Howell later claimed that the “house of worship 
belonged justly, without a doubt, to the “United Baptist Church,’ according to the terms 
of the deed, and not to the church of ‘the Reformation’.” Unfortunately for the new 
church, Howell wrote, the original Baptist church had never incorporated and “was a 
body unknown to law.  It was neither a person, nor a corporation, and therefore incapable 
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of holding property.”  Even if a judge ruled to dispossess the house from the Reformation 
Church, the property would revert to the original owner, who remained with the church 
majority.  “The legal resort to obtain [the Spring Street building] which had been talked 
of,” Howell concluded, “was therefore abandoned.”74 In 1836, after having worshipped in 
the city’s courthouse, a local schoolhouse, and the Masonic Hall, Nashville’s First Baptist 
Church acquired a tract of land for a new house of worship.
75
  Members had learned a 
harsh lesson. This time they ordered the trustees to insert the church’s majority-approved 
confession of faith and constitution into the title papers.  “If at any time a majority of the 
Church should depart” from the expressed doctrine, the order declared, “the property of 
the church shall belong to the minority, however small, who adhere to [the present] 
principles.”  If all the members departed from the “present doctrines”, the trustees were 
directed to hold the property for any group who “may now profess or hereafter embrace 
the present principles of the Church.”76   
Land grantors took similar actions to ensure their bequests remained associated 
with their religious preferences.  Some made no stipulation of particular principles.  Jonas 
Bradley donated one acre to the Cedar Creek Baptist Church in Wilson County, 
Tennessee for them to hold “so long as the Baptist Church shall continue a regular 
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constituted body at said place or meeting house.”77  Others, like John Bond, who donated 
land to the Union Baptist Church, noted the property was for “the benefit of said Church 
now constituted at said meeting house & there [sic] successors in principle & practice 
forever.”78  Yet some donors took no chances.  Charles Hays donated a half-acre in 1820 
to the Antioch Baptist Church “holding and maintaining the communion of Baptized 
believers, the impotency of fallen man, the imputed righteousness of Jesus Christ, [and] 
the election of grace and eternal judgment.”79 Likewise, in 1817, Emmanuel Skinner 
conveyed two acres to the Spring Creek Baptist Church.  He also included eleven 
principles adhered to by that fellowship (and which he presumably believed were the 
tenets of the true Baptist), noting more than once that the land was for the “use and 
benefit of said Baptist Church and their successors of the same faith and order in 
religious worship.”  If the church deviated from their doctrinal path, then the land would 
be returned to Skinner and his heirs.
80
 
Doctrinal disagreement and congregational schisms over a variety of issues 
played out in county clerks’ record books and local meetinghouses.  In 1808, amidst 
efforts of anti-slavery Baptists to abolish the peculiar institution in Kentucky, Elijah and 
Winnifred Hanks conveyed a tract of land to trustees of the Newhope Church in 
Woodford County. They insisted, however, that the church could hold the property only 
so long as it adhered to the belief “that perpetual[,] hereditary[,] involuntary[,] & 
unmerited Slavery is contrary to the gospel of Jesus Christ.”  If the church strayed from 
that position, or the property was put to any other use, then it would revert back to the 
                                                          
77
 Cedar Creek Baptist Church Deed, Wilson County Deed Books, Volume I, 471, TSLA.     
78
 Union Baptist Church Deed, Wilson County Deed Books, Volume P, 158, TSLA. 
79
 Antioch Baptist Church Deed, Davidson County Deed Books, Volume O, 32-33, TSLA.  
80







   The mission controversy, one of the largest and most significant divisions to 
emerge within Baptist churches prior to the sectional crisis, began rupturing 
congregations in the region as early as the 1810s.
82
  By the mid-1830s, many Tennessee 
Baptists witnessed internal turmoil or schism over the question of the Baptist State 
Convention, a pro-mission body established in 1834.   As “New School” or “Missionary” 
Baptists in Tennessee engaged in a broad movement to spread the gospel through Bible 
Societies, Foreign Missions, and Educational Associations, they faced a conservative 
counteroffensive made up of “Old School,” “Hard Shell,” or “Anti-Missionary” Baptists 
who denounced the man-made, the movement’s unscriptural institutions.83   
Divisions over the missionary question led to religious doctrine being encoded in 
subscription papers and land deeds. Members of the Little Cedar Lick Church agreed in 
1838, not long after a schism over the Mission question, “to build a meeting house by 
subscription…for the use of the United Baptists and free for the Methodist an 
Presbyterian” churches.  By deeding it to the “United Baptists”, the church explicitly 
barred their former brethren who denounced the Tennessee Baptist Convention the 
previous year.
84
  In 1837 Thomas Bradshaw granted over four acres of land to the 
Spencer’s Creek Baptist Church for their “exclusive use and benefit” provided “always 
that [the church] shall be wholly distinct from the Baptist State Convention of 
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Tennessee.”85 The following year, Philip Smart and William Mary donated just over an 
acre to the Ridge Church of United Baptists, a body “disconnected from the Baptist State 
Convention and all other institutions contrary to the order of the old united Baptists.”86  
For donors such as Bradshaw, Smart, and Mary, Middle Tennessee’s changing religious 
backdrop of the 1830s necessitated a legal bulwark against their property being swept 
away with opposing doctrine.  These actions may seem like benign, ordinary efforts to 
secure property.  And sometimes they were.  Yet by tying property to specific doctrinal 
principles, such stipulations hindered the ability of the church majority to direct their own 
theological course.  If a church, whose property was deeded to a body unaffiliated with 
the Missionary movement, for example, decided to embrace the Missionary cause, it 
could engender years of consternation and negotiation between factions for rights to, or 
control over, the deeded property. 
 Land Deed stipulations, then, could at times empower seceded or excluded 
minorities to the detriment of the Baptists’ highest earthly authority: the will of the 
church majority.  Such was the case of the Concord Baptist Church of Brentwood, 
Tennessee, not far south of Nashville.  The church divided over the mission question in 
the fall of 1835.   The pro-mission majority, in support of the church’s long-time 
preacher, founder, and one of the “strongest promoters” of the missionary cause in the 
state, James Whitsitt, ordered the details of the split recorded in the opening pages of 
their new church book.  In 1834, church members had voted overwhelmingly to continue 
Whitsitt as their pastor. Three dissenters “succeeded in agitating the church painfully on 
this subject,” however, charging that Whitsitt, in pursuing the Missionary cause, had 
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departed from the “original principles” of the church.  Members investigated the charges, 
but acquitted Whitsitt “by a unanimous vote with the exception of his accusers.”  The 
church gave the three dissenters a month to re-think their position and fall in line with the 
authority of the church majority, demanding also that William Nance, one of the 
Whitsitt’s accusers and the church clerk, turn over the record book.  Nance refused and 
members charged him with, among other things, “a breach of trust in illegally retaining 
[the church’s] property.” Nance and his two cohorts withdrew from the fellowship, and 
the majority excommunicated them for good measure.  The controversy continued 
through that year, with the majority excluding three other members who had “withdrew 
from the church for reasons of the same kind.”  Nance and his fellow dissenters claimed 
they were excluded simply because of their opposition to the workings of the Baptist 
State Convention.  Though only totaling five in number, the group insisted upon 
recognition as the true Baptist church of Concord.  The pro-mission majority, of course, 
also claimed to be the true Baptist church, even if—as the dissenters asserted—they had 
drifted from the fundamental principles on which the body was founded.
87
    
Negotiations between the two parties turned on the wording of the church’s land 
deed, and provided the minority faction with the exclusive right to the meetinghouse. 
Numbering near forty members, the majority had successfully retained Whitsitt as their 
pastor, but their embrace of the Baptist State Convention’s more liberal theological 
principles hindered their access to the meetinghouse. Over the next several years, the 
clerk recorded meetings that took place in members’ homes and at a local school.  It 
appears that in the early 1840s, the majority still had at least partial access to their 
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original meetinghouse, for in December 1843 “the subject of repairing the old 
meetinghouse or building a new one was agitated.”  After investigating the matter, the 
church learned that their former brethren had claimed the meetinghouse and were 
“determin[ed] on hostile movements” if the majority pursued any further claims to the 
property.  Rights to the “old meeting house and particularly the ground upon which it is 
built,” the clerk recorded, was “connected with the old confession of faith or the 
fundamental doctrinal principals upon which the Concord Church was first constituted,” 
and no longer ascribed to by their body.  A discussion ensued whether the church should 
adopt their former constitution and confession of faith, which “was rejected by a very 
large majority.”   Realizing that by refusing to adopt their former principles, they 
relinquished their claims to the meetinghouse, the church voted to raise a subscription 
paper and begin looking “out for a new situation [to] build another.” 88   
The Concord Church’s lack of a written constitution or articulation of faith 
inhibited their ability to acquire a sound title to land for a new meetinghouse.  In June 
1844, the committee appointed to oversee the subscription paper and the erection of a 
new house of worship reported they had indeed secured a tract of land from one Lafayette 
Ezell, yet continued that “it will be very difficult for us to obtain a valid deed” to the lot 
unless “we have some articles or confession of faith in order to tell who we are.”  Nearly 
ten years had passed since the first rumblings of dissension had appeared over the 
mission question, and almost nine since the minority seceded from the main body—
claiming recognition as the true church of Concord and rights to the original 
meetinghouse—and the majority pro-mission body had yet to declare their theological 
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principles in constitutional form.
89
 On New Year’s Day 1845, Ezell conveyed over four 
acres to the “Missionary or United Baptist Church at Concord.”90 The necessity of 
securing legal title propelled the Concord Church to profess their faith in writing, to 
articulate their religious identity in order to gain legal recognition.  Their newly acquired 
property would thereafter be entwined with their liberal, pro-mission standards of faith, 
and would presumably protect the church from reliving the material uncertainties of the 
prior decade. 
This is not to say that property matters wholly constructed individuals’ religious 
beliefs. Concord Church members signified as much when they voted down the 
resolution to adopt their old principles—the church constitution and confession of faith 
associated with their former meetinghouse.  But conflict over property certainly 
exacerbated church schisms and may have informed many individuals’ denominational 
affiliation.   In the case of Nashville’s First Baptist, for instance, only five members, 
along with their families, and a “few friends,” took part in the reorganization of the 
Baptist Church in 1830.  “Not a few [individuals] were held back by social and family 
influences which were brought to bear upon them with great power,” Rev. Howell 
insisted, while others, “were down and utterly disgusted with the endless agitations” and 
ceased attending either of the churches. Yet the small number was also due to the fact 
that their original meetinghouse on Spring Street—the one deeded to the Baptists but 
retained by the Reformation Church—was “very handsome.”  All the members were 
“very proud” of it, and would have been “obliged to abandon” their “spacious house of 
worship” and assemble instead “in an unsightly hovel.”  Moreover, Howell continued, 
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“many of the most liberal and wealthy” members of the church “were satisfied to remain” 
with the Reformation Church. In contrast, the re-organized Baptist body was made up of 
only a “handful of members, comparatively poor [and] without a house of worship, or the 
means to build one.” Thus, those who remained with the Reformation “saw no prospect 
for success.”91  
 Across the trans-Appalachian West during the post-Revolutionary period, local 
meetinghouses emerged as sites of contestation over religious doctrine.   Churches and 
land grantors entwined rights to property with specific theological principles—at times 
hindering the ability of the church authority to adopt new doctrine—and, through state-
based law, spatially constructed the bounds of religious tolerance in the new republic.  
Doctrinal specification in land deeds and subscription papers were only the most subtle 
ways in which religious groups’ utilized state authority to secure their temporal holdings.  
By the early 1830s, the region’s Baptists had witnessed nearly a decade of discord 
emanating from Alexander Campbell’s growing popularity.  The schisms emanating from 
this sectarian insurgency led some churches to seek recourse for their property disputes at 
local and state courts.  Their actions illuminate how the changing religious culture—
engendered itself by constitutional enactments separating church and state—necessitated 
churches’ interaction with state authority.      
  
By the time the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided Curd v. Wallace (1838), its 
first dispute over church property arising from doctrinal schism, courts across the United 
States had experienced decades of litigation between disputing religious factions.  In 
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1790s Vermont, clashes between Congregationalists and Baptists over property erupted. 
Baptists demanded partial ownership in existing meetinghouses or recompense for fees 
paid to build and maintain them.  Congregationalists also found themselves in heated, 
sometimes violent, conflict with Methodists and Universalists who they tried to bar from 
town meetinghouses.
92
  A decade later, litigation ensued when Vermont’s legislature re-
granted all lands which had previously been allotted for religious purposes for the support 
or education.  This litigation continued for decades and germinated two U.S. Supreme 
Court Cases.
93
 More than eighty cases in Massachusetts alone involved Unitarian factions 
battling their Trinitarian Congregationalist counterparts.
94
 And in Virginia, the 
Assembly’s 1802 Glebe Act did not end controversy over churches’ property.95  Nor did 
it, as historian Thomas Buckley notes, “separate church and state or prevent 
government’s involvement with religious issues or the churches.”96  Indeed, he continues, 
the “Virginian glebe fight demonstrated the possibilities for the entanglement of church 
and state, religion and politics that would follow throughout the nation’s history.”97  
Although Curd proved the first case over a disputed meetinghouse to reach the 
state’s Court of Appeals, Kentucky courts had not been entirely free of conflict over 
religious groups’ property.  After two members withdrew from Pleasant Hill Shaker 
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community in the 1830s, they initiated suit against the Shakers for the property they had 
brought into the society. In Gass v. Wilhite (1834), the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of the Shakers.98 Writing for the Court, Judge 
Nicholas pointed to the Shakers’ articles of association which clearly stated that new 
members “bring and devote to the joint interest of the church, all such property as they 
justly hold &c.”  If a court ordered the seceding members’ property returned, Nicholas 
claimed, “it must be in direct contravention of their express agreement” made upon 
entering the Shaker community.
99
   The material benefits of membership extended only to 
those who remained within the fellowship.   
Local courts also witnessed disputes involving land and meetinghouses following 
schism. In 1832, the Fayette Circuit Court heard a case concerning property belonging to 
Lexington’s African Baptist Church. In the early 1820s, church trustees, all free blacks, 
acquired two separate tracts of land.  The first lot had no meetinghouse, while the second 
had a “suitable house of worship.”  The church began worshipping at that house, and thus 
never pursued construction of a house on the first lot.  By the end of that decade, “several 
members” of the church “were expelled therefrom upon charges of immorality” and 
“united as a separate congregation.”  The expelled members, acting as a new church, 
erected a house of worship on the empty lot, and proceeded to use that building for 
services.  The original African Baptist Church denied the new church’s claim and sued 
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for “a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of said property.”  The case 
dragged on until the Fayette Court dismissed it with costs in June 1837.
100
   
Both these cases foreshadowed litigation appearing in local and state courts over 
the next four decades. From the 1850s through the early 1870s, Kentucky courts 
arbitrated property claims in schisms over racial ideology.  In the 1830s and early 1840s, 
however, courts litigated property disputes arising from doctrinal schisms, splits resulting 
primarily from Campbell and Stone’s insurgency. In Kentucky, with schismatic sects 
relying on the strictures of the 1814 Act, many churches found themselves entrenched in 
litigation—alongside and against their friends, family, and former brethren—over local 
meetinghouses.  In these cases, doctrine and religious identity often took center stage, 
availing the state a role in reviewing and determining each. 
Thanks to the efforts of John Taylor, the 1828 schism within the Clear Creek 
Baptist Church of Woodford County was probably the most infamous example of 
Campbell’s influence in Kentucky.   The “intruders [had] pushed in,” Taylor reported in 
his 1830 pamphlet, A History of Clear Creek Church; and Campbellism Exposed, and 
through their preaching “divided and distracted the church.”  After the division, the 
Baptists of Clear Creek, “like many other distressed places in Kentucky,” had to share 
their house and “forbear to commune together at the Lord’s table” with those “vulgarly 
called Campbellites.”  Campbell’s adherents, Taylor remarked, “seem to be very church 
hungry; if they cannot get a whole one, they will put up with a scrap.”101  Taylor’s 
comments can be read in two ways.  Hungry for new followers and converts to their 
                                                          
100
 “Bill,” in Trustees of African Church v. Welcher Breckinridge, Fayette Circuit Case Files, Courts of 
Justice (hereafter FCCCJ), Box 100, Drawer no. 894 (no case number), KDLA. 
101
John Taylor, History of Clear Creek Church and Campbellism Exposed (Frankfort: A.G. Hodges, 





doctrine, Taylor believed that the Campbellites endeavored to sway whole church bodies, 
or at least a minority faction, to their doctrinal position.  His lamentations also point to 
the material realities of doctrinal dissension and church schism, as church meetinghouses 
throughout Kentucky emerged as sites of negotiation and controversy for competing 
religious groups.   
Not all disputes over church property emanating from Campbell’s Reformation 
revolved around legal title or even access to the grounds and meetinghouses.  At times, 
the opposing parties had to work out more mundane matters such as building 
maintenance.  The Floyd’s Fork Church in Fishersville, Kentucky split over Campbellism 
in the early 1830s.  Both parties retained some access to the meetinghouse, though 
relations continued to be strained between the two groups.  In December 1834, the 
Baptist body appointed a committee “to see the party claiming a part of this house” to 
inquire over “putting in a floor of plank” and installing a pulpit.  The Reformation 
Church at Floyd’s Fork did not agree to help with the repairs, primarily because Baptist 
church had not assisted them in building the church benches.  Instead of voting internally 
to pursue construction, the Baptist church’s actions were curtailed, and they agreed to 
dispense with the matter for the time being.  Similarly, in the early 1840s, the Harrod’s 
Creek Baptist Church appointed a committee to correspond with the Reformation Church 
which shared their meetinghouse “to take in consideration the necessity of repairing the 
meting [sic] house.”  Four years later, the Reformation Church asked the Baptist Church 





house.”102  Such negotiations were certainly more common occurrences for churches then 
litigation in the secular courts, but these more routine parleys demonstrate the pervasive 
nature of church-property concerns, during and after schisms.  
Participants on both sides of the religious controversy understood the importance 
meetinghouse-access for the continued growth and success of their respective body. John 
Curd claimed that “the occupancy of meeting houses by opposing parties” was “a great 
drawback to the progress of the reformation, in Kentucky at least.”  Yet the actions taken 
by Curd and his party in their effort to retain proportional usage of the Mount Vernon 
meetinghouse clearly demonstrated that they believed their expulsions were unjust, and 
even though they were the minority faction, that they retained rights to the 
neighborhood’s house of worship.  Similarly, writing from Lexington in 1834, James 
Challen informed Alexander Campbell and the subscribers of the latter’s Millennial 
Harbinger newspaper—Campbell’s successor to the Christian Baptist—that the 
“reformation” was suffering, and he believed it was due primarily to “our having an 
interest in so many Baptist meeting houses, which precludes the probability of meeting at 
the same place” and at the same time each week.  “I have been almost tempted to pray,” 
Challen continued, “that the disciples may be entirely excluded from every Baptist house 
in the land.”  Only then would they be “obliged” to construct their own dwellings.   Not 
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all the followers of Campbell and his “reformation” agreed on the necessity of expulsion 
from Baptist bodies or construction of new meeting houses.
103
 
The “law of the land” to which Challen referred was, of course, Kentucky’s 1814 
Act.  In many disputes over meetinghouses which entered Kentucky courts the 1814 
statute became an issue.   Indeed, although legislators had passed the bill with hopes of 
avoiding the disputation that had arisen in New England and elsewhere, the statute may 
have propelled disputing factions to pursue recourse through the state legal system.
104
  
Prior to the Civil War, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled on at least six cases in which 
the 1814 Act became an issue.
105
  In Tennessee, where the legislature failed to pass a 
nearly identical law in 1827, and where churches were similarly divided over doctrine 
and form of church government, I have yet to discover any state Supreme Court cases.
106
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In the conflict over the Mt. Vernon meetinghouse, the 1814 Act centered prominently, 
even before the case reached the Woodford County Circuit Court or the state appeals 
court. Pastor Fishback testified that Curd and his fellow dissenters were well aware of the 
1814 Act, and specifically that the dissenters believed the law provided them a right to 
the meetinghouse.  For his part, Fishback read the statute from the pulpit in an effort to 
convince the dissenters that Curd had misunderstood the legislators’ intent in passing the 
measure.
107
   
No matter how disputants interpreted the law, however, the 1814 Act paved the 
way for judges to review or revise actions taken by church majorities.  In his opinion in 
Curd v. Wallace (1838), Justice George Robertson of Kentucky’s Court of Appeals 
lamented that the case file exhibited “a large mass of polemical theology” which “was 
probably abstract and unessential” and certainly not “the province nor the inclination of 
this Court to consider.”  Civil courts had no business determining whether “the Church of 
Christ” under Fishback was “essentially” a Baptist Church or part of the Baptist Society 
as understood by Harris and Branham, the grantors of the land.  Nor was it necessary or 
proper to determine whether the “reformers” led by Curd were part of the Baptist society 
or not. Instead, Robertson insisted, the court could only consider the controversy so far as 
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it “involves the right of property or use” between the two groups.108  Though clearly 
striving to avoid meddling in church affairs, the court’s decree, relying upon the 1814 
Act, did just that. Robertson granted Curd’s schismatic church proportional usage based 
upon its seceding members, despite the fact that many of those seceding members had 
been excommunicated by a regular vote of their former church. This, of course, touches 
on one of the Act’s potential problems, specifically its first proviso mentioning 
“immorality.”  For who defines “immorality?”  The judges?  The church body itself?  The 
legislators, in both the 1814 measure and the 1852 Revised Statutes, failed to define the 
term.  Fishback claimed the dissenters had acted immorally when they fomented division 
within the church. “By immorality is ment [sic],” he wrote, “‘any act, conduct, or 
practice, which contravenes the divine commands or the social duties of the members of 
the Church'.”109  For Fishback, and surely other members of his church, the court’s 
allowing of members deemed immoral by the church to continue using their 
meetinghouse, smacked of state interference. 
Indeed, during the 1830s, some observers denounced the 1814 Act as a threat to 
religious liberty. In 1835, “A Spectator” called upon state legislators to repeal the law.  
During the previous five years, he lamented, it was “believed that at least fifty adverse 
claims to the use of meetings houses” in Kentucky had been taken up “by a new sect that 
call themselves Reformers, composed of the followers of A. Campbell and B.W. Stone.”  
These individuals may not have been pushed out of the Baptist ranks for traditional 
immoralities, but they had “created schisms and divisions in churches” and failing in both 
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their religious and civil duties.  Their actions constituted immorality, Spectator insisted, 
because immorality was anything that went against the commands of God or “‘violate[d] 
social duties.’”  It was fine if individuals changed their religious viewpoints and left their 
former church in peace.  But the Reformers, and especially those who sought to retain the 
use of Baptist meetinghouses, brought only “disorder and strife.” By facilitating the 
Reformers, the 1814 Act had brought “the destruction of the comfort, peace, and 
happiness of churches,” as well as “neighborhoods and families,” and needed to be 
immediately repealed.  If not, then the legislature would continue to reward “disorderly 
and licentious men” for violating “the rights and good order of religious society” and 
corrupting “the good morals of the state.”110 
The Act, too, held the potential to encourage dangerous religious ideas to gain 
influence and adherents.  On the same page of the Baptist Banner as Spectator’s editorial, 
an anonymous article warned readers that the Act enabled more than simply Campbellites 
or other Reformers.  “For should some two or three members of a church become 
Mormonites [sic], or followers of Matthias; or even Deists or Atheists…what is there [ in 
the 1814 Act] discussed by [Spectator], to debar them from using the meeting house to 
propagate their dangerous and demoralizing sentiments?”  Already, the writer continued, 
he knew of meeting houses in Kentucky where “as many as three parties” claimed the 
same space to worship.
111
 In Nashville, Tennessee, where no law provided proportional 
usage for schismatic groups, observers echoed this sentiment in public arguments over 
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access to houses of worship.  One writer asked his opponents (who had retained the use 
of the church building after a schism) what they would do if a majority of their body 
suddenly became “Mormons, or Jumpers.” Would they give up their meetinghouse and 
“walk off content with the result[?]”112   This may have been a back-handed insult at the 
supporters and congregants of the Campbellite Church.  Yet statements such as these 
display the growing cultural anxiety over the prevalence of non-belief and the rise of 
marginal religious movements.  As communities’ central social and spiritual sites, 
meetinghouses were too important to allow them to fall in the hands of professors of 
unorthodox, disorderly, or dangerous religious principles. 
In its decree, Robertson and the Court addressed the possibility of marginal 
religious groups gaining access to property.  Noting the “anomalous, and somewhat 
perplexing” provisos of the 1814 Act, Robertson sought to calm Fishback and others who 
feared the law availed their local meetinghouses to religious outsiders.  Robertson 
insisted the legislature did not intend to secure meetinghouses to those who “renounce the 
christian [sic] religion and become infidels or Mahometans.”113  Rather, the Act was 
intended as a check on trustees’ authority in doctrinal disputes.  It sought to leave 
disputing parties “to ecclesiastical discipline and authority, to the protection of their own 
christian armor, and to the guidance of their own christian charity and prudence.”114 Yet 
to Fishback and his church, the Act appeared to do exactly the opposite.  It rewarded 
those excluded by a regular vote of the church, deferring church authority to that of the 
state.  Throughout his decision, Robertson appeared uncomfortable applying the Act.  
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Subsequently, although a number of schismatic factions initiated suits based upon the 
1814 Act, after its ruling in Curd, the Court interpreted the statute rigidly, applying it 
only in cases in which the trustees had been appointed according to its strictures, and 
dispensing with the Act when the property in question remained in the hands of the 
original trustees.
115
   
But even cases in which Kentucky courts ruled the 1814 Act inapplicable, some 
jurists meddled with actions taken by church authorities.  Frankfort’s First Baptist Church 
divided over Campbell’s doctrine in 1841. The majority excluded a number of members 
who then formed a new church a right to worship the meetinghouse.  Seeking exclusive 
control over the property, the Baptist majority faction “invoked the intervention of 
the civil power by filing a bill” at the Franklin Circuit Court.  That court ordered the 
Baptist Church to hold a new election for its board of trustees and directed that members 
recently excluded could vote in the matter.  Upon hearing the case in 1842, the Court of 
Appeals, rejected the Reformation Church’s invocation of the 1814 Act. Secular courts, 
“having no ecclesiastical jurisdiction,” said the justices, “cannot revise or question 
ordinary acts of church discipline or excision.”  The exclusions, the court continued, 
meant that they are no longer members of that society, and thus no longer “entitled to any 
rights or privileges incidental or resulting from membership therein.”116  The Court’s 
deference to actions taken by the church body, a tactic it again utilized five years later in 
Gibson v. Armstrong (1847) and in Berryman v. Reese (1850), would eventually be 
sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in its first church-property case, Watson 
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v. Jones (1872), which involved the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville.
117
 
These cases and others highlight the continuing process of constructing the boundaries of 
civil and religious authority after disestablishment, a process which continued throughout 
the period at local, state, and federal levels. 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals increasingly relied upon the deference principle 
in its decrees, yet church property cases still provided avenues for state authority to 
determine a group’s religious identity. At the center of many church-property cases was a 
congregation’s denominational affiliation, especially when the land had been deeded to a 
specific group. The subscription paper for the Mt. Vernon meetinghouse indicated that 
the house was to be “For the benefit of the Baptist Society,” and both sides jockeyed for 
recognition as a Baptist body while insisting that their opponents were heretical in their 
doctrine. Curd and his co-defendants denied that they or their pastor, F. Palmer, held any 
heretical beliefs, expressing their willingness “to submit to the most rigid scrutiny on 
these points.”   When asked if Fishback’s church was “any part of the Baptist Society,” 
member Robert Risk asserted that “I did not join it on such & joined believing it to be the 
Church of Christ.”   Risk’s sentiments were echoed by former member, Robert Adams, 
who averred that “so fare [sic] as I know they are not recognized by the Regular Baptist 
Society as a Regular Baptist church.”  Adams had heard from current members, too, that 
Fishback’s church had changed their name, established open communion, and asked to be 
dismissed from the Elkhorn Association.  Witness William Poindexter testified that he 
had personally heard Fishback declare that “the name Baptist was a sectarian tag & the 
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association a biding place for the devil[.]”118 One witness even insisted that he heard 
Fishback claim that “if the house was not awarded to them he would advise [his] church” 
to rejoin the Elkhorn Association or General Union of Baptists, “by which means [his 
church] would be able to get the house.”119  Fishback, of course, claimed his church was 
of the regular Baptist order, yet it went by the appellation of “Church of Christ” and had 
voluntarily departed from the Baptists’ regional governing association.  Indeed, prior to 
the court case, an arbitration committee ruled that neither Fishback’s nor Curd’s church 
were Baptist organizations.
120
 Despite the land-deed strictures and the testimony, 
however, the court of appeals awarded control—though not exclusive usage—of the 
house to Fishback’s church. 
In other cases, too, the Court strayed from the original land deed’s doctrinal or 
denominational specifications. In 1847 it awarded a meetinghouse to the United Baptist 
Church of Washington despite the original deed’s stipulation that the property was for the 
use of the town’s Particular Baptist Church. Observers testified that the United Baptist 
Church was not a Particular Baptist Church, that it adhered to a different doctrine of 
salvation, and that the Particular Baptist governing Association in Kentucky did not 
recognize or correspond with that body as a Particular Baptist Church.
121
  The court 
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insisted that a change in name did not entail a change in religious identity.  Throughout 
the early nineteenth century, however, “United” Baptists and “Particular” Baptists did 
distinguish themselves from one another, and at times the differences caused schisms in 
both individual churches and their regional governing associations.
122
   
The following year, in Scott v. Curle, the Court again deviated from the strictures 
of the land deed—which had clearly directed the property to the Regular Baptists—and 
awarded the meetinghouse to the schismatic Reformation Church, even after 
acknowledging that the latter had “dissolved all connection with the Baptist order.”123   
Over twenty-years later, the United States Supreme Court insisted that civil courts could 
not deviate from property donors’ express terms, claiming, “it is not in the power of the 
majority of [a] congregation, however preponderant, by reason of a change of views on 
religious subjects to carry the property…to the support of a new and conflicting 
doctrine.”124  This ruling, surely, would have gratified numerous Kentucky and 
Tennessee Baptists who watched as their property was swept away by Campbellite 
factions during the antebellum period.  
The Kentucky Court of Appeal’s rulings in these cases were certainly not the last 
word on matters of church property in that state or, of course, throughout the nation.  
Indeed, from the 1850s through the early 1870s, disputes over church-property percolated 
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through Kentucky’s courts. In cases such as Harper v. Straws (1853)125 and Gartin v. 
Penick (1868)
126
, the Court continued crafting its jurisprudence of disestablishment.  This 
process came to a head in Kentucky with the dispute over the Walnut Street Presbyterian 
Church in Louisville, a congregation divided between allegiances to the denomination’s 
Northern and Southern branches. That case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1871, and served as precedent for subsequent church-property conflicts for nearly a 
century. 
But rather than a beginning, the cases over racial ideology serve as bridge 
between antebellum disputes arising from doctrinal controversy and those of the 
twentieth century.
127
 The pre-war cases in Kentucky illuminate not only the connection of 
church and state—despite no legacy of establishment in the state—through the first-half 
of the nineteenth century and beyond, but how the democratizing religious culture 
propelled churches’ to seek out state authority to protect their property. In his answer to 
the original bill at the Woodford County Court, John Curd lamented his “mortification 
and pain” in arguing “spiritual matters in a tempiral [sic] court.”  Yet it did not stop him 
or his co-defendants from attacking Fishback’s doctrinal inconsistency and herald their 
own orthodoxy in testimony, or, when the lower court’s ruling went against them, seek 
further recourse at the Court of Appeals.  Like their counterparts throughout the region 
                                                          
125
 53 Ky. 39, Lexis 14.  
126
 68 Ky. 110, Lexis 236.  
127
 Recently, church property disputes have found new life due to the cultural politics of gay marriage. See, 
for example, Michelle Boorstein, “After Prolonged Legal Battle, Virginia Episcopalians Prepare to Reclaim 







(and across the young nation), they appealed to state authority to settle disputes that their 
church tribunals could not successfully mitigate. 
 It is a mistake, however, to center the examination solely upon cases which 
reached local and state courts.  Neighborhood meetinghouses served as important sites 
for individuals’ spiritual and social interaction, and from the earliest days of settlement, 
churches looked to the state in order to claim and maintain their property.  State authority 
worked in subtle ways to shape religious matters.  Whether through incorporation or 
stipulations in land deeds and subscription bonds, legal authority protected churches’ 
temporal property and implicitly constructed the boundaries of sacred space, upholding 
communities’ understandings of religious orthodoxy while barring others from 
“republican” meetinghouses.  Rather than moving in “clearly defined” and “separate 
spheres,” as Judge Robertson claimed in Gartin, church and state—religious and civil 
authority—often crisscrossed during the early-republican and antebellum-periods.  
Baptists, especially, but other religious groups as well, often pride themselves on their 
autonomous natures.  Yet, as disputes over church property clearly demonstrate, churches 
are “artifacts of the state,” reliant on its protection, and subject to its authority.  By 
seeking out state assistance, Baptists, who had fought so passionately for the separation 
of church and state during the Revolutionary era, inadvertently opened the door for civil 
















“I desire to see…that every disorderly person and church may be made to feel the 
authority of Christ's laws, and every good member of society inspired with growing 
confidence in their protection.”1 
 
 
In January 2012, Fairfax County Circuit Court Judge Randy Bellows ordered 
nearly $40 million worth of church property returned to Virginia’s Episcopal Church.  
Five years earlier, a number of conservative congregations—upset with, among other 
things, the Church’s celebration of same-sex relationships and ordination of gay clergy—
broke away from the Episcopal Church and joined the Anglican Church of Nigeria.
2
  The 
schismatics, according to Michelle Boorstein of the Washington Post, took with them 
some of the “largest, most prominent churches in the region,” leaving those who stayed 
behind worshiping in “borrowed basements and empty houses.”3  Applying the “neutral 
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principles of law,” Bellows insisted that upon examining Virginia statute law, land deeds, 
and the Constitution and Canons of [the Episcopal Church] and the Diocese,” that it was 
“overwhelmingly evident” that the Episcopal Church had “contractual and proprietary   
interests” in the property of seven disputed churches.  He ordered the congregations 
recently affiliated with the Anglican Church of Nigeria to “promptly relinquish control 
over the properties to the Diocese.”4   
On the heels of the court’s decree, those who remained with the Episcopal Church 
expressed an eagerness to return to their former churches.  Deborah Miller claimed the 
Falls Church where she had worshiped from 1982 until the schisms was “within the 
fabric of who we are.  It’s a holy place.”5 Similar frustrations had been evoked in the 
1840s by Nancy Pierce when she testified about her desire for the nearby Bethlehem 
meetinghouse to be re-opened for her Baptist congregation.  John Curd and his fellow 
recusants conjured the same emotions in their battle with James Fishback and his 
followers at Mt. Vernon, arguing that the dissenters had not only helped construct the 
meetinghouse, but were settled in a “convenient distance” from the property, and thus 
entitled to its use.
6
  In each case, the dispossessed congregation sought out state authority 
in hopes of regaining access to their local church buildings.  The state’s role in settling 
each dispute illuminates the continued linkage between church and state throughout 
American history. 
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Disestablishment at the state and federal levels during the post-Revolutionary 
period repositioned churches as private institutions, presumably removed from asserting 
state-like governing powers.    Yet as we have seen, Baptist churches in Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and across the South and West, claimed broad jurisdiction over their 
members’ personal and public affairs.  They encouraged members to refrain from “going 
to law” with another, and served as important law-making sites for all members 
regardless of their sex, race, or social status. Churches litigated disputes over contract, 
land-sales, and slave warranty cases.  They policed household relations—at times serving 
as sites of authoritative recourse for abused dependents—and protected the purity of their 
own covenanted communities by expelling unrepentant transgressors as well as those 
who bucked church authority by propagating doctrinal dissension. Baptists insisted, as 
Reverend Eleazer Savage did in 1844, that church tribunals served as “the only proper 
judicatory, before which matters of difficulty can be brought; and the only proper court, 
wielding the power of ultimate decision.”7  
Church tribunals’ operations—and their potential effectiveness—however, were 
entangled with the legal, economic, and cultural transformations that gripped much of the 
nation in the first-half of the nineteenth century.  By 1830, middle Tennessee and north-
central Kentucky were no longer outpost societies far from governing authority and 
isolated from national and international markets.  Rather, both areas had developed into 
vibrant commercial centers with their residents fully engaged in the expanding market 
economy.  The region’s overall growth gave rise to a class of wealthy planters, lawyers, 
merchants, and manufacturers who disseminated middle-class values of domesticity and 
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family-privacy.  The more fluid gender- and racial-relations of the immediate post-
Revolutionary period dissipated, and the churches’ opportunities for authoritative 
recourse for women and blacks were tempered.  
Alongside these economic and social transformations—and in some cases 
facilitating them—a social relations by contract vision for society assumed precedence in 
American legal and intellectual thought.  While middle-class families insisted upon 
domestic privacy, state-law makers gradually reformulated the law of the household.  In 
Tennessee and Kentucky, progressive divorce measures not only provided women greater 
leeway in separating from an abusive or neglectful husband, but also clashed with 
Baptists’ scriptural vision for marriage as a lifelong contract.  The increasingly liberal 
economic order embraced by so many Americans during the period, too, led to calls for a 
legal system based upon predictability, free from subjectivity or passion.  For many 
antebellum Baptists, the decrees emanating from their church meetinghouses were 
riddled with factionalism and prejudice.  So, while individuals such as Jacob Creath 
insisted he would never trust the church with his “character and property” again, religious 
treatise writers engaged in a broad effort to formalize Baptist jurisprudence.
8
  It was too 
little too late, as the antebellum period proved the beginning of discipline’s slow 
marginalization in Baptist church life.
9
   
As Creath and others heralded the operations of state-based law above legalities 
rooted in local churches, American religious groups were still dealing with the profound 
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changes unleashed by disestablishment and the process of reconfiguring their roles in 
society and their relationship with the state.  The very free-religious marketplace that 
Baptists and other evangelicals fought for in late-eighteenth-century Virginia, while 
instituting religious liberty and removing tax support for the Anglican Church, also gave 
rise to a competitive denominational-landscape which required many churches to resort 
to state authority to secure their property rights.   Churches’ experience with dissension 
and schism added to, and in some cases produced, the factionalist spirit Creath and others 
derided during the early nineteenth-century.  In the trans-Appalachian region, divisions in 
the Baptist-ranks over missions, the utility of associations, and, especially, the Stone-
Campbell movement, hindered churches’ effective practice of discipline and led many 
individuals to re-think their churches as legal sites, and thus re-conceptualize a central 
aspect of church ritual.  Moreover, by entwining property rights with doctrinal principles 
in land deeds and subscription bonds, grantors of land or money, and at times whole 
communities, turned to state authority to secure public spaces of worship for professors 
of particular creeds.  Their actions implicated state-based law in excluding unorthodox 
religious groups and held the potential—especially in congregationally-based groups like 
the Baptists—to hinder the church majority in directing their theological evolution.  
When this failed, when church tribunals could not contain internal disputes, and when 
schismatic groups ignored or contested land-deed stipulations, opposing groups found 
themselves in local and state courtrooms debating religious doctrine alongside the legal 
and opening the door for judges to review ecclesiastical affairs.   
In some ways this whole story is one of security.  Moving across the mountains 





communities to thwart disorder and find refuge from a rather chaotic frontier experience.  
As Baptists and Americans of all religious backgrounds encountered the expanding 
market-economy of the post-Revolutionary period, they sought more rigorous, more 
objective legal sites to secure their property claims and uphold their contractual 
obligations.  Rooted in churches’ member-relations, Baptist jurisprudence appeared 
mired in faction and prejudice, an atmosphere exacerbated by the religious controversy 
that gripped so many churches during the 1820s and 1830s.  Campbell and Stones’ 
questioning of creeds, covenants, and articles of faith that had served to secure churches’ 
doctrinal boundaries upended many of these inclusive communities of believers, 
engendering dissension, schism, and competition for both members and adherents. The 
quest to secure land, to buttress a church’s claim to specific property, led some 
individuals to inscribe their theological principles in state-backed legal instruments.  
Others, of course, sought their property’s security through direct recourse to local and 
state courts.   
This is more than a story about Kentucky and Tennessee Baptists and their quest 
to maintain their neighborhoods’ peace.  It certainly demonstrates how religious men and 
women adapt aspects of their doctrine and ritual to better fit the “usages of the times.”  
But it is also about communities’ social-relations in flux under the pressures of legal, 
economic, and cultural diversification, and how local authorities, whether they be within 
churches, within homes, or among empaneled jurors, lost, and in some cases ceded 
authority, to more expansive governing institutions.  It is about individuals’ confronting, 





In the end, it shows how individuals at once crafted and participated in a fluid 
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(KHS). 
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South Elkhorn Baptist Church, 1822-1834, sporadic entries through 1857, KHS. 
Mount Pleasant Baptist Church, 1790-1828, KHS. 
Elk Lick Primitive Baptist Church, 1809-1818, 1823-1865, KHS. 
 
Tennessee: 
Nashville First Baptist, 1831-1845, Southern Baptist Library and Archives, Nashville,  
Tennessee (SBLA). 
Red River Baptist Church, 1791-1826, SBLA. 
Fyke’s Grove Primitive Baptist Church, 1814-1850, SBLA. 
Little Cedar Lick Baptist Church, 1815-1865, SBLA. 
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Types of Offenses/Disputes Coded:  
 
1.  FORNICATION 
2. FIGHTING OR “RIOTING” 
3. BREACH OF CONTRACT 
4. GOING TO LAW W/BAPTIST 
5.  INTERACTION/JOINING WITH OTHER SECT/DENOM 
6. INTOXICATION 
7.  DEBT 
8. THEFT 
9. SWEARING/PROFANE LANGUAGE 
10. DISORDERLY CONDUCT/ MISCONDUCT 
11. LYING/FALSE STATEMENT/Slander/FALSEHOOD 
12. DANCING/FIDDLING (or permitting either) 
13. THEATER ATTENDANCE or SECULARIZING 
14. FRAUD 
15. BREAKING THE SABBATH 
16. NON-ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS 
17. ADULTERY 
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David’s Fork Baptist Church, http://davidsfork.org/history.html. Accessed March 27,  
2015. 
BullittsBurg Baptist Church,  
http://baptisthistoryhomepage.com/bullittsbrg.minutes.index.html. Accessed 
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“‘Looks Like Acquittal’: Sex, Murder, and the Tampa Morning Tribune, 
1895” Florida Historical Quarterly 88, no. 3 (Winter 2010): 348-367 
 
  
Reviews and Essays 
Review, Tyrannicide: Forging an American Law of Slavery in 
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University Libraries: Civil War Book Review, forthcoming 
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Early American Republic.  Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 
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Adjunct Instructor, HIST 101, American History I, Ivy Tech State 
College, Lafayette Campus, Spring 2015 
Adjunct Instructor, HIST 102, American History II, Ivy Tech State 
College, Lafayette Campus, Spring 2015 
Instructor, HIST 151-1: American History to 1877, Purdue University, 
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World Civilizations I, Ivy Tech Community College, February 2015 
American History Survey, Purdue University, October 2014 
American History Survey, Purdue University, April 2012 
 
 Teaching Assistantships 
HIST 383, Recent American Constitutional History, Purdue University, 
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HIST 371, Society, Culture, and Rock and Roll, Purdue University, Fall 
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Bilsland Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Purdue Graduate School, 
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Frederick N. Andrews Fellowship, Purdue Graduate School, 2013-2014 
Biannual Clinton Jackson and Evelyn Coley Research Grant, Alabama 
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Lynn E. May Study Grant from the Southern Baptist Library and Archive, 
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American Society of Church History, Minneapolis, MN, 17 April 2015 
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Disputes in the Antebellum Trans-Appalachian West” American Society 
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 International Osnabrück Summer Institute on the Cultural Study of 
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“From ‘Disturbers’ to Protectors of the Peace: Baptist Church Discipline 
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Interviewed for Select Learning’s forthcoming documentary on 
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Participant, J. Willard Hurst Summer Institute in Legal History, University 
of Wisconsin-Madison, 14-27 June 2015 
Guest Blogger, Legal History Blog, http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/, 
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Certified Reader for the Educational Testing Service’s Advanced 
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